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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis contributes to the area of network theory in economics. It especially
deals with the role of externalities, either positive or negative, in social and economic
networks. The implementation of the network approach in economics is a relatively
recent development that has strongly flourished over the last two decades. The
books by Goyal (2007), Jackson (2008) and Bramoullé et al. (2016) provide an
excellent overview of the theory of social and economic networks. Network theory is
an interdisciplinary field and links various research areas together, like economics,
sociology, computer science, physics and mathematics. Many of the basic ideas and
concepts go back to the early roots of graph theory in mathematics.
Social and economic networks play a prominent role in many areas of our daily life.
Consider for example a network of professional contacts. There is strong empirical
evidence that the better a person is positioned in such a network, the more valuable
information about open vacancies she will receive when she is looking for a job (see
e.g. Granovetter (1974) and Cingano and Rosolia (2012)). Further applications are
e.g. opinion formation and influence in social networks, buyer-seller networks or
R&D networks in which companies form joint collaborations to reduce costs, benefit
by knowledge spillovers and foster innovation. All these applications have also been
studied from a theoretical perspective: See e.g. Calvó-Armengol (2004) and Cahuc
and Fontaine (2009) for job networks; Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010) and Grabisch
et al. (2017) for opinion formation and influence in social networks; Kranton and
Minehart (2001) and Wang and Watts (2006) for buyer-seller networks; and Goyal
and Moraga-González (2001) and Dawid and Hellmann (2014) for R&D networks.
1
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A network is given by a set of nodes and a set of links which connect the nodes.
The network explicitly indicates the relationships and distances (by the length of
the paths) between the nodes. When new links are formed or existing ones are
deleted, the situation may (substantially) change, not only for the nodes directly
involved, but also for the other nodes in the network. These eﬀects are called exter-
nalities. Consequently, some nodes may then favor to form/delete (diﬀerent) links
than before and the network structure could significantly change over time. Typical
questions which arise and which are usually discussed in the relevant literature are
the following: Are there positive and/or negative externalities and if so, how severe
are they for whom under which conditions? Which networks are (pairwise) stable
and which are (strongly) eﬃcient? Which structures are equilibria that are likely to
be observed in the long run?
For this thesis, the groundbreaking paper by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) plays a
central role. We consequently build up on it and we frequently relate our results to
their outcomes. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduce two fundamental models,
the connections model and the co-author model and provide conclusions regarding
the pairwise stability and strong eﬃciency of specific architectures in these settings.
In the connections model, nodes establish links to each other and receive a certain
benefit for it. Establishing/Maintaining a link is associated with a cost and de-
pending on the cost-benefit comparison, adding, maintaining or deleting a specific
link might be individually rational. Benefits spill over to a node from all nodes
it is directly and indirectly connected to. The spillovers from indirect connections
are discounted and dependent on distance. If two nodes form a new link, this may
only reduce the distance between other nodes. Hence, the connections model is a
framework with purely positive externalities by link formation.
In contrast, the co-author model is a framework with purely negative externalities
by link formation. In the co-author model, the nodes are interpreted as researchers
who put eﬀort in (joint) research projects. On the one hand, to be involved in a
further co-authored project provides an additional option to pubish, but on the other
hand, being increasingly connected also comes with a downside. The more projects
a researcher is involved in, the less time he spends on every single project, since his
time budget is fixed. Hence, if a researcher decides to join an additional project,
link formation always induces negative externalities on his existing co-authors.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) als introduce the notion of pairwise stability. A net-
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work is said to be pairwise stable, if no single node wants to delete an existing link
and no two nodes mutually would like to establish a link between each other. This
stability concept has been widely applied in the literature afterwards (see e.g. in
Johnson and Gilles (2000) and Goyal and Joshi (2003)). It has been critized, how-
ever, due to the restriction that only one link can be altered at the same time.
Therefore, diﬀerent (stronger) stability concepts were suggested, like the notion of
strong stability where a network is stable against changes in links by any coalition
of individuals (see e.g. Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Jackson and van den
Nouweland (2005)).
Besides that, there exist many further refinements of stability. Buechel and Hell-
mann (2012) provide a comprehensive overview of the most common notions and
elaborate important results regarding the connectedness of networks and the role of
externalities in strategic network formation. First, the authors show that if a pro-
file of utility functions satisfies positive externalities, then no pairwise Nash stable
network is over-connected with respect to any monotonic welfare function. Second,
Buechel and Hellmann (2012) prove that if a profile of utility functions satisfies
negative externalities and concavity, then no network which is pairwise stable with
transfers, is under-connected with respect to the utilitarian welfare function. Addi-
tional contributions on the role of externalities in social and economic networks have
been provided, e.g. by Goyal and Joshi (2006), Bloch and Jackson (2007), Morrill
(2011) and Hellmann (2013).
While many models in the aforementioned literature consider either positive or neg-
ative externalities, in this thesis we will focus in large parts on modifications that
contain both types of externalities – positive and negative – at the same time. Then,
given a network structure and the perspective of a specific node, the critical ques-
tion usually is, which eﬀect overweighs. It is important to understand better the
implications of having both types of externalities simultaneously because models
with purely positive or negative externalities appear to be somehow restrictive. As
a concrete example, displaying either externailities, consider a stylized academic
job market in which information about job opportunities and candidates is shared
within a network of scientists (the nodes). In such a network, some scientists oﬀer
vacancies which they cannot fill internally, while others need to place team members,
e.g. their job market candidates or untenured faculty. Establishing and maintaining
a connection to a colleague (i.e., a link) is costly, but increases the probability of
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receiving valuable information. Information received from a neighboring node is
passed on to all neighbors, with its value depreciating. For a given node, an addi-
tional link induces a positive externality (if it reduces the distance to other nodes)
and/or a negative externality (if it better connects remote nodes, i.e., if it gives
theses scientists a relative advantage). The analysis of such a situation would be
strongly simplified by considering only one specific type of externality, but like in
many other real-world applications it does not to appear very coherent. Depending
on the structure of the network, the perspective of a specific node and the nodes
involved in the link formation process, either positive or negative externalities may
overweigh.
Throughout this thesis, we are going to introduce various (specific and generalized)
models that capture both types of externalities. Our main goals are to describe the
structural implications induced hereby and to understand better the role of exter-
nalities in social and economics networks. We will derive results about (asymptotic)
pairwise stability and strong eﬃciency, draw conclusions depending on the under-
lying framework and relate our results to the existing literature on externalities.
Following this introductory chapter, this thesis contains four additional chapters:
Chapters 2 to 5 are all self coherent research papers using their own notation. Chap-
ters 2 and 3 are joint work with Agnieszka Rusinowska and Emily Tanimura, chapter
4 is work on my own and chapter 5 is joint work with Claus-Jochen Haake and Sonja
Recker. Chapter 2 is already published in the Journal of Public Economic Theory
(JPET) and chapter 3 is forthcoming in Mathematical Social Sciences (MSS). In
the following let me highlight more details regarding the specific contents of the
chapters 2 to 5.
In chapter 2 we develop a modification of the connections model by Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) that takes into account negative externalities arising from the con-
nectivity of direct and indirect neighbors, thus combining aspects of the connections
model and the co-author model. We consider a general functional form for agents’
utility that incorporates both the eﬀects of distance and of neighbors’ degree. Con-
sider a situation in which people are involved in projects. They generate some kind
of knowledge by themselves and receive some from others. If an agent is involved
in many projects, he will have less time to generate output by himself. However,
the more connections he has, the more knowledge he will receive from neighbors,
neighbors of neighbors and so on. Consequently, we introduce a framework that
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can be seen as a degree-distance-based connections model with both negative and
positive externalities. Our analysis shows how the introduction of negative external-
ities changes certain results on stability and eﬃciency in comparison to the original
connections model. In particular, we see the emergence of new stable structures,
such as a star with links between peripheral nodes. Our analysis focuses mainly
on structures with short diameters, but also considers cases with extreme levels of
decay. We also identify structures, for example, certain disconnected networks that
are eﬃcient in our model, but which cannot be eﬃcient in the original connections
model. While our results are proved for the general utility function, some of them
are illustrated by using a specific functional form of the degree-distance-based utility.
In chapter 3 we deal with network formation frameworks, where payoﬀs reflect an
agent’s ability to access information from direct and indirect contacts. We integrate
negative externalities due to connectivity associated with two types of eﬀects: com-
petition for the access to information, and rivalrous use of information. We consider
two separate models to capture the first and the second situation, respectively. In
the first model we assume that information is a non-rivalrous good, but that there is
competition for the access to information, for example because an agent with many
contacts must share his time between them and thus has fewer opportunities to pass
on information to each particular contact. In the second model we do not assume
that there is competition for the access to information, but rather that the use of
information is rivalrous. In this case, it is assumed that when people are closer
to the sender than an agent, the harmful eﬀect is greater than when others are at
the same distance to the sender as that agent. In both models we analyze pairwise
stability and examine if the stability of a structure is preserved when the number
of agents becomes very large. This leads to a new concept that we call asymptotic
pairwise stability. We show that there exists a tension between asymptotic pairwise
stability and eﬃciency. The results allow us to compare and contrast the eﬀects of
two kinds of competition for information.
While in chapter 2 the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) is modi-
fied to a degree-distance-based variation, in chapter 4 we present another modifica-
tion of the connections model that is closely related and takes account of negative
externalities by overall connectivity. The idea for this approach goes back to Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996) who mention in their seminal paper that “... one might have
a decreasing value for each connection (direct or indirect) as the total amount of
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connectedness increases.” (p. 53.). Taking this as a starting point, we add a weight-
ing factor depending on overall connectivity to the functional form of the original
connections model. This weighting factor is independent of own links, but benefits
received from direct and indirect connections are reduced by increasing overall con-
nectivity of the other nodes in the network. In this context, we solve for pairwise
stable and asymptotically pairwise stable networks and analyze strongly eﬃcient
networks. We compare the results and indicate the similarities and diﬀerences of
the connections model with purely positive link externalities and the adjusted ver-
sion with negative externalities by overall connectivity. What appears to be striking
in the overall connectivity model is the role of the star network. It turns out to
be pairwise stable, asymptotically pairwise stable and to be a very well perform-
ing structure in terms of strong eﬃciency. The reason for this is that it combines
short distances between all nodes with a minimal number of links. Hence, all nodes
receive many spillovers with low decay and relatively low punishment by overall
connectivity.
Chapter 5 is more applied and we investigate a duopoly with horizontal product
diﬀerentiation, in which firms strategically form costly links to customers. Such a
link to a customer may be interpreted as the firm granting access to trade its product.
Altering the network of links changes the structure of competition. This results in
externalities and influences the equilibrium quantities and profits. We investigate
in how far the degree of substitutability of the firms’ products and the costs of link
formation influence equilibrium profits and thus the incentives to form or delete
links. We illustrate which networks are locally and Nash stable for which regions
of costs/substitutability combinations. For networks with an arbitrary number of
customers we analyze local stability regions for selected networks and determine
their limits as the number of customers becomes large. We also relate local and
Nash stability for selected networks with n customers. For networks with three
customers we entirely characterize locally stable networks. In particular, existence
is guaranteed for any degree of substitutability and any cost value.
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A degree-distance-based
connections model with negative
and positive externalities
This chapter is based on a joint work with Agnieszka Rusinowska and
Emily Tanimura, both from Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Cen-
tre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. It is published in the Journal of Public
Economic Theory (JPET), volume 18, pages 168–192, 2016.
2.1 Introduction
The connections model, introduced in the seminal paper of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) is a setting in which only direct contacts are costly but discounted benefits
spill over from indirect neighbors. A natural interpretation is that benefits result
from the access to a resource conveyed by the network, such as information or
knowledge provided by indirect contacts.
An appealing feature of networks is that they capture the externalities that ‘occur
when the utility of or payoﬀ to an individual is aﬀected by the actions of others,
although those actions do not directly involve the individual in question’ (Jackson,
2008, p. 162). In the connections model, network externalities are positive. An
additional link formed by some pair of individuals (weakly) benefits all other agents
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by providing access to new indirect contacts or by reducing the distance that infor-
mation has to travel. Such positive aspects of increased connectivity are certainly
important. However, in many situations increased connectivity can also have nega-
tive side eﬀects. Studying such cases is what motivates the analysis in this paper:
we consider a model in which agents benefit from indirect contacts as in the origi-
nal connections model but in which the connectivity of an agent may also exert a
negative externality on his direct and indirect neighbors.
Contexts where this is the case abound. For example, learning of a job opening
may be less useful if the information has been communicated to many others. When
there is competition for some resource transmitted by the network, the benefits
from indirect contacts are reduced when the latter have many connections. In our
model, the utility an agent derives from an indirect contact, viewed as the initial
sender of an information, is reduced when the latter has a high degree and thus
sends the information to many others. However this might not fully account for the
negative impact of all other individuals in the communication chain who receive the
information. Hence, our model should be viewed only as a simplified or approximate
description of the negative eﬀects of connectivity when there is competition for
information.
Another negative eﬀect of high connectivity that our model perfectly captures arises
because the busyness of agents reduces their availability or productivity. The con-
nections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) could also be interpreted as follows:
nodes generate output by themselves but also forward output from others. Now in-
terpret this as a situation in which individuals are involved in projects and generate
knowledge by themselves but also receive knowledge from others. Then, a person
involved in many projects will have less time to generate output. On the other hand,
the more well connected he is, the more knowledge he will receive and forward to his
neighborhood. Stated in a provocative way, “well connected people are often great
talkers, but networking is time consuming and reduces one’s productive time so
that the main work is done by others”. Nevertheless, the role of such well connected
agents is very important: not that they contribute a lot by their own knowledge
production, but they provide access to the output of many others.
By integrating the negative eﬀect of the busyness of agents, at first sight, our model
looks similar to the well-known co-author model (also introduced in Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996)) where the time devoted to a single project decreases with the
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total number of projects a co-author is involved in. In our version, the nature of the
negative externality is similar but information spills over from indirect connections.
The co-author model only considers direct collaborations and thus conveys negative
eﬀects solely through the busyness of direct co-authors. Hence, our model combines
aspects of the connections model and the co-author model. Externalities resulting
from additional links can be both positive and negative. New links are useful for
reaching indirect partners, but the latter will be more busy, less productive and thus
less valuable per se although more eﬃcient as intermediaries. Exploring the tradeoﬀ
of these eﬀects and their impact on the stable and eﬃcient network architectures
that can arise is the object of our analysis.
A host of papers modify the original connections model in diﬀerent directions, but
most are not directly related to the issues we explore. Generalizing Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), Bloch and Jackson (2007) show that the results of the latter still
hold when decay takes a more general functional form. Besides the aforementioned
co-author model, the study of negative externalities that is most closely related to
ours is the model of Morrill (2011) in which the benefits of a link is a decreasing
function of the partner’s degree. In fact, our setting generalizes Morrill (2011),
where there are no benefits from indirect contacts and externalities are purely nega-
tive. Goyal and Joshi (2006) consider a framework where connectivity can generate
positive or negative externalities, depending on whether the other agent is a direct,
indirect or non-neighbor. They investigate two specific models. The first one cap-
tures negative externalities due to overall connectivity and thus addresses situations
somewhat diﬀerent from the ones that motivate our work. In their second model, the
marginal benefit of forming a link to some agent is aﬀected both by his and by one’s
own degree. The authors characterize stable structures, both in cases where the
marginal benefits of a link increase with the potential partner’s degree and in cases
where they decrease as a function of it. Billand et al. (2012) prove the existence of a
pairwise stable network in a local spillover game, when the marginal benefit of link-
ing to an agent is decreasing with the degree of the latter and increasing in the own
degree. The two aforementioned studies focus on the interplay between an agent’s
own degree and the degree of his neighbors when spillovers are local, whereas our
analysis explores the tradeoﬀ between degree-based negative externalities, reflecting
busyness, and the possibility of receiving positive spillovers from distant partners.
We consider a network formation game whose payoﬀs have a functional form similar
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to that of the generalized connections model by Bloch and Jackson (2007) – the
distance-based utility model, so as to facilitate comparison with the latter, but
involve a penalty resulting from the degree of direct and indirect contacts. In this
degree-distance-based connections model, we assume a two-variable (instead of one-
variable) benefit function which depends on distances to and degrees of (direct and
indirect) neighbors.
As in the original connections model, there is multiplicity of pairwise stable struc-
tures. We do not give a complete characterization but focus on some cases where
outcomes can be compared and contrasted with those of the original connections
model. In particular, we analyze stable structures with short diameters. The Jack-
son and Wolinsky model exhibits two such pairwise stable structures, the star and
the complete network with a swift transition from one to the other. In our model,
these structures can also be stable, but more interestingly we find new pairwise sta-
ble structures with short diameters which could not arise in the original connections
model.
The nature of these new structures raises the following question: when direct and
indirect contacts are evaluated based on two criteria, their capacity to be intermedi-
aries and to what extent they are available (i.e., not too busy), how should these two
roles be distributed? Will we see specialization so that some highly connected agents
are valuable only as eﬃcient intermediaries whereas other contacts are counted on
for availability, or will we see a more equal distribution of roles where all agents are
moderately busy and play a moderate role as intermediaries?
Indeed, we identify two types of architectures both of which ensure short commu-
nication paths between all agents but which are organized quite diﬀerently. One
resembles a star but all peripheral agents also have a “local” neighborhood of direct
contacts. In this case, the agents in the network occupy diﬀerent roles. The center
is specialized in the role of intermediary but is too busy to be of much value per se.
The agents in the local neighborhood are not useful as intermediaries, but, being
less busy, they are valuable in their own right. In the second structure, all agents
have similar degrees and contribute equally to providing indirect contacts.
We derive stability conditions for the stable architectures in the original connections
model (star/complete/empty) and for the aforementioned new structures. For a
given payoﬀ function, these conditions tell us whether one of these structures is
stable. However, they provide little intuition for what determines the stability.
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We pursue our analysis under the additional fairly natural assumption that decay
is independent of degree. The concavity of the benefit function with respect to
degree is then suﬃcient to ensure the existence of a range of link costs for which at
least one of the new structures with short diameter is stable. More generally, the
concavity/convexity of the benefit function with respect to degree is seen to play
an important role in determining which structures with short diameters are stable.
We also analyze stability and eﬃciency for extreme levels of decay. For high decay,
our stable structures coincide with those in Morrill (2011) which is natural since
our model approximates his when decay is large. For small levels of decay, stable
structures will be minimally connected with some constraints on degrees.
As shown in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) strongly eﬃcient networks may not be
stable, and conversely networks need not be eﬃcient even when they are uniquely
stable. Buechel and Hellmann (2012) show that ineﬃcient outcomes can be related
to the nature of the externalities. They introduce the notion of over-connected
(under-connected) networks – those which can be socially improved by the deletion
(addition) of links. The authors prove that for positive externalities no stable net-
work can be over-connected. Negative externalities tend to induce over-connected
networks, and under some additional conditions, no stable network can be under-
connected. In our model, the new structures with short diameters, while stable,
would typically not be eﬃcient when the network is large. The same is true for the
complete graph. We show this without actually characterizing the eﬃcient network.
Finally, we show that under certain conditions the star will be uniquely eﬃcient. The
conditions required in our proof are quite restrictive but compatible with the stabil-
ity of the star structures with peripheral links. Thus, our model can indeed generate
over-connectedness as defined by Buechel and Hellmann (2012), which could never
occur in the original connections model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2 we recapitulate some
preliminaries on networks, the Jackson and Wolinsky connections model and existing
extensions. In Section 2.3 we present our model. Pairwise stability and eﬃciency are
studied in Sections 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. We begin by providing some illustrating
examples in networks of small size and then turn to the general analysis of stability
and eﬃciency. In Section 2.6 we mention some possible extensions. Some proofs are
presented in the Appendix.
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2.2 The connections model and its modifications
In this section we first present the preliminaries on networks (see, e.g., Jackson
and Wolinsky (1996); Jackson (2008)) and then briefly recapitulate some models
related to our work: the connections model and the co-author model of Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), the distance-based model by Bloch and Jackson (2007), and the
model with degree-based utility functions by Morrill (2011).
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of players (agents). A network g is a set of
pairs {i, j} denoted for convenience by ij, with i, j ∈ N , i ̸= j,1 where ij indicates
the presence of a pairwise relationship and is referred to as a link between players i
and j. Nodes i and j are directly connected if and only if ij ∈ g.
A degree ηi(g) of agent i counts the number of links i has in g, i.e.,
ηi(g) = |{j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}|
We can identify two particular network relationships among players in N : the empty
network g∅ without any link between players, and the complete network gN which
is the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The set of all possible networks g on N is
G := {g | g ⊆ gN}.
By g+ ij (g− ij, respectively) we denote the network obtained by adding link ij to
g (deleting link ij from g, respectively). Furthermore, by g−i we denote the network
obtained by deleting player i and all his links from the network g.
Let N(g) (n(g), respectively) denote the set (the number, respectively) of players in
N with at least one link, i.e., N(g) = {i | ∃j s.t. ij ∈ g} and n(g) = |N(g)|.
A path in g connecting i1 and iK is a set of distinct nodes {i1, i2 . . . , iK} ⊆ N(g)
such that {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , iK−1iK} ⊆ g.
A network g is connected if there is a path between any two nodes in g.
The network g′ ⊆ g is a component of g if for all i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g′), i ̸= j,
there exists a path in g′ connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g),
ij ∈ g implies that ij ∈ g′.
A star g∗ is a connected network in which there exists some node i (referred to as
1Loop ii is not a possibility in this setting.
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the center of the star) such that every link in the network involves node i.
The value of a graph is represented by v : G → R. By V we denote the set of
all such functions. In what follows we will assume that the value of a graph is an
aggregate of individual utilities, i.e., v(g) =
∑
i∈N ui(g), where ui : G→ R.
A network g ⊆ gN is strongly eﬃcient (SE) if v(g) ≥ v(g′) for all g′ ⊆ gN .
A network g ∈ G is pairwise stable (PS) if:
(i) ∀ ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij) and
(ii) ∀ ij /∈ g, if ui(g) < ui(g + ij) then uj(g) > uj(g + ij).
In the symmetric connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the utility of
each player i from network g is defined as
uJWi (g) =
∑
j ̸=i
δlij(g) − cηi(g) (2.1)
where 0 < δ < 1 denotes the undiscounted valuation of a connection, lij(g) denotes
the distance between i and j in terms of the number of links in the shortest path
between them in g (with lij(g) =∞, if there is no path connecting i and j in g) and
c > 0 determines the costs for a direct connection.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) (Proposition 1) show that the complete, the empty
or the star graph can be uniquely strongly eﬃcient (depending on c and δ). More
precisely, they prove that the unique SE network in the symmetric connections model
is:
(i) the complete network gN if c < δ − δ2
(ii) a star g∗ if δ − δ2 < c < δ + (n−2)δ22
(iii) no links if δ + (n−2)δ
2
2 < c.
They also examine pairwise stability in the symmetric connection model. By virtue
of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) (Proposition 2), in the symmetric connections
model:
(i) A pairwise stable graph has at most one (non-empty) component.
(ii) For c < δ − δ2, the unique PS network is the complete graph gN .
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 2. A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive
externalities 14
(iii) For δ−δ2 < c < δ, a star g∗ encompassing all players is PS, but not necessarily
the unique PS graph.
(iv) For δ < c, any PS network which is non-empty is such that every player has
at least two links (and thus is ineﬃcient).
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also present the co-author model, in which nodes are
interpreted as researchers and a link represents a collaboration between two re-
searchers. The utility function of each player i in network g is given by
ucoi (g) =
∑
j:ij∈g
wi(ni, j, nj)− c(ni) (2.2)
where wi(ni, j, nj) is the utility of i derived from a link with j when i and j are
involved in ni and nj projects, respectively, and c(ni) is the cost to i of maintaining
ni links.
Bloch and Jackson (2007) introduce an extension of the original connections model
– the distance-based model, where the utility of agent i is given by
udisti (g) =
∑
j ̸=i
f(lij(g))− cηi(g) (2.3)
with f nonincreasing in lij(g); see also Jackson (2008) for the presentation of this
distance-based model.
Morrill (2011) models situations in which any new relationship causes negative ex-
ternalities. The payoﬀ of each player from a link is a decreasing function of the
number of links maintained by his partner. A utility function is degree-based if
there exists a decreasing function φ such that
udegi (g) =
∑
j:ij∈g
φ(ηj(g))− cηi(g) (2.4)
2.3 A degree-distance-based connections model
In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), an additional link induces only positive external-
ities. We suggest a modification that also generates negative externalities due to
increasing connectivity. Every agent benefits from his direct and indirect connec-
tions, but it is additionally assumed that the higher the degree of a direct or indirect
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partner, the less valuable is this connection. In order to remain close to the connec-
tions model we follow existing generalizations of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), by
considering the utility of agent i given by
u˜i(g) =
∑
j ̸=i
b(lij(g), ηj(g))− cηi(g) (2.5)
where b : {1, . . . , n − 1}2 → R+ is the net benefit that an agent receives from the
direct and indirect connections, and c > 0 is the cost for a direct connection. It is
assumed that for all lij(g), b(lij(g), k) is nonincreasing in degree k, and for all ηj(g),
b(l, ηj(g)) is nonincreasing in distance l. Moreover, if there is no path connecting i
and j in g, i.e., if lij(g) =∞, then we set b(∞, ηj) = 0 for every ηj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n−1}.
In particular, u˜i(g∅) = 0 for every i ∈ N .
In the original connections model the benefit term is expressed using a single pa-
rameter δ. If we expressed the benefit function in our model using parameters that
regulate decay with distance and utility loss due to degree, we could write
b(l + 1, ηj(g)) = δl,ηj(g)b(l, ηj(g)), b(l, ηj(g) + 1) = cl,ηj(g)b(l, ηj(g))
where δl,ηj(g) ∈ (0, 1) expresses the decay between distance l and (l + 1) for a fixed
degree ηj(g), and cl,ηj(g) ∈ (0, 1) expresses the utility loss due to an additional link
increasing the degree from ηj(g) to (ηj(g)+1) for a fixed distance l. This gives much
versatility, in particular, decay does not need to be constant with distance.
Since we aim to analyze negative externalities resulting from the connectivity of di-
rect and indirect neighbors, we will assume that the benefit function b is decreasing
in degree (and in distance), except when mentioning explicitly the original connec-
tions model as a particular case of the degree-distance-based model.
Our framework also generalizes the degree-based model by Morrill (2011). We have
φ(ηj(g)) = b(1, ηj(g)), for all ηj(g) ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} (2.6)
The generalized model defined by (2.5) also extends the distance-based model con-
sidered in Bloch and Jackson (2007) and recapitulated in (2.3). In other words, we
consider a two-variable (instead of one-variable) benefit function.
In some examples, we will use a specific form of the degree-distance-based utility,
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which is very close to the original connections model, except that it incorporates
an additional information about the degree of direct and indirect neighbors. More
precisely, to illustrate some of our results, the following utility of agent i will be
used:
ui(g) =
∑
j ̸=i
1
1 + ηj(g)
δlij(g) − cηi(g) (2.7)
that is, we will set b(lij(g), ηj(g)) =
1
1+ηj(g)
δlij(g).
An idea somewhat similar to the one expressed by our model is presented in Haller
(2012) who studies a non-cooperative model of network formation. He considers
two examples with negative network externalities in which the values of information
are endogenously determined and depend on the network. This is in line with the
idea that it is harder to access the information from an agent who has more direct
neighbors.
2.4 Pairwise stability in the model
2.4.1 Stability of the star, the complete and the empty
graph
Next, we examine pairwise stability (PS) in the model. In order to compare results
in our model with those of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we start by analyzing the
stability of the architectures which were prominent there: the empty network, the
star and the complete graph. Furthermore, we check if a non-empty PS network
must be connected. In the connections model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), any
pairwise stable graph has at most one (non-empty) component. We will show that
it is not necessarily the case in our model. After establishing the stability conditions
for g∅, g∗ and gN , we will look for other PS structures. We will begin by considering
networks in which all agents are at distance at most 2 from each other. In such a
network, the benefit of adding a link to an agent of degree k − 1 is
f˜(k) := b(1, k)− b(2, k − 1) for k ∈ {2, . . . , n− 1}, and f˜(1) := b(1, 1) (2.8)
Note that in the original connections model f˜(k) = δ − δ2 for each k. We have the
following results on pairwise stability of the three prominent architectures.
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Proposition 2.1. In the degree-distance-based connections model defined by (2.5):
(i) The empty network g∅ is PS if and only if f˜(1) ≤ c.
(ii) The star g∗ with n ≥ 3 encompassing all players is PS if and only if
f˜(2) ≤ c ≤ min
(
f˜(1), b(1, n− 1) + (n− 2)b(2, 1)
)
(2.9)
This cost range is non-empty whenever f˜(2) ≤ b(1, n− 1) + (n− 2)b(2, 1).
(iii) The complete network gN with n ≥ 3 is PS if and only if
c ≤ f˜(n− 1) (2.10)
(iv) The unique PS network is the complete network gN if
c < min
1≤ηk≤n−2
f˜(ηk + 1) (2.11)
(v) g∗ and gN are simultaneously PS if and only if f˜(2) ≤ c ≤ f˜(n− 1). This cost
range is non-empty whenever f˜(2) ≤ f˜(n − 1). In particular, if f˜(n − 1) <
c < f˜(2), then neither the complete graph nor the star is PS.
(vi) A PS network may have more than one (non-empty) component.
Proof: (i) Consider any two agents i, j ∈ g∅. u˜i(g∅ + ij) − u˜i(g∅) = u˜j(g∅ + ij) −
u˜j(g∅) = b(1, 1) − c = f˜(1) − c. Hence, if f˜(1) > c, then both players profit from
establishing the link, and therefore g∅ is not PS. If f˜(1) ≤ c, then u˜i(g∅+ij)−u˜i(g∅) ≤
0 and u˜j(g∅ + ij)− u˜j(g∅) ≤ 0 which means that g∅ is PS.
(ii) Consider the star g∗ with n ≥ 3 agents. Take the center of the star i and two
arbitrary agents j, k, where j ̸= i, k ̸= i, and j ̸= k. This means that ij ∈ g∗ but
jk /∈ g∗. For stability the following conditions must hold:
(A) u˜i(g∗)− u˜i(g∗ \ ij) ≥ 0 and (B) u˜j(g∗)− u˜j(g∗ \ ij) ≥ 0 and (C) u˜j(g∗ + jk)−
u˜j(g∗) ≤ 0.
(A): u˜i(g∗)− u˜i(g∗ \ ij) = b(1, 1)− c = f˜(1)− c. Hence, (A) holds iﬀ f˜(1) ≥ c.
(B): u˜j(g∗) − u˜j(g∗ \ ij) = b(1, n − 1) + (n − 2)b(2, 1) − c. Hence, (B) holds iﬀ
b(1, n− 1) + (n− 2)b(2, 1) ≥ c.
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(C): u˜j(g∗ + jk) − u˜j(g∗) = b(1, 2) − b(2, 1) − c = f˜(2) − c. Hence, (C) holds iﬀ
f˜(2) ≤ c.
Hence, we get f˜(2) ≤ c ≤ min
(
f˜(1), b(1, n− 1) + (n− 2)b(2, 1)
)
.
(iii) Let n ≥ 3. Consider any two agents i, j ∈ gN . We have u˜i(gN)− u˜i(gN − ij) =
u˜j(gN)− u˜j(gN − ij) = b(1, n− 1)− b(2, n− 2)− c = f˜(n− 1)− c.
(iv) Consider two arbitrary agents i and j, j ̸= i such that ij /∈ g, ηi > 0 and ηj > 0.
Then we have u˜i(g + ij) − u˜i(g) ≥ b(1, ηj + 1) − b(2, ηj) − c = f˜(ηj + 1) − c and
u˜j(g+ ij)− u˜j(g) ≥ f˜(ηi+1)−c. If ηiηj = 0, then u˜i(g+ ij)− u˜i(g) ≥ b(1, ηj+1)−c
and u˜j(g + ij)− u˜j(g) ≥ b(1, ηi + 1)− c. Hence, if c < min1≤ηk≤n−2 f˜(ηk + 1), then
any two agents who are not directly connected benefit from forming a link.
(v) We have f˜(n−1) = b(1, n−1)−b(2, n−2) < b(1, n−1)+(n−2)b(2, 1). Moreover,
from the nonincreasingness of b in degree, f˜(n − 1) < b(1, 1) = f˜(1). Hence, from
(2.9) and (2.10), g∗ and gN are simultaneously PS if and only if f˜(2) ≤ c ≤ f˜(n−1).
(vi) The general existence of pairwise stable disconnected structures is given in
Proposition 2.8. In small networks we can also find other types of architectures.
Consider for example g given in Figure 2.1 and the utility function given by (2.7).
g
1
3
2 4
5
Figure 2.1: A PS network with two components in the degree-distance-based con-
nections model
Network g is PS if 14δ +
2
3δ
2 < c ≤ 13δ − 12δ2, e.g., for δ = 115 and c = 1075400 . Since we
have two groups of symmetric agents (1, 2, 3 and 4, 5), we only need to calculate the
following:
u2(g)− u2(g \ 23) = 23δ − 2c−
(
1
3δ +
1
2δ
2 − c
)
= 13δ − 12δ2 − c ≥ 0
u4(g)− u4(g \ 45) = 12δ − c ≥ 0
u2(g + 24)− u2(g) = 13δ + 12δ2 − c and u4(g + 24)− u4(g) = 14δ + 23δ2 − c
Note that if 13δ − 12δ2 − c ≥ 0, then 12δ − c > 0 and 13δ + 12δ2 − c > 0. Hence, g will
be PS if 13δ − 12δ2 ≥ c and 14δ + 23δ2 < c. !
Note that Proposition 2.1 confirms, in particular, the results on pairwise stability
of gN , g∗ and g∅ in the Jackson and Wolinsky model. Assume now that the benefit
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function b is strictly decreasing in degree – for simplicity, take the degree-distance-
based model given by (2.7). Naturally, since δ− δ2 > δn − δ
2
n−1 for any n ≥ 2, if gN is
PS in our model, then it is also PS in the Jackson and Wolinsky framework under
the same parameters. Moreover, if g∅ is PS in the original connections model, then
it is also PS in our framework. Roughly speaking, the costs under which the star
g∗ is PS in our model are rather lower than the costs under which g∗ is PS in the
Jackson and Wolinsky model for the same δ and n. For δ < 12 , g
∗ cannot be PS in
both frameworks at the same time, but for δ ≥ 12 such an overlap of costs under
which the star is PS is non-empty2.
Proposition 2.1(v) shows the existence of a region where the star and the complete
graph are simultaneously PS. This could never occur in the original connections
model where the regions of stability for these two structures were disjoint. However,
we should note that, for instance, for the degree-distance-based utility given by (2.7),
limn→∞ f˜(n−1) = 0 so that the possible cost range for which the complete network
and the star are simultaneously PS is very small in large networks.
Figure 2.2 (left) illustrates the pairwise stability regions for the three simple archi-
tectures for the model given by (2.7) with n = 9, δ ∈ (0, 1) and c ∈ (0, 0.5]3. In this
figure, the green area indicates the stability region of g∅, the red area the one for
gN and the yellow area the one for g∗. The overlapping (quite small) orange area
indicates the parameter region in which gN and g∗ are simultaneously PS, and the
white area in which none of the three simple structures are PS.
2.4.2 Other stable structures in the degree-distance-based
model: examples and illustration
Next, we will be interested in PS architectures of the degree-distance-based connec-
tions model, other than those analyzed in the previous section. An example of a
PS structure that can occur in the white area in Figure 2.2 (left) is the windmill
2In the Jackson and Wolinsky model, g∗ is PS if δ − δ2 < c < δ. In our model (2.7), g∗ is PS
if δ3 − δ
2
2 ≤ c ≤ min
(
δ
2 ,
δ
n
+ (n−2)δ
2
2
)
. As δ3 − δ
2
2 < δ − δ2, the costs range under which g∗ is PS
in both frameworks is δ − δ2 ≤ c ≤ min
(
δ
2 ,
δ
n
+ (n−2)δ
2
2
)
. Note that δ − δ2 ≤ δ2 if and only if
δ ≥ 12 , and therefore g∗ cannot be PS if δ < 12 . For δ ≥ 12 , the overlap of costs is non-empty, as
δ − δ2 ≤ min
(
δ
2 ,
δ
n +
(n−2)δ2
2
)
.
3The calculations have been done in Mathematica. The details can be provided upon request.
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Figure 2.2: PS regions in the degree-distance-based connections model given by (2.7)
(n = 9): only g∅ (green area), only g∗ (yellow area), only gN (red area), none of
these three (white area); Left – g∗ and gN simultaneously (orange area); Right –
“Windmill” (blue region)
structure shown in Figure 2.3. This is a specific example of what we will call a
core-periphery structure.
Definition 2.1. In a core periphery structure with periphery degree ηm, one node,
the center, is linked to all other nodes, and every node other than the center has the
same degree ηm.
Figure 2.3: Windmill as an example of a PS network in the degree-distance-based
connections model
To get a more precise feeling for the range of parameters in which such a windmill
structure is stable, consider Figure 2.2 (right). Compared to Figure 2.2 (left), Fig-
ure 2.2 (right) is zoomed in and shows an additional blue area in which the windmill
structure is PS. The green, yellow, red and white areas have the same meaning as
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before.
Figure 2.4 presents all PS networks for n = 3 with the corresponding parameters
for the model (2.7). Note that a network with one link can be PS in our framework
(with b being strictly decreasing in degree), contrary to the Jackson and Wolinsky
model. Figure 2.4 confirms nicely Proposition 2.1(v). In particular, g∗ and gN are
simultaneously PS only for c = δ3 − δ
2
2 .
Figure 2.4: PS networks in the degree-distance-based connections model given by
(2.7) (from left to right): (i) δ ≤ 2c, (ii) 0 < δ < 13 and δ3 + δ
2
2 < c ≤ δ2 , (iii)
(0 < δ < 13 ,
δ
3 − δ
2
2 ≤ c ≤ δ3 + δ
2
2 ) or (
1
3 ≤ δ < 1, δ3 − δ
2
2 ≤ c ≤ δ2), (iv) c ≤ δ3 − δ
2
2
Let us now illustrate, for some small network sizes, examples of other PS structures
that can appear. In some cases, these architectures are not stable in the original
connections model which make them interesting per se. Many of the architectures
that we see in these examples can also be shown to exist in a network of arbitrary size
n in some parameter range, as will be shown in a later section. Figures 2.5 and 2.6
show some examples of diﬀerent PS structures for n = 5 and n = 6, respectively, for
the model given by (2.7) with δ = 115 and c =
107
5400 . From among these examples,
only the two regular networks (with the degree ηi = 2 for every i ∈ N) can be PS
under some parameters in the original connections model. The remaining networks
which are PS in our framework could never be PS in the original connections model.
Note that four of these networks contain two components. In Figure 2.5 these are
the first network (on the left) that has been used in the proof of Proposition 2.1(vi),
and the second network with one isolated player and four players, each having the
degree equal to 2. In Figure 2.6 these are the first and the second network, both
having two non-empty components.
Figure 2.5: Some PS networks in the degree-distance-based connections model given
by (2.7) for n = 5, δ = 115 and c =
107
5400
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Figure 2.6: Some PS networks in the degree-distance-based connections model given
by (2.7) for n = 6, δ = 115 and c =
107
5400
2.4.3 Stability analysis for new architectures with short di-
ameters
In the previous sections, we provided examples of networks that are PS in our
framework for small values of n. These illustrate some of the general results about
architectures that can be PS for an arbitrary size n for some values of the decay
and cost parameters. In contrast, most of them can never be PS in the original
connections model. We have already seen that there exist PS structures other than
the star and the complete graph, in particular, ones that are intermediary between
these two in the sense of link inclusion, that is g is PS and g∗ ⊂ g ⊂ gN . This is
never possible in the original Jackson and Wolinsky model. Figure 2.3 depicted an
example of such a structure, the windmill which is an example of a PS structure that
contains a star but which also comprises links between the nodes in the periphery.
We prove the following result about the stability of stars with peripheral links.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that the benefit b and the cost c are such that there exists
an ηm ∈ N such that f˜(ηm + 1) < c ≤ f˜(ηm). Assume that moreover, n is such
that f˜(n−1)+(n− 1− ηm − (ηm − 1)(ηm − 2)) (b(2, ηm)− b(3, ηm)) > c. Then any
core-periphery structure with periphery degree ηm is PS.
Proof: Let us show that under the conditions stated the described structure is
pairwise stable. Every peripheral node has degree ηm. Breaking the link to another
peripheral node does not modify the benefits from nodes that can be reached at
distance 2. Only direct benefits are lost. None of those peripheral nodes wants to
break a local link with another peripheral agent of degree ηm because u˜j(g)− u˜j(g−
lj) = b(1, ηm)−b(2, ηm−1)−c = f˜(ηm)−c ≥ 0 by assumption. No agent wants to add
a link to a peripheral agent whose degree in g is ηm because doing this would decrease
the utility, as u˜j(g + jm)− u˜j(g) = b(1, ηm + 1)− b(2, ηm)− c = f˜(ηm + 1)− c < 0
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by assumption.
Every peripheral node has an incentive to maintain a link to the center for the
following reason: Without a link to the center, an agent can reach at most (ηm− 1)
neighbors. Each neighbor has (ηm − 2) links to nodes diﬀerent from the center and
the respective agent. Hence, without a link to the center, an agent can reach at
most (ηm − 1)(ηm − 2) + 1 nodes at distance 2 (including one indirect link to the
center). To identify the nodes who are at distance 3 in absence of a link to the
center, one has to subtract from the overall number of nodes n the agent himself,
his direct neighbors and the neighbors of degree 2. Consequently, by breaking a link
to the center, at least n − 1 − (ηm − 1) − ((ηm − 1)(ηm − 2) + 1) = n − 1 − ηm −
(ηm − 1)(ηm − 2) nodes move to distance 3. Thus u˜j(g)− u˜j(g − ij) ≥ b(1, n− 1)−
b(2, n− 2) + (n− 1− ηm − (ηm − 1)(ηm − 2)) (b(2, ηm)− b(3, ηm))− c = f˜(n− 1) +
(n− 1− ηm − (ηm − 1)(ηm − 2)) (b(2, ηm)− b(3, ηm))− c.
We show that for given b and c, we can find n such that
f˜(n− 1) + (n− 1− ηm − (ηm − 1)(ηm − 2)) (b(2, ηm)− b(3, ηm))− c > 0 (2.12)
Note that b(2, ηm) > b(3, ηm). Moreover, b(1, k) ≥ 0 for all k, and therefore from
(2.8) we have f˜(n− 1) ≥ −b(2, n− 2) ≥ −b(2, 1). Hence, c− f˜(n− 1) ≤ c+ b(2, 1)
and then every n such that n > c+b(2,1)b(2,ηm)−b(3,ηm) + 1 + ηm + (ηm − 1)(ηm − 2) satisfies
(2.12). !
Note that in the original connections model, where f˜ is constant, the first assumption
of Proposition 2.2 which requires a decreasing f˜ is never satisfied.
The stable structure with inhomogeneous degrees given in Proposition 2.2 illustrates
the fact that in the degree-distance based model, a node can be attractive either
because it is not too “busy” with other neighbors or because it is highly connected
and provides indirect benefits. We also have examples of stable structures where
the degree distribution is essentially homogeneous.
Proposition 2.3. Let g be a network such that lij(g) ≤ 2 for all i, j, and there
are at least (n − 1) nodes with identical degree k and at most one node j such that
ηj < k. Then g is PS in the cost range f˜(k + 1) < c < f˜(k) and f˜(ηj) > c. In
particular, for the utility function given by (2.7), this cost range is non-empty if and
only if k > δ+
√
δ
1−δ and f˜(ηj) > c.
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Proof: No agent wants to add a link to an agent with degree k since f˜(k + 1) < c.
Moreover, no agent wants to delete a link to an agent with degree k since the loss
of utility is at least f˜(k) which exceeds the saving of c. Note that there may be a
single agent j such that ηj < k. This agent does not want to form a link to any
other agent since all other agents have degree k. Moreover, since lij ≤ 2, the only
path that is shortened is the one to the player one links to, and this path is reduced
by one link. No agent wants to drop a link to agent j since f˜(ηj) > c. For the
utility function given by (2.7), there exists a cost c such that f˜(k+ 1) < c < f˜(k) if
k belongs to the interval where f˜(k) is decreasing, i.e., on [ δ+
√
δ
1−δ , n− 1]. !
Structures satisfying the properties stated in Proposition 2.3 clearly exist. We can
give some (non exhaustive) examples.
Proposition 2.4. Pairwise stable networks with equal degree: For n, M and l
such that M =
√
n ∈ N , and l is a divisor of M , there exists a pairwise stable
network g such that lij(g) ≤ 2 for all i, j and all nodes have a degree equal to
k = (M − 1) + (M − 1)l. It consists of M completely connected components or
islands. Each node is linked to exactly l nodes on all other islands.
Proof: Divide n = M2 into M disjoint sets of size M , which we index by m =
1, . . . ,M . Divide each set of M agents into disjoint sets of size l (Smi )
M/l
i=1 . Link
agents from distinct islands if they have the same i. This ensures that each agent
has exactly M − 1 + (M − 1)l neighbors. Moreover, lij(g) ≤ 2 for all i, j. !
We note that since k = (M − 1) + (M − 1)l ≥ 2(√n − 1), the structures defined
above only exist for fairly large degrees. We also note that whenever l > 1, the
resulting homogeneous network is such that the removal of a single link does not
change the diameter.
Architectures with small diameters: further interpretation and analysis
of the stability conditions
We established conditions for the stability of the main PS structures considered
in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) as well as other structures with small diameters:
windmill structures and equal degree island models. However, these conditions did
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not provide much intuition for what really lies behind the stability of the various
structures.
The conditions did show that the stability of some of the structures was only com-
patible with certain behaviors of the function f˜ . For example, Propositions 2.2, 2.3
require f˜ to be decreasing. In this section we show that, under an additional as-
sumption, namely that decay is independent of degree, the behavior of the function
f˜ (increasing or decreasing) can be related to the convexity/concavity of the ben-
efit with respect to degree. Conditions related to concavity/convexity are easy to
interpret and the results in this section should make it apparent that the conditions
ensuring the stability of the new structures with short diameters analyzed in the
previous section are not diﬃcult to satisfy.
Throughout this section, we make the assumption that decay of the benefit is inde-
pendent of the degree of the neighbor in the sense that b(l+1,k)b(l,k) =: δl for every k, that
is, the decay of the benefit may vary with the distance l but not with the degree k.
The following proposition links the behavior of the function f˜ to the convexity/con-
cavity of the benefit with respect to degree.
Proposition 2.5. We have the following:
• f˜(k) is decreasing whenever b(l, k) is concave in the degree k.
• If b(l, k) is convex in the degree k, then there exists a level of decay 0 < δm < 1
such that f˜(k) is decreasing whenever δ1 ≤ δm, and there exists a 0 < δM < 1
such that f˜(k) is increasing whenever δ1 ≥ δM .
Proof: Consider f˜(k) − f˜(k + 1) = b(1, k) − b(2, k − 1) − (b(1, k + 1)− b(2, k)) =
b(1, k)− b(1, k + 1)− δ1 (b(1, k − 1)− b(1, k)). This quantity is positive if and only
if b(1,k)−b(1,k+1)b(1,k−1)−b(1,k) ≥ δ1. If b is concave in degree, then b(1,k)−b(1,k+1)b(1,k−1)−b(1,k) ≥ 1 ≥ δ1, so that
f˜(k) will always be decreasing. Now, if b is convex, then 0 < b(1,k)−b(1,k+1)b(1,k−1)−b(1,k) < 1 for
all k ∈ 1, . . . , n− 1. Define δM := maxk b(1,k)−b(1,k+1)b(1,k−1)−b(1,k) and δm := mink b(1,k)−b(1,k+1)b(1,k−1)−b(1,k) ,
then f˜(k) is decreasing for δ1 ≤ δm and increasing when δ1 ≥ δM . !
Consequently, the conditions in Propositions 2.2 and 2.3 are compatible with a
benefit function that is concave in degree and with one that is convex in degree only
if decay is large. Other results, such as the existence of simultaneous stability of the
star and the complete network (see Proposition 2.1) cannot occur for a b concave
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in degree, but are compatible with a b convex in degree, for which the function f˜
exhibits a wider range of behaviors.
The behavior of the function f˜ is crucial for selecting the stable structures with di-
ameter 2. We will now return to the stability conditions of the structures considered
in the previous section. When f˜ is increasing, we have a precise characterization of
the stable networks with diameter 2 which have the property that the removal of a
single link does not increase the diameter.
Proposition 2.6. If f˜ is increasing, then:
• there is a cost range for which the star is stable
• there is a cost range for which the complete graph is stable
• there is a cost range for which the star and the complete graph are stable
• a stable network g such that lij(g − kl) ≤ 2 for all i, j and all kl must be a
complete network.
Proof: The function f˜ is increasing on [2, n − 1]. However, f˜(1) = b(1, 1) >
f˜(2), . . . , f˜(1) > f˜(n − 1). The complete network is stable if c < f˜(n − 1). The
star is stable if f˜(2) < c < f˜(1) and if f˜(n− 1) + (n− 2)b(2, 1) > c. The condition
f˜(2) < c < f˜(n − 1) < f˜(1) is suﬃcient for simultaneous stability of the star and
the complete network.
For the last property, consider a stable network g such that lij(g − kl) ≤ 2 for
all i, j and all kl. The existence of a node of degree 1 contradicts the property
lij(g− kl) ≤ 2 for all i, j and all kl, because the removal of such a node disconnects
the network. First note that if there are two nodes in g whose degrees are diﬀerent
from n− 1, these nodes must be directly linked. Indeed, suppose that their degrees
are η and η′. Neighbors of these agents do not lose any indirect benefits by breaking
with them. Hence, stability requires that f˜(η) > c and f˜(η′) > c. But then
f˜(η + 1) > c and f˜(η′ + 1) > c. Consequently, if the agents of degree η and η′
are not connected, they would like to form a link and g would not be stable. Let
S = {i ∈ N(g)|1 < ηi < n−1}. All agents in S are linked by the above. The agents
in N \ S have degree n − 1, they are linked to all agents. An agent in S is linked
to all other agents in S and to agents in N \ S. But then an agent in S has degree
n− 1 contrary to hypothesis. Thus S is empty. Consequently, the stable networks
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 2. A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive
externalities 27
g such that lij(g − kl) ≤ 2 for all i, j and all kl have only nodes with degree n− 1
and are thus complete graphs. !
Corollary 2.1. If f˜ is increasing, then:
• no core periphery structure is stable
• no homogeneous island structure where each agent has at least two links to the
other islands is stable.
Having established these results, we will now return to the stability of the new
structures with short diameters in the case where f˜ is decreasing. Recall that
by Proposition 2.2, the core-periphery structure in Proposition 2.2 with periphery
degree η is PS if
• f˜(η + 1) < c ≤ f˜(η)
• f˜(n− 1) + (n− 1− η − (η − 1)(η − 2))[b(2, η)− b(3, η)] > c
These conditions can only be satisfied if f˜ is decreasing. When this is the case, we
note that it is fairly easy to find a cost range such that the conditions in Propo-
sition 2.2 are satisfied when the periphery degree η is small compared to n. To
satisfy the first condition we must take a cost c > f˜(η + 1) ≥ f˜(n − 1). There-
fore the link to the center is only maintained if the indirect benefit term, bounded
below by (n − 1 − η − (η − 1)(η − 2))[b(2, η) − b(3, η)] is suﬃciently large. When
the network size n is large and η is small compared to n (η ≪ √n), this term is
large unless [b(2, η)− b(3, η)] is very small, that is unless there is hardly any decay.
In other words, when f˜ is decreasing, it is easy to find cost ranges with PS core-
periphery structures in which each peripheral agent has a “local” neighborhood that
is relatively small compared to the whole network.
It is more diﬃcult to obtain a stable core-periphery structure when the periphery
degree η is large. Indeed, suppose for example that n/2 + 1 < η < n − 1. In this
case the only benefit that is lost when a peripheral agent breaks with the center is
the direct utility of the link to the center. When n/2+1 < η < n−1, the peripheral
agent can reach the whole network at distance 2 without going through the center.
Peripheral agent i has at least n/2 + 1 contacts other than the center. Suppose
that there were some agent k that he could not reach at distance 2 through these
contacts. But agent k has at least n/2 + 1 links that are not to the center. At least
one of these must lead to a neighbor of i. The benefit of conserving the link to the
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center is then reduced to b(1, n − 1) − b(2, n − 2) = f˜(n − 1) < f˜(η) < c and so
the core-periphery structure is not stable. It is quite natural that a core periphery
structure where agents have very large peripheral neighborhoods cannot be stable.
Indeed, the peripheral agents can then reach a large fraction of the network without
going through the center which then becomes superfluous and cannot be maintained.
While there may not be any stable core periphery structure with a large periphery
degree η, if η is suﬃciently large, then we can always find a cost range in which
there is a stable homogeneous island structure (Proposition 2.4) with degree η when
f˜ is decreasing.
Proposition 2.7. For degrees η such that the structure in Proposition 2.4 exists,
this structure is PS if f˜(η + 1) < c ≤ f˜(η). Such a c always exists when f˜ is
decreasing.
Proof: We revisit the conditions of Proposition 2.4. When f˜ is decreasing, we can
always find a cost satisfying f˜(η + 1) < c ≤ f˜(η). When f˜ is decreasing, the latter
also implies that f(d) > c for any d < η. !
The propositions in this section highlight the importance of whether the function f˜
is decreasing or increasing. This can in turn be related to the concavity/convexity
of the benefit function with respect to degree. However, even without concav-
ity/convexity of the latter, it is easy to compute directly the function f˜ whose
behavior allows us to pin down the stable structures with short diameters. Struc-
tures with short diameters other than the star and the complete network, such as
the core-periphery network and the homogeneous degree network, cannot be stable
when f˜ is increasing. On the other hand, when f˜ is decreasing, we always have a
cost range where the homogeneous island structure is stable. A cost range where
the core-periphery structure is stable should also exist for many reasonable benefit
functions at least when the number of peripheral links is small compared to the
whole network. This shows that our model exhibits new pairwise stable structures
in some cost ranges under reasonable and not too demanding assumptions. Indeed,
the function f˜ will be decreasing if the benefit function is concave with respect to
the degree, or even when it is convex in this variable, provided that decay is high
enough.
We also observe that the comparison of link costs and the marginal benefit of linking
to an agent of degree η, i.e., f˜(η) is important for determining whether a core-
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periphery or a homogeneous structure emerges. If f˜(η) exceeds the cost even for large
degrees η, then it is diﬃcult to maintain a core-periphery structure. The peripheral
agents want to form many links in the periphery, but by doing so, they are able to
circumvent the center which becomes superfluous and cannot be maintained. On
the other hand, the homogeneous organization where all agents have an equal and
fairly high but not maximal degree will be stable. Such a structure is not possible if
the cost exceeds f˜(η) for a small degree. In this case, however, we can have a stable
core-periphery structure with only a small number of peripheral links.
2.4.4 Stability analysis for extreme values of the decay pa-
rameter
We complete our analysis of pairwise stability by considering the two extreme cases
where decay is very large (i.e., δ is very small for the model given by (2.7)), or
where decay is very small (i.e., δ is close to one for the model defined by (2.7)). We
will show that in both of these cases, the degree-distance-based model can exhibit
a very large number of PS architectures, which are only restricted by the fact that
(most) nodes must have the same degree. When decay is large, the pairwise stable
architectures include a number of disconnected structures with constraints on the
degrees. These structures can be seen to coincide with those that are shown to be
stable in Morrill (2011) (Proposition 2, p. 372). This is a natural since the benefits
of a direct link in our model coincide with the benefits of a link in Morrill (2011)
and that the indirect benefits can be neglected when decay is large.
The case of the benefit function where decay is very large can be expressed by the
condition b(1, k)≫ b(2, k) for every k.
Proposition 2.8. Let n be a fixed network size. Let ϵ > 0. Then there exists b > 0
such that for any function b with b(2, 1) < b and any cost such that b(1, r+1)+ ϵ <
c < b(1, r)− ϵ, a network g satisfying the following properties is pairwise stable: in
g, n − k nodes, where k ≤ r, have an identical degree r. The remaining k nodes
are all linked to each other (such a network is what Morrill (2011) calls a maximal
nearly k-regular network).
Proof: Fix ϵ > 0. Consider the maximal indirect benefit an agent can gain from a
link. This benefit is bounded by (n−2)b(2, 1). Let b = ϵn−2 . For any 0 < b(2, 1) < b,
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the benefit of indirect links is inferior to ϵ. Basically, we can now neglect utility from
indirect contacts. Let us establish that no pair of agents i, j in g can establish a
mutually beneficial link. Let i be a node of degree ηi = r. Then u˜j(g+ ij)− u˜j(g) <
b(1, r + 1) + ϵ − c < 0. Therefore no agent wishes to form a link to an agent who
already has degree r. Let ij ∈ g with ηi ≤ r and ηj ≤ r. Neither i nor j wishes to
break this link: u˜j(g − ij)− u˜j(g) < c+ ϵ− b(1, ηi) ≤ c+ ϵ− b(1, r) < 0. !
The family of PS networks described in Proposition 2.8 is very large and includes
in particular all structures where agents have identical degrees, such as the circle
or a generalized circle with agents linked to their m nearest neighbors. There is
also an abundance of disconnected structures that satisfy the condition stated in
Proposition 2.8.
One example is that of a number of disconnected “islands” of identical size.
Corollary 2.2. Consider a network of size n. Let m be a divisor of n. The net-
work consisting of n/m completely connected components of size m is PS under the
conditions stated in Proposition 2.8.
The class of PS networks described in Proposition 2.8 exists for some decay values
and for some cost range for every network size. However, in order for these structures
to appear, decay must be large, and all the more so when n is large, as we have
(n− 2)b(2, 1) < ϵ < b(1, r) ≤ b(1, 1). The possible values of the cost for which these
structures exist shrink the larger n and r are. In practice, the most likely decay is
very large so that indirect benefits are almost negligible. The larger the size of the
components, the smaller is the possible cost range. Among the possible structures,
the one that we are most likely to see emerge in practice is thus that in which all
agents have degree one or two, and the network size is not too large.
Let us now consider the other extreme case where decay is very small so that δ is
close to one in the model defined by (2.7). In other words, we consider the benefit
functions such that b(l, k) ≈ b(l′, k) for all k, l, l′ ̸=∞.
Proposition 2.9. Let n be a fixed network size. Let c > 0. Then there exist
ϵ > 0 and b such that |b(l, k) − b(l′, k)| ≤ ϵ for all k, l, l′ ̸= ∞, and any network g
satisfying the following properties is pairwise stable: g is minimally connected and
satisfies minj∈N b(1, ηj(g)) ≥ c > (n− 1)ϵ.
Proof: Fix c > 0. What is the maximal benefit an agent can derive from an
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additional link in an already connected structure? The indirect benefit of link for-
mation is bounded above by (n − 2)max1≤x≤n−1 (b(1, x)− b(n− 1, x)) ≤ (n − 2)ϵ.
Since g is connected, any additional link provides a utility u˜i(g + ij) − u˜i(g) ≤
b(1, ηj + 1)− b(n− 1, ηj) + (n− 2)ϵ− c ≤ (n− 2)ϵ+ b(1, ηj + 1)− b(n− 1, ηj + 1) +
b(n− 1, ηj + 1)− b(n− 1, ηj)− c ≤ (n− 1)ϵ− c < 0. Let us establish that no agent
wants to remove a link. If ij ∈ g, then neither i nor j wishes to break this link.
Indeed, because g is minimally connected, i and j are not in the same connected
component in g − ij. Therefore u˜i(g − ij)− u˜i(g) < c− b(1, ηj) < 0. !
De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) also study a model where agents’ payoﬀs are
based on their access to information in a setting with small decay. Information is
defined as the sum of all decayed paths to indirect contacts, i.e., exactly the benefit
term in the connections model. Payoﬀs diﬀer from those of Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996) because agents apply a possibly non-linear function to evaluate this aggregate
quantity. Our model diﬀers from Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) because we impose
a “penalty” on the value received from each indirect contact before aggregating
the value of all indirect contacts by addition. Because of these diﬀerences, our
setting and that of De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) are not directly comparable.
However, in both cases, the small decay assumption leads to stable structures that
are minimally connected, reflecting the low benefit of forming a link to someone who
is already in the same connected component. We obtain this result when the decay
parameter approaches 1, whereas De Jaegher and Kamphorst (2015) assume small
but not vanishing decay.
2.5 Eﬃciency in the model
Next, we analyze strong eﬃciency (SE) in the model, also sometimes referred to as
eﬃciency in the paper. In the degree-distance-based model, there is a much wider
range of possible SE architectures than in the Jackson and Wolinsky model. While
in the latter, only g∅, g∗ and gN can be SE, in our model additional structures can
be SE for some parameters. To see this immediately, consider the 3-player example
presented in Section 2.4.2. Figure 2.7 shows all strongly eﬃcient networks in this
model given by (2.7).
In this simple 3-player example we can already see an additional diﬀerence between
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Figure 2.7: Unique SE networks in the degree-distance-based connections model
given by (2.7) (from left to right): (i) (0 < δ < 13 and 2c > δ) or (
1
3 ≤ δ < 1
and 2c > 12δ
2 + 56δ), (ii) 0 < δ <
1
3 and δ
2 + 23δ < 2c < δ, (iii) (0 < δ <
1
3 ,
1
3δ − δ2 < 2c < δ2 + 23δ) or (13 ≤ δ < 1, 2c < 12δ2 + 56δ), (iv) 2c < 13δ − δ2
our model and the original connections model. In the latter, the cost ranges of
PS and SE for the complete network coincide. In the degree-distance-based model
defined by (2.7), gN can be PS but not eﬃcient: for n = 3 it is the case for 13δ−δ2 <
2c < 23δ − δ2. Similarly to Jackson and Wolinsky, we exhibit the contradiction
between stability and eﬃciency in the higher cost ranges: the empty network is PS
but not SE for δ < 2c < 12δ
2+ 56δ and
1
3 < δ < 1. The structure which could neither
be PS nor SE in the original connections model – the network containing one link
and one isolated player – is PS and SE in our model in the same cost range.
Another interesting observation in the model given by (2.7) and n = 4 is for instance
that the line is the unique SE network if 0 < δ < 4−
√
13
6 and
1
3δ − 13δ2 − δ3 < 2c <
1
3δ +
5
3δ
2 + δ3; for the calculations, see Appendix 2.A.1.
After presenting these examples, we turn to the theoretical analysis. Contrary to
the original connections model, disconnected networks may be pairwise stable. Let
us show that they can also be eﬃcient.
Proposition 2.10. Let n be even and fixed, and ϵ > 0. There exists b > 0 such
that for any function b with b(2, 1) < b, the network described in Proposition 2.8,
consisting of n/2 disjoint completely connected components with m = 2 is uniquely
eﬃcient in the cost range b(1,1)+b(1,2)2 + ϵ < c < b(1, 1)− ϵ.
Proof: Fix ϵ > 0. Consider the maximal indirect benefit an agent can gain from
a link. This benefit is bounded by (n− 2)b(2, 1). Thus the total social utility from
indirect links is bounded by n(n− 2)b(2, 1). Let b = ϵn(n−2) . For any 0 < b(2, 1) < b,
the total social utility of indirect links is inferior to ϵ. Basically, we can now neglect
utility from indirect contacts. Note that if there are at least two nodes with no
link, forming a link between them increases total utility since c < b(1, 1). Assume
now that a network contains some node i such that ηi = k ≥ 2. Let ij belong to
the network. Let us show that removing ij is eﬃciency improving. Let ηj ≥ 1.
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Since indirect benefits are negligible, only i and j lose by removing the link ij. This
loss is b(1, ηi) + b(1, ηj) ≤ b(1, 2) + b(1, 1) < 2c. Therefore removing the link of an
agent with degree greater than one is eﬃciency improving. In this parameter range,
an eﬃcient network is such that each agent has exactly degree 1. This is achieved
uniquely by a network consisting of disjoint connected components of size two. !
When decay is very large, benefits from indirect contacts are negligible and the
negative impact of an increased degree dominates. Thus it is not socially desirable
to connect two components.
Proposition 2.11 shows that when network size is large, the complete network is not
strongly eﬃcient when it is stable.
Proposition 2.11. Whenever (n − 1) (b(1, n− 2)− b(1, n− 1)) > b(1, n − 2) −
b(2, n− 2), the complete network is not strongly eﬃcient for any cost c > 0. For the
model defined by (2.7), gN is not SE whenever n > 1δ . In particular, the complete
network is not strongly eﬃcient when it is uniquely PS.
Proof: We note that the total link cost is always greater in gN than in gN − ij
when c > 0. Assume c = 0. Let us consider the diﬀerence in total utility between
gN and gN − ij, that is ∑ni=1 (u˜i(gN)− u˜i(gN − ij)). For agents i, j the utility loss
is b(1, n− 1)− b(2, n− 2). The remaining n − 2 agents gain from the connectivity
decrease of their direct neighbors i and j, 2(n − 2) (b(1, n− 2)− b(1, n− 1)). In
total, the change in social utility is
n∑
i=1
(
u˜i(g
N − ij)− u˜i(gN)
)
= 2(n− 2) (b(1, n− 2)− b(1, n− 1))− 2b(1, n− 1) + 2b(2, n− 2)
= 2(n− 1) (b(1, n− 2)− b(1, n− 1)) + 2 (b(2, n− 2)− b(1, n− 2)) .
This quantity is positive whenever (n− 1) (b(1, n− 2)− b(1, n− 1)) > b(1, n− 2)−
b(2, n− 2) meaning that the complete network gN is not strongly eﬃcient. Except
for very large decay (when b(1, n − 2) ≫ b(2, n − 2)), the complete network is
ineﬃcient even when n is rather small. Solving (n− 1) (b(1, n− 2)− b(1, n− 1)) >
b(1, n − 2) − b(2, n − 2) for the model defined by (2.7) leads equivalently to the
condition n > 1δ . !
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Proposition 2.12. Let g be a network in which lij(g) ≤ 2 for all i, j and let kl be
a link such that lij(g − kl) ≤ 2 for all i, j. Then:
(i) g − kl has higher overall utility than g for any c > 0 when n is such that
2(n − 2) > Kmin(α,β) where K = b(1, ηk) − b(2, ηk − 1) + b(1, ηl) − b(2, ηl − 1),
α := min1<l<n[b(1, l−1)−b(1, l)] > 0 and β := min1<l<n[b(2, l−1)−b(2, l)] > 0
(ii) In particular, for the model defined by (2.7), g − kl is strictly more eﬃcient
than g for any c > 0 if δ > 1/n.
Corollary 2.3. Suppose n satisfies the condition in Proposition 2.12. Then, neither
the windmill (presented in Proposition 2.2), nor the complete graph, nor the multiple
islands model (presented in Proposition 2.4 with l > 1) are eﬃcient (even when they
are PS).
Indeed, it is readily verified that these structures contain a link whose removal
conserves a maximal network diameter of 2.
Proof of Proposition 2.12: Consider two nodes k, l, such that the maximal dis-
tance in g − kl is still 2. We must have 1 < ηk ≤ n− 1 and 1 < ηl ≤ n− 1. Let us
show that overall utility increases when this link is removed.
First consider the change in utility for k and l: u˜k(g)−u˜k(g−kl)+u˜l(g)−u˜l(g−kl) =
b(1, ηk)−b(2, ηk−1)−c+b(1, ηl)−b(2, ηl−1)−c. This quantity is positive when g is
pairwise stable, since k and l have an incentive to maintain the link. It is bounded
by K.
The presence of the link kl has a negative impact on all other agents. Agent k has
degree ηk. Thus he has ηk − 1 direct neighbors, excluding l already accounted for
above. Besides k himself and his ηk direct neighbors, the remaining n−1−ηk agents
are at distance 2. The utility loss for these agents is (ηk−1)(b(1, ηk−1)−b(1, ηk))+
(n− 1− ηk)(b(2, ηk − 1)− b(2, ηk)) and similarly for agent l, replacing ηk by ηl.
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We can now compare the overall utility of g and g − kl. It is
n∑
i=1
(u˜i(g)− u˜i(g − kl))
= b(1, ηk)− b(2, ηk − 1) + b(1, ηl)− b(2, ηl − 1)− 2c
− (ηk − 1)(b(1, ηk − 1)− b(1, ηk))
− (n− 1− ηk)(b(2, ηk − 1)− b(2, ηk))− (ηl − 1)(b(1, ηl − 1)
− b(1, ηl))− (n− 1− ηl)(b(2, ηl − 1)− b(2, ηl))
Define α := min1<l<n[b(1, l−1)−b(1, l)] > 0 and β := min1<l<n[b(2, l−1)−b(2, l)] >
0.∑n
i=1 (u˜i(g)− u˜i(g − kl)) ≤ K − 2(n− 2)min(α, β)− 2c < K − 2(n− 2)min(α, β),
which is negative provided 2(n− 2) > Kmin(α,β) .
In particular, for the model defined by (2.7),
∑n
i=1 (ui(g)− ui(g − kl)) is negative
if F (ηk) + F (ηl) < 0 with F (ηk) =
δ
ηk+1
− δ2ηk − (ηk − 1)
[
δ
ηk
− δηk+1
]
− (n − 1 −
ηk)
[
δ2
ηk
− δ2ηk+1
]
F (ηk) < 0 ⇐⇒ ηk − δ(ηk + 1) − (ηk − 1) − (n − 1 − ηk)δ < 0 ⇐⇒ 1 < nδ.
Similarly, F (ηl) < 0 if and only if n >
1
δ . Thus, whenever n >
1
δ the network g is
not eﬃcient. !
This result is easy to understand. In a network in which all agents are at distance at
most 2 when kl is removed, the link kl benefits only agents k and l themselves and
exerts a negative externality on a large number of agents at distance 2. Provided n
is large, this outweighs the positive eﬀects of the link.
Next, we focus on the conditions for eﬃciency of the star. Let us define the function
h(m) = mb(1, m) + (n− 1−m)b(2, m) (2.13)
This function represents an upper bound of the social utility that an agent with
degree m provides to others. This upper bound is attained for example for a star,
but generally it is not attained. For the model defined by (2.7), we have h(m) =
m δ1+m + (n− 1−m) δ
2
1+m .
We assume the following conditions:
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Condition 2.1. Function h defined by (2.13) is decreasing.
Condition 2.2. For any k > 2, let a+d = k and a
′
+d
′
= k. Then if |a−d| ≥ |a′−d′|
then h(a) + h(d) ≥ h(a′) + h(d′).
Condition 2.2 means that when keeping fixed the sum of degrees of two agents,
the total maximal social utility provided by the two agents, as measured by the
function h is greater if the agents have dissimilar degrees. Note that Conditions 2.1
and 2.2 are satisfied for the model defined by (2.7), when n > 1δ ; for the proof, see
Appendix 2.A.2.
Condition 2.1 is not demanding and holds easily if the network size n is large. Condi-
tion 2.2 seems to have a convexity flavor. One agent with high degree and one agent
with low degree provide more social utility (or at least the upper bound given by h
is greater) than two agents with intermediate degrees. In fact the proposition below
shows under some conditions that Condition 2.2 cannot hold if b is concave with
respect to degree. However, convexity is not suﬃcient to guarantee Condition 2.2
because a convex function whose behavior is very close to that of a linear function
would not satisfy it.
Proposition 2.13. Suppose that for any degree η, b(2, η) = δb(1, η) for some δ ≤ 1
(decay independent of degree) and that b(1, η) is diﬀerentiable. Then Condition 2.2
never holds if b(1, η) is concave. Moreover Condition 2.2 does not hold for all convex
b(1, η).
This proposition is proved in Appendix 2.A.3.
Proposition 2.14. Let g be a connected structure. Whenever h given by (2.13)
satisfies Conditions 2.1 and 2.2, we have v(g) ≤ v(g∗).
Proof: First we show that v(g) ≤ v(g∗) for any minimally connected structure g.
Let g be a minimally connected structure. It is thus characterized by m, J1 and S
in Lemma 2.1 (presented in Appendix 2.A.4), the degrees of the nodes in S and the
distances between all pairs of nodes. By Lemma 2.1, all nodes in J1 have degree one.
There are m nodes in S whose degrees are (2+αi)mi=1 (without loss of generality we
let the m nodes in S be 1, 2, . . . , m). The remaining n − j1 −m nodes have degree
2. Therefore by Lemma 2.2 (presented in Appendix 2.A.5), we have
v(g) ≤ ∑ni=1 h(ηi(g)) = j1h(1) +∑mi=1 h(2 + αi) + (n− j1 −m)h(2).
We apply Condition 2.2 to obtain h(αi+αj+2)+h(2) ≥ h(αi+2)+h(αj+2). Thus
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we have
∑m
i=1 h(αi + 2) + (n−m− j1)h(2) =
∑m−2
i=1 h(αi + 2) + (n−m− j1)h(2) +
h(αm−1 + 2) + h(αm + 2) ≤ ∑m−2i=1 h(αi + 2) + (n −m − j1)h(2) + h(αm−1 + αm +
2) + h(2) =
∑m−2
i=1 h(αi + 2) + h(αm−1 + αm + 2) + (n −m − j1 + 1)h(2) ≤ . . . . ≤
h(
∑m
i=1 αi + 2) + (n− j1 − 1)h(2).
Then, applying again repeatedly Condition 2.2, v(g) ≤ j1h(1)+h(∑mi=1 αi+2)+(n−
j1−1)h(2) = j1h(1)+h(j1)+(n−j1−1)h(2) = j1h(1)+(n−j1−2)h(2)+h(2)+h(j1) ≤
j1h(1)+(n−j1−2)h(2)+h(1)+h(j1+1) = (j1+1)h(1)+h(j1+1)+(n−j1−2)h(2) ≤
. . . ≤ (n− 1)h(1) + h(n− 1) = v(g∗).
As we have shown, any minimally connected structure g has a degree sequence (ηi)ni=1
such that v(g) ≤ ∑ni=1 h(ηi) ≤ v(g∗). Any connected structure gK is a superset of
a minimally connected network g. Let g ⊂ gK and let µi = ηi(gK) − ηi(g) ≥ 0. By
Lemma 2.2 we have v(gK) ≤ ∑ni=1 h(ηi(gK)). We will show that ∑ni=1 h(ηi(gK)) ≤∑n
i=1 h(ηi(g)). Let us consider h being decreasing. For the model given by (2.7), we
verify that for all m > 1, h(m + 1) − h(m) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ δ ≥ 1n . We use this now to
show successively that:∑n
i=1 h(ηi(gK)) =
∑n
i=1 h(ηi(g) + µi) ≤
∑n
i=1 h(ηi(g) + (µi − 1)) ≤
∑n
i=1 h(ηi(g) +
(µi − 2)) ≤ . . . . ≤ ∑ni=1 h(ηi(g)). Since ∑ni=1 h(ηi) ≤ v(g∗), we conclude that
v(gK) ≤ ∑ni=1 h(ηi) ≤ v(g∗). !
Consequently, for the model defined by (2.7), v(g) ≤ v(g∗) whenever n > 1δ . We
now show that under some fairly weak assumptions on the payoﬀs, we also have
v(g∗) ≥ v(g) for any disconnected network g. Under these conditions, the star will
then be eﬃcient.
Proposition 2.15. Let g∗1 and g
∗
2 be two disjoint stars with centers i and j. When-
ever (nk − 1)[b(1, nk) + b(2, 1) − b(1, nk − 1)] ≥ c for k = 1, 2 (suﬃcient but not
necessary condition), where nk is the cardinality of g∗k, v(g
∗
1 ∪ g∗2 + ij) ≥ v(g∗1 ∪ g∗2).
In particular, this cost range exists when b(1, nk) + b(2, 1) > b(1, nk − 1).
Proof: Under the assumptions in Proposition 2.14, the value of a star is not smaller
than the value of any connected structure. Let g be a disconnected network. Then
v(g) is maximized when g is the union of star components. Let us show that under
some weak conditions, social utility is increased by connecting two stars.
Indeed, let i and j be the centers of two stars of size n1 and n2, with 2 ≤ n1 ≤ n
and 2 ≤ n2 ≤ n. If we add a link between the centers, then the change in utility is
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 2. A degree-distance-based connections model with negative and positive
externalities 38
(n1−1)[b(2, n2)+(n2−1)b(3, 1)+ b(1, n1)− b(1, n1−1)]+ b(1, n2)+(n2−1)b(2, 1)+
(n2−1)[b(2, n1)+(n1−1)b(3, 1)+b(1, n2)−b(1, n2−1)]+b(1, n1)+(n1−1)b(2, 1)−2c ≥
(n1−1)[b(2, n2)+b(1, n1)+b(2, 1)−b(1, n1−1)]+(n2−1)[b(2, n1)+b(1, n2)+b(2, 1)−
b(1, n2 − 1)]− 2c
This quantity is positive under a fairly weak condition: it is suﬃcient that decay
with distance is not too great and utility decrease with respect to the neighbor’s
degree is not too great: (nk − 1)[b(1, nk) + b(2, 1)− b(1, nk − 1)] ≥ c for k = 1, 2.
If connecting two disjoint stars is eﬃciency improving, the eﬃcient network cannot
be disconnected and so under Conditions 2.1 and 2.2, the star is eﬃcient. !
The condition in the above proposition is suﬃcient but not necessary and can be
improved. However, the star is not uniquely eﬃcient. The complete graph, the
empty one, and also the line or a disconnected graph with connected components of
size two can all be eﬃcient for some choices of b. The results we have are suﬃcient
to show that the star is uniquely stable under conditions which are compatible with
the (in some cases unique) pairwise stability of other structures than the star.
From Propositions 2.14 and 2.15, and adding condition that b(1, 1) > c (which
ensures that the empty network is not eﬃcient), we obtain the following.
Proposition 2.16. Let the benefit function b satisfy Conditions 2.1 and 2.2, (n˜−
1)[b(1, n˜) + b(2, 1) − b(1, n˜ − 1)] ≥ c for all 2 ≤ n˜ ≤ n and let b(1, 1) > c. Then
the star is eﬃcient, and is uniquely eﬃcient whenever a strict inequality holds in
Condition 2.2.
Having established the eﬃciency of the star under some conditions, we can now com-
pare with the pairwise stable structures characterized in the previous section. The
conditions for eﬃciency of the star can be compatible with the stability conditions
of the complete network or with that of the windmill network (Propositions 2.1(iv)
and 2.2). This is most readily verified by checking the respective conditions for
the function (2.7). Indeed, the assumptions under which we proved the star to be
eﬃcient exclude concavity of the benefit function with respect to degree, but the
new structures with short diameters could be stable both when the benefit function
is concave and when it is convex in degree. This implies the existence of benefit
functions and cost ranges verifying our general assumptions for which the star is
eﬃcient but not pairwise stable, and the pairwise stable or even uniquely pairwise
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stable network is not eﬃcient. We have already seen that for large n the windmill
or complete network are not eﬃcient in their stability region. The result about the
eﬃciency of the star also shows that the eﬃcient network can be strictly contained
in a (or the, in the case of uniqueness) pairwise stable network. This implies that
our model can give rise to overconnectivity in the strong sense defined by Buechel
and Hellmann (2012), which could never occur in the original connections model.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we analyzed network formation in the presence of negative externalities
in a model that combined the presence of indirect benefits and a penalty resulting
from the connectivity of direct and indirect neighbors. Our analysis focused mainly
on the case of structures with short diameters but also considered cases with extreme
levels of decay. It would be interesting but more challenging to extend it beyond
these cases. While remaining in the framework with global positive spillovers, we
could also consider somewhat diﬀerent models that capture other types of negative
externalities. As we discussed in the introduction, the model we proposed here is a
good fit for a situation that we could see as a “generalized” co-author model where
knowledge spills over from more distant parts of the network. We can also think of
situations where benefits could spill over from distant neighbors but be reduced by
overall connectivity. One might see a link as a consumer good whose value is based
on its rarity and which thus decreases the more common or widespread it is. We
could also gear the model more specifically towards the competition for information,
by letting payoﬀs depend on the number of informed agents in a communication
chain. Finally, we note that in the model we considered, as well as in the potential
extensions, we are likely to have a high multiplicity of equilibria, suggesting that
the use of stronger stability concepts, e.g., strongly stable networks (those which
are stable against changes in links by any coalition of individuals; see Jackson and
van den Nouweland, 2005) could be helpful for equilibrium selection.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Proof for eﬃciency of the line for n = 4
The line is the unique SE network for n = 4, model (2.7) and some δ, c.
Proof: Let n = 4. Let U (k) =
∑4
i=1 ui(g
(k)), where k ∈ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ 8. Similarly,
the sum of the players’ utilities for the line, the empty graph and the complete graph
is denoted by UL, U∅ and UN , respectively. We will determine the parameters δ and
c under which the line gL is the unique SE network. We have: UL = δ3+ 53δ
2+ 73δ−6c
U∅ = 0, UN = 3δ − 12c, for the graph with one link: U (1) = δ − 2c
for the graphs with two links: U (2) = 2δ − 4c, U (3) = δ2 + 53δ − 4c
for the graphs with 3 links (diﬀerent from gL): U (4) = 3δ2 + 94δ − 6c (star), U (5) =
2δ − 6c
for the graphs with 4 links: U (6) = 43δ
2 + 83δ − 8c, U (7) = 53δ2 + 3112δ − 8c
for the graph with 5 links: U (8) = 23δ
2 + 176 δ − 10c.
UL > U (4) iﬀ δ2− 43δ+ 112 > 0 iﬀ 0 < δ < 4−
√
13
6 . We solve: U
L > U (2) and UL > U (6)
and 0 < δ < 4−
√
13
6 , which gives 0 < δ <
4−√13
6 and
1
3δ− 13δ2−δ3 < 2c < 13δ+ 53δ2+δ3.
For such δ and c, we have, in particular, δ > 2c. Hence, UL > U (1), UL > U∅, and
also UL > U (3), UL > U (5), UL > U (8), UL > U (7), UL > UN . !
2.A.2 Proof regarding Conditions 2.1 and 2.2
Conditions 2.1 and 2.2 are satisfied for the model (2.7), when n > 1δ .
Proof: Consider h(m) = m δ1+m +(n−1−m) δ
2
1+m . We have h
′(m) = δ(1−δn)(1+m)2 < 0 for
n > 1δ . Consider a, d such that a + d = k, and therefore d = k − a. For the model
defined by (2.7), we have h(a)+h(d) = h(a)+h(k−a) = δa1+a+(n−1−a) δ
2
1+a+(k−
a) δ1+k−a+(n−1−(k−a)) δ
2
1+k−a =
(1+a)(δ−δ2)
1+a +
(1+k−a)(δ−δ2)
1+k−a +δ
[
nδ−1
1+a +
nδ−1
1+k−a
]
. Thus
we can write h(a)+h(d) = c(δ)+δG(a), where G(a) := nδ−11+a +
nδ−1
1+k−a . The derivative
of this function is G
′
(a) = 1−nδ(1+a)2 +
nδ−1
(1+k−a)2 which is zero at a = k/2. Moreover, we
can show that this zero corresponds to a minimum provided that nδ > 1. Indeed,
when this is the case, G(a) ≥ 0 and G(0) = (nδ − 1)
(
1 + 11+k
)
≥ G(k/2) =
(nδ− 1)
(
2
1+k/2
)
for every k ≥ 2. We also note that by symmetry, G(a) = G(k− a).
This implies that G(a) is decreasing on [0, k/2] and increasing on [k/2, k]. Since
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|a− d| = |a− (k − a)| = |2a− k|, if |a− d| > |a′ − d′ |, then |a− k/2| > |a′ − k/2|,
which implies G(a) > G(a
′
), which implies h(a) + h(d) > h(a
′
) + h(d
′
). !
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2.13
Proof: Condition 2.2 holds if and only if h(a) + h(d) = h(a) + h(k − a) =: H(a)
is decreasing on [0, k/2]. We have b(2, η) = δb(1, η) for some δ ≤ 1. We compute
H
′
(a) to find H
′
(a) = (1− δ)[b(1, a)− b(1, k− a)] + δ(n− 1)[b′(1, a)− b′(1, k− a)] +
(1 − δ)[ab′(1, a) − (k − a)b′(1, k − a)]. Now a ≤ k − a. Consequently if b(1, η) is
concave in degree, b′(1, k − a) < b′(1, a) < 0 and H ′(a) > 0. Thus Condition 2.2 is
not compatible with concavity of b with respect to degree. We can also see that in
the limit case between concavity and convexity where b(1, η) is linear in degree, we
would have H
′
(a) ≥ (1−δ)[b(1, a)−b(1, k−a)] > 0. Thus convexity is not suﬃcient
to guarantee Condition 2.2. !
2.A.4 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Lemma 2.1. Let g be a minimally connected network of size n > 3. Let J1 be the
set of nodes of degree 1 and j1 the number of elements in this set. Then, whenever
j1 > 2, there exists a set S containing 1 ≤ m ≤ j1 nodes such that for all i ∈ S,
ηi ≥ 3 and ∑i∈S αi = j1 − 2, with αi = ηi − 2.
Proof: We prove this by induction on the network size. Any minimally connected
structure of size n+1 can be obtained by adding one node n+1 and one link between
n+1 and some j < n+1 in a minimally connected network of size n. Suppose that gn
(n ≥ 4) verifies the induction hypothesis. If S(gn) = ∅, gn is a line. If we link n+1 to
a node of degree 1, j1(gn+1) = j1(gn) = 2 and S(gn+1) is still empty. If we add a link
between n+1 and a node of degree 2, there will be 3 nodes with degree 1 and 1 node of
degree 3. Thus j1(gn+1) = 3, and
∑
i∈S(gn+1) αi(gn+1) = 1 = j1(gn+1)−2. If gn verifies
the induction hypothesis and S(gn) ̸= ∅, there are several possibilities. Either the
link from n+1 goes to a node j such that ηj(gn) = 1. Then the number of nodes with
degree one does not change so j1(gn+1) = j1(gn). The number of nodes in S does not
change and ηj(gn+1) = 2. Thus
∑
i∈S(gn+1) αi(gn+1) =
∑
i∈S(gn) αi(gn) = j1(gn)− 2 =
j1(gn+1)− 2. If ηj(gn) = 2 then ηj(gn+1) = 3 and card(S(gn+1)) = card(S(gn)) + 1
and j1(gn+1) = j1(gn) + 1. Thus
∑
i∈S(gn+1) αi(gn+1) =
∑
i∈S(gn) αi(gn) + αj(gn+1) =
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j1(gn) − 2 + 1 = j1(gn+1) − 2. Finally, if n + 1 links to j such that ηj(gn) > 2,
then j1(gn+1) = j1(gn) + 1, card(S(gn)) = card(S(gn+1)) and ηj(gn+1) = ηj(gn) + 1.
Thus
∑
i∈S(gn+1) αi(gn+1) =
∑
i∈S(gn) αi(gn+1) =
∑
i∈S(gn) αi(gn) + 1 = j1(gn) − 2 +
1 = j1(gn+1) − 2. This concludes the proof of the induction step. The induction
hypothesis is verified when n = 4. There are two minimally connected structures:
a line and a star. In a line, there are two elements of degree 1, thus j1 = 2 and
S = ∅. In a star with n = 4, j1 = 3, S consists of the center with degree 3 and
indeed
∑
i∈S(gn) αi(gn) = 3− 2 = j1(gn)− 2. !
2.A.5 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Lemma 2.2. Let g be a network with degree sequence (ηi(g))ni=1. Then the value of
g is v(g) ≤ ∑ni=1 h(ηi(g)).
Proof: The ηi(g) immediate neighbors of i derive the utility b(1, ηi(g)) from the
link to i. The remaining n − 1 − ηi(g) nodes are at distance at least 2 from i and
therefore the utility obtained from i is bounded by b(2, ηi(g)). !
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 3
Competition for the access to and
use of information in networks
This chapter is based on a joint work with Agnieszka Rusinowska and
Emily Tanimura, both from Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne, Cen-
tre d’Economie de la Sorbonne. It is forthcoming in Mathematical Social
Sciences (MSS).
3.1 Introduction
In addition to public information, diﬀused by sources such as the media, and avail-
able to everyone, most of us also receive valuable information that circulates only in
a restricted manner, between friends and acquaintances. Access to such decentral-
ized information certainly matters. For example, numerous studies have shown that
direct and indirect personal contacts are the most frequent providers of information
that leads to finding a job (Granovetter, 1973, 1974); see also Boorman (1975) for
transmission of job information via strong and weak contacts. This highlights the
importance of an individual’s network of friends and acquaintances and justifies the
widely recognized idea that the latter is a form of social capital.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) were the first to propose and analyze a setting, later
generalized by Bloch and Jackson (2007), where individuals seek to maximize the
benefits in terms of information flow, that they receive in a network by strategically
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forming their links. An underlying assumption in their framework is that a denser
social network will benefit everyone by providing more information, at least if we
disregard the cost required to maintain the relationships.
However, this relies on the underlying assumption that information is what is known
as a non-rivalrous good, that is, a good which, used by several individuals simul-
taneously, provides each of them with the same utility as if he were the sole user.
At a closer look, the validity of this assumption seems to depend on the nature of
the information. Going back to the case of employment opportunities, someone who
learns of an attractive job opening would certainly prefer that few other people were
informed. Similarly, learning of an early sale of coveted concert tickets or where
there is available parking in a crowded part of town is more valuable when the in-
formation is not widely shared. In other cases, information is truly a non-rivalrous
good: I am glad to be informed that rain is predicted in the afternoon because I can
bring my umbrella and my well-being is in no way reduced by the fact that others
find out too and bring theirs. For this reason, it is natural to integrate a negative
externality that captures how much an agent’s utility declines when he has to share
his information with others.
A second point to consider is that even in cases where the use of information is non-
rival, there may be competition for the access to it due to congestion eﬀects. Agents
with many contacts are less likely to spend as much time with each one of them
as someone who has a small number of contacts. This may translate into a lower
probability of transmitting useful information to each one of the contacts. In this
case, an agent is not per se unhappy that other people receive certain information.
He is unhappy if others receive it instead of him.
In this paper we discuss how to model the negative externalities associated with
connectivity resulting from the two aforementioned eﬀects in a network formation
game framework. We consider two separate models, to capture competitive use
of information and competitive access to information, respectively. In practice,
the presence of both together is perfectly possible. However, separating the cases
facilitates the analysis and allows us to better understand and compare the eﬀects
of each assumption.
Our main results concern pairwise stability and eﬃciency in these two models. In
particular, our analysis sheds some light on the essential diﬀerences between the
eﬀects of competition for the access to information and the competitive use of in-
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 3. Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 45
formation. We begin our analysis by determining necessary conditions for pairwise
stability in the first model. This allows us to rule out some candidates for pairwise
stability and to characterize the possible ones in terms of the quantity of incom-
ing information received by the agents and their importance as intermediaries. In
both models, we analyze pairwise stability of several “standard” architectures, in
particular, the star, circle, complete and empty networks, and a structure of sepa-
rate pairs. We also examine k-regular networks in the second model which is more
tractable with respect to this analysis. Depending on model parameters, a variety of
structures can be pairwise stable. We introduce a new stability concept that we call
“asymptotic pairwise stability”, i.e., we are interested in the network structures that
remain PS when the number of agents becomes very large. This approach, which
consists in studying the asymptotic properties of a sequence of graphs of increasing
size is standard in the analysis of random graphs (see, e.g., Erdős and Rényi (1960)
and Bollobas (2001)) where it is motivated by the need to use probabilistic limit
theorems. Our framework is the same but in the special case where the sequence of
graphs is deterministic and the asymptotic properties we seek to study are related
to the payoﬀ parameters of our model. From an empirical point of view, focusing
on network structures that are stable when the number of agents is large but not
necessarily otherwise seems relatively reasonable in our model which aims to de-
scribe individuals’ access to useful information. To illustrate this point through a
numerical example, empirical studies such as e.g., Killworth and Bernhard (1978)
estimate the number of contacts where a contact is defined as somebody from whom
one can ask for a favor to 200 on average. In an empirical study about finding a job,
Granovetter (1974) found that the information that allowed an individual to find a
job typically originated from indirect contacts up to three steps away. Even if we
assume that there is much overlap, so that each of one’s 200 contacts does not pro-
vide 200 distinct contacts, conservatively estimating the number of non-overlapping
contacts to 100 places the number of agents relevant to the transmission of informa-
tion at 1003 = 1 000 000. More generally, the notion of asymptotic pairwise stability
could be relevant for studying various large networks such as peer to peer file shar-
ing networks, Facebook, etc. In our setting, asymptotic pairwise stability allows
us to obtain sharper predictions. Furthermore, for both models we show a tension
between the asymptotic pairwise stability and eﬃciency, in the sense that some
network architectures are not eﬃcient when being asymptotically pairwise stable.
While our paper is related to a number of other works in the literature on strategic
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network formation, to the best of our knowledge we are the first ones to propose a
framework for studying network formation with information overspills in the case
where the use of information is competitive. A model of network formation with
information flow and congestion eﬀects is studied by Charoensook (2012), although
in a diﬀerent framework from the connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996)
and the model we propose, since he builds on Bala and Goyal (2000) and analyzes
Nash networks. Calvó-Armengol (2004) considers job contacts networks and rivalry
in the access through network links, but investigates a diﬀerent framework of strate-
gic network formation and studies the Nash equilibria of a non-cooperative game of
network formation. The problems of competitive use or access to information are not
explicitly considered in the modifications and extensions of the original connections
model (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996) that capture the issue of negative and positive
externalities in networks (e.g., Billand et al. (2012), Billand et al. (2013), Buechel
and Hellmann (2012), Currarini (2007), Goyal and Joshi (2006), Haller (2012), Hell-
mann (2013), Morrill (2011), Möhlmeier et al. (2016) and the references therein) or
in the communication networks where the link-strength is endogenously chosen by
the agents (e.g., Bloch and Dutta, 2009).
In the model of competition for the access to information, for reasons that will be
explained when the model is presented, all paths between agents are taken into
account, not only the shortest paths as is usually the case in the literature on
strategic network formation. An exception is Charoensook (2012) where in case of
multiple paths between two agents, the value of information sent between them is
given by the optimal paths, i.e., the paths that maximize the value of information
obtained via the diﬀerent paths.
Another work that has a similarity with the present paper in the sense of considering
all possible paths is Lim et al. (2015) who investigate a threshold model of cascades
in networks. They define a cascade centrality of an agent as the expected number of
switches given the agent is the seed, where the expected probability that an agent
switches is equal to the sum of the degree sequence products along all the paths
from each seed.
In the remainder of the paper we proceed as follows. First, preliminaries on net-
works are recalled in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 concerns competition for the access
to information. In Section 3.4 we study the competition for the use of informa-
tion. Section 3.5 presents concluding remarks and a comparison of the two kinds
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of competition for information. Longer proofs of the results are presented in the
Appendix.
3.2 Preliminaries
First we recall some notations and definitions related to networks that will be used
in our analysis; see e.g., Jackson and Wolinsky (1996); Jackson (2008). Let N =
{1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of players (actors, agents). For simplicity and w.l.g. we
assume that n is even. A network g is a set of pairs {i, j} denoted for convenience by
ij, with i, j ∈ N , i ̸= j,1 where ij denotes a link between players i and j. Nodes i and
j are directly connected (in other words, i and j are neighbors) if and only if ij ∈ g.
We denote by Ni(g) the neighborhood of i in g, i.e., Ni(g) = {j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}.
The degree di(g) of agent i counts the number of links i has in g, i.e., di(g) =
|Ni(g)| = |{j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}|.
A network g is regular if for some d ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}, di(g) = d for each i ∈ N .
We denote by g∅, g∗, gc and gN the empty network (regular network with d = 0),
the star (network in which di = n − 1 for one node i (the center) and dj = 1 for
all other (peripheral) nodes j ̸= i), the circle (regular network with d = 2) and the
complete network (regular network with d = n − 1), respectively. The set of all
possible networks g on N is denoted by G := {g | g ⊆ gN}.
By g+ ij (g− ij, respectively) we denote the network obtained by adding link ij to
g (deleting link ij from g, respectively). Furthermore, by g−i we denote the network
obtained by deleting player i and all his links from the network g.
Let N(g) (n(g), respectively) denote the set (the number, respectively) of players in
N with at least one link, i.e., N(g) = {i | ∃j s.t. ij ∈ g} and n(g) = |N(g)|.
A path connecting i1 and iK is a set of distinct nodes {i1, i2 . . . , iK} ⊆ N(g) such
that {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , iK−1iK} ⊆ g. We denote by p(i1iK) a path from i1 to iK and
by P (i1iK) the set of all paths from i1 to iK . We write j ∈ p(i1iK) if path p(i1iK)
passes through j.
By lij(g) we denote the geodesic distance between i and j, i.e., the number of links
1We do not allow for loops in this setting.
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in the shortest path between i and j in g. If there is no path connecting i and j in
g, then we set lij(g) =∞.
A network g is connected if there is a path between any two nodes in g.
The network g′ ⊆ g is a component of g if for all i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g′), i ̸= j,
there exists a path in g′ connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g),
ij ∈ g implies that ij ∈ g′.
Let ui : G → R denote the utility for player i ∈ N . A network g ∈ G is pairwise
stable (denoted by PS) if:
(i) ∀ ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij) and
(ii) ∀ ij /∈ g, if ui(g) < ui(g + ij) then uj(g) > uj(g + ij).
A network g ⊆ gN is strongly eﬃcient (denoted by SE) if
∑
i∈N
ui(g) ≥
∑
i∈N
ui(g
′) for all g′ ⊆ gN
3.3 The model of competition for the access to
information
3.3.1 Description of the model
Each agent possesses a private piece of information which provides other agents
with a benefit if they receive it. The information transmission between two agents
takes place if a costly link between them is established. We assume two-way com-
munication which can be modeled by an undirected network, where a link between
agents i and j enables agent i to access j’s information and vice-versa. We consider
two-sided link formation, i.e., mutual consent is required for forming a link.
In our first model we assume that there is competition for the access to information,
for example because an agent with many contacts spends less time with each of his
contacts, and thus has fewer opportunities to pass on information to the latter. On
the other hand, we assume that the use of the information is non-rivalrous. We
want to capture the idea that the likelihood that each neighbor receives a piece of
information decreases with the number of contacts of the sender. When an agent
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is not sure that information will actually reach him through the shortest path to
the sender, it is natural to value redundancy, that is, the agent gets utility from
all paths between him and the sender not just the shortest one. Consequently, the
utility of agent i in the model of competition for the access to information is defined
by
uCAi (g) =
∑
j ̸=i
∑
p(ij)∈P (ij)
δ|p(ij)|
∏
k∈p(ij),k ̸=i
f(dk(g))− cdi(g) (3.1)
where p(ij) is a path from i to j of length |p(ij)|, 0 < δ < 1, f is a decreasing
function of the degree, f(d) > 0 for every d ∈ N+, f(1) ≤ 1, and c > 0 is the cost
for a direct connection. We have uCAi (g) = 0 if P (ij) = ∅ for each j ∈ N .
The modeling of the function f is important. We can interpret f(d) as the proba-
bility that a neighbor of an agent with degree d receives the information from the
latter. We compute the probability of each possible path along which information
can travel to an agent, and multiply it by the utility of receiving the information
through that path (i.e., taking into account the path length). Arguably, the value
one assigns to receiving a piece of information from some path with a certain proba-
bility, might be lower if one also has a probability of receiving the information along
other paths. This would be especially true if one was almost sure to receive the
information along some of the paths. However, we are interested in the case where
communication eﬃciency decreases with degree, so that a large number of paths
necessarily means that each one has a low probability. We will assume that agents
value all additional possibilities of receiving an information and so we do not apply
a concave transformation to
∑
j ̸=i
∑
p(ij)∈P (ij) δ|p(ij)|
∏
k∈p(ij),k ̸=i f(dk(g)).
The functional form of f determines how the level of ineﬃciency of the communica-
tion varies with degree. If f is convex, the decline is more rapid for small degrees,
if f is concave it is the contrary. We can see the quantity f(d)d as measuring the
eﬃciency of transmission to d contacts. We note that f(d)d ≤ d. Cases where f(d)d
is large (a particular case being f(d) = 1) would be for example when an agent uses
mailing lists to communicate, he can then successfully send information to an arbi-
trarily large number of contacts. If he needs to meet contacts in person, we should
have f(d) ≪ 1d for large degrees, so that f(d)d < 1, which can be interpreted as a
situation where conveying the information requires a lengthy explanation so that an
agent with too many contacts may not convey it successfully to any of them.
The specific choice f(d) = 1/d can be viewed as a case where the agent splits his
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time equally with his contacts and the probability of being informed is proportional
to this time. Since we will sometimes do computations with this specific functional
form, we define the utility
u˜CAi (g) =
∑
j ̸=i
∑
p(ij)∈P (ij)
δ|p(ij)|
∏
k∈p(ij),k ̸=i
1
dk
− cdi(g) (3.2)
It is clear that our model diﬀers from the connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky,
1996) and the degree-distance-based connections model (Möhlmeier et al., 2016) in
several respects. In the original Jackson-Wolinsky model, the benefit of i from the
information sent by j in g is equal to δlij(g). In the degree-distance-based connections
model, such a benefit is determined by bˆ(dij(g), dj(g)), where the benefit function bˆ
is nonincreasing in each of the two variables (distance, degree) and bˆ(∞, dj) = 0 for
every dj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1}. In the present model, the function f reduces the flow
of information from high degree senders and passing via high degree intermediaries.
Moreover, we take into account multiple paths originating from the same sender,
not only the shortest paths. To illustrate it on a simple example, consider networks
g and g′ in Figure 3.1 and the benefit of agent i from the information sent by agent
j. In the original connections model, the flow of information from j to i is equally
beneficial to i in g and g′, and is equal to δ2. The fact that agent k has fairly more
connections in g′ than in g and hence the information from j to i could be conveyed
much easier in g than in g′ is ignored in the Jackson-Wolinsky model. Similarly in
the degree-distance-based connections model (and if we set a particular functional
form of the benefit function bˆ(dij(g), dj(g)) =
1
1+dj(g)
δdij(g) which gives i the benefit
δ2
3 from the information sent by j): while it does take into account the number of
connections of the sender of information, it ignores the connections of agents along
the paths of the flow of information, i.e., the connections of agent k in this example.
The model of competition for the access to information defined in (3.1) and (3.2)
assumes that the neighbors of both agents j and k have an impact on the eﬃciency
of the information transmission between j and i. Agent i benefits more when the
intermediary agent k has less contacts. In model (3.2) the benefits that i gets from
j’s information sent via k are equal to δ
2
4 in g and
δ2
14 in g
′.
Our model of competition for the access to information also diﬀers from the original
connections model in how the information flow is evaluated. It is assumed that
each agent passes the piece of information he possesses to all of his contacts, i.e.,
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j’s information is sent to i both via k and via l. Since i cannot always be sure via
which path j’s information will reach him first, not only the shortest paths that the
information passes through (or the path that would give the maximum benefit), but
all paths of the information flow between j and i “contribute” to the benefit. In the
example given in Figure 3.1 this means that the benefit for i from the information
sent by j is equal to the sum of the benefits from the shortest path going through
k and from the path passing through l and m (the latter being equal to δ
3
8 in both
g and g′ under model (3.2)). Note that in g′, for suﬃciently large δ this benefit δ
3
8
is greater than the benefit δ
2
14 from the information passed via the shortest path.
g
k
i
j
l
m
g′
k
i
j
l
m
12
3
4 5
Figure 3.1: The models of competition for information versus the connections and
degree-distance-based connections models
In the next sections we analyze pairwise stability in the model given by (3.1) and
(3.2).
3.3.2 Possible and ruled-out categories of pairwise stable
structures
In what follows we analyze necessary conditions for maintaining a link in a PS net-
work in model (3.1). We show that the value of a link to an agent is determined
by two features of this agent’s structural position: on one hand the quantity of
incoming information he receives and on the other hand his importance as an inter-
mediary. The condition allows us to obtain some characterizations of possible PS
structures in terms of these two features - incoming information and importance as
an intermediary.
• We define the information obtained by j without using i as an intermediary
in network g as:
Ij−i(g) =
∑
k ̸=j,i
∑
p−i(kj)∈P−i(kj)
δ|p
−i(kj)| ∏
m∈p−i(kj)
f(dm(g))
where p−i(kj) is a path from k to j that does not pass through i and P−i(kj)
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denotes the set of such paths.
• We define the information of i with j as an intermediary (or a sender) in
network g − ij as:
I i,j(g − ij) =∑
k ̸=i
∑
pj(ki)∈P j(ki)
δ|p
j(ki)| ∏
m∈pj(ki)
f(dm(g − ij))
where pj(ki) is a path from k to i that passes through j and P j(ki) denotes
the set of such paths. Moreover, pj(ji) and P j(ji) denote simply p(ji) and
P (ji), respectively.
Lemma 3.1. Let ij ∈ g. Agent i prefers network g to network g − ij if and only if
δf(dj(g))
(
1 + Ij−i(g)
)
− I i,j(g − ij)
(
1− f(dj(g))
f(dj(g)− 1)
)
> c (3.3)
Proof: uCAi (g) > u
CA
i (g− ij) is equivalent to δf(dj(g))+ Ij−i(g)δf(dj(g))+ I i,j(g−
ij) f(dj(g))f(dj(g)−1) − c > I i,j(g − ij) which leads to (3.3). !
It results from the above formulation that if the communication technology is inef-
ficient for high degrees (limd→∞ f(d) = 0) then:
• In a PS network (unless the cost is very low), agents with a high degree must
receive a high quantity of information.
• In a PS network (unless the cost is very high), if low degree agents receive a
high quantity of information, they must also be important as intermediaries
in the network.
One could be inclined to think that agents with a high degree always receive a lot
of information, making the first remark above trivial. This is in fact not the case.
Even if a node has a high degree, it does not necessarily need to get a lot of incoming
information.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that the degree di of every agent i in the network satisfies
d ≤ di ≤ d¯. Then an upper bound on value of the information received by any agent
is
∑n−1
l=1 (d¯f(d)δ)
l. In particular, if d¯f(d)δ < 1, then the upper bound is independent
of the network size n.
Proof: The number of paths (without repetition) of length l leading to i is bounded
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by d¯l. Indeed, i has at most d¯ neighbors and each of them has at most d¯ neighbors
and so on. Since the minimal degree of any node is d, the value of an information
sent on a path of length l is bounded by (f(d)δ)l. Since the maximal length of a
path with no repetition is n − 1, the total value of incoming information is thus
bounded by
∑n−1
l=1 (d¯f(d)δ)
l. !
It follows from the bound above that the quantity of incoming information of a high
degree node can vary greatly depending on the network structure. For example,
we can apply Lemma 3.2 with d¯ = d = n − 1 to the complete network. If the
communication technology is ineﬃcient, the condition d¯f(d)δ < 1 holds and so the
value of the incoming information for each node in the complete network is bounded
independently of n. When n is large, it is thus order of magnitude smaller than for
the center of a star which receives (n− 1)f(1)δ, and this despite identical degrees.
The following proposition can be seen to result from a bound of the incoming infor-
mation an agent can receive.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose that the communication technology satisfies f(d)d < α <
1 when d is suﬃciently large. Consider a network in which each node i has a degree
di such that k ≤ di ≤ kδ . If k = cn for c > 0, so that the degrees are of the same
order of magnitude as the network size, then such a network cannot be PS when n
is large.
Proof: We apply Lemma 3.2 with d = k and d¯ = kδ . The total value of incoming
information is thus bounded by
∑n−1
l=1 (kf(k))
l. By assumption kf(k) < α < 1 for
large k, and we have limn→∞
∑n−1
l=1 (kf(k))
l = kf(k)1−kf(k) . Consequently, the requirement
δf(d)[1 + Ij−i(g)] > c cannot hold for any d = cn, when n is large. This rules
out networks with high (on the order of magnitude of the total network size) and
fairly homogeneous (i.e., whose variation is bounded by the constraint k ≤ di ≤ kδ )
degrees. !
The condition k ≤ di ≤ kδ for each i puts a bound on the variation in degree of the
nodes. The result basically says that large networks where agents have high but
homogeneous degrees are not PS when communication technology is ineﬃcient for
large degrees.
To conclude, the previous results rule out some candidates for PS structures (except
for very low costs):
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(1) No PS network can contain high degree nodes receiving a low level of incoming
information.
(2) No PS network can consist only of nodes with a high and fairly homogeneous
degree (the degree of every node i must verify k ≤ di ≤ kδ ).
The PS networks that are not ruled out by the previous results can thus belong to
the following very general categories:
(a) networks combining high degree nodes with a lot of information and low degree
nodes receiving little information;
(b) networks with only low degree nodes and a lot of information who are all
important as intermediaries in the network (this structural constraint is ac-
tually rather restrictive since low degree nodes are not naturally important
intermediaries);
(c) networks combining high degree nodes and low degree nodes, where both types
receive a lot of information;
(d) networks with only low degree nodes with little information.
In the next subsection, we will study the pairwise stability of some particular net-
works which provide examples of structures belonging to the diﬀerent categories
listed above.
3.3.3 Pairwise stability of some “standard” architectures
We analyze pairwise stability of the prominent network structures that were shown to
be stable in the Jackson-Wolinsky model and the degree-distance-based connections
model, such as the empty network, the star and the complete network, as well as
pairwise stability of the circle and some disconnected structures.
Proposition 3.2. In the model defined by (3.1) the following holds:
(i) The empty network g∅ is PS if f(1)δ ≤ c.
(ii) The star g∗ with n ≥ 3 is PS if
f(2)δ + f(n− 1) (2f(2)− f(1)) δ2 + (n− 3)f(1)f(2)f(n− 1)δ3 ≤ c
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and
c ≤ min
(
f(1)δ, f(n− 1)δ + (n− 2)f(1)f(n− 1)δ2
)
. (3.4)
(iii) The complete network gN with n ≥ 3 is PS if
c ≤ f(n− 1)δ
+ f(n− 1)δ
n−2∑
k=1
δk
(n− 2)!
(n− 2− k)!f
k−1(n− 1) ((k + 1)f(n− 1)− kf(n− 2)) .
(3.5)
(iv) The circle gc of n > 3 nodes is PS if
c ≤
n−1∑
k=1
fk(2)δk + fn−2(2)δn−1 (f(2)− f(1)) (3.6)
and
c ≥ f(3)δ + 2f(3)
n−2∑
k=1
fk(2)δk+1 + 2f(3)f
n
2
−1(2)δ
n
2 − 2
n−1∑
k=n
2
fk(2)δk. (3.7)
(v) The structure of n2 separate pairs is PS if
f(2)δ(1 + f(1)δ) ≤ c ≤ f(1)δ (3.8)
The cost range for the stability is non-empty whenever
δ ≤ f(1)− f(2)
f(1)f(2)
. (3.9)
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.1.
The conditions for pairwise stability obviously involve the cost c, the decay δ and the
function f . Depending on the structure, pairwise stability depends on the eﬃciency
of the communication technology for diﬀerent degrees. More precisely, we only take
into account f(1) for the empty network, f(1) and f(2) for the structure of separate
pairs, f(1), f(2) and f(3) for the circle, f(1), f(2) and f(n − 1) for the star with
n nodes, and finally f(n − 1) and f(n − 2) for the complete graph with n nodes.
Conditions for pairwise stability of the network structures of n nodes usually depend
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on n, with the exception of the empty network and the structure of separate pairs. It
is interesting to see if the stability of these structures is preserved when the number
of agents becomes very large. For instance, if we consider the particular model
defined in (3.2), then one can clearly see that the cost range for stability of the
star decreases with the number of agents and becomes empty when n → ∞. The
same remark holds for the stability of the complete network. The next subsection
is devoted to the analysis of this issue.
3.3.4 Asymptotic pairwise stability
As we have explained in the introduction, it is natural to assume that the number
of agents who participate in the information exchange described by our models is
large. For this reason, it is natural to focus on networks that are PS when n is large.
To this eﬀect, we introduce a notion of asymptotic (with respect to network size)
pairwise stability.
Definition 3.1. Let S be some network structure (e.g., star, complete graph, circle,
. . . ). We say that the structure S is asymptotically pairwise stable (APS) with
respect to the utility function u if
• it is asymptotically well defined, i.e., we can define a sequence of networks
(gnk)k≥1 of strictly increasing size nk such that every network gnk has the struc-
ture S, and
• there exist fixed admissible parameters of the utility functions (ui)ni=1 such that
for all i, j, i ̸= j
lim
n→+∞ (ui(gn)− ui(gn − ij)) ≥ 0
and if
lim
n→+∞ (ui(gn + ij)− ui(gn)) > 0,
then
lim
n→+∞ (uj(gn + ij)− uj(gn)) ≤ 0.
The set of admissible specifications (parameters) of the utility function for which
the network is APS is the asymptotic stability range of the networks.
Remark 3.1. In the model (3.1) the asymptotic stability range is (c, δ, f), i.e., it
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is determined by the cost c > 0, 0 < δ < 1 and a function f defined in (3.1), i.e.,
verifying f(d) > 0 for all d ∈ N+ and f(1) ≤ 1.
We should note that APS is not a refinement of PS, nor is it a weaker concept. A
certain network structure can be PS for some fixed n but not APS. It is also possible
that a certain network structure is APS but not PS for small values of n. This will be
illustrated by several examples further on. The main interest of the concept of APS
is to reduce the parameter space since the parameter n disappears. The conditions
for APS tend to be less involved than those for PS which may depend on n.
Proposition 3.3. In the model (3.1) the following holds:
(i) The empty network g∅ is APS whenever it is PS, i.e., if f(1)δ ≤ c.
(ii) The star g∗ with n ≥ 3 is not APS for ineﬃcient communication technology,
more precisely, when limn→+∞ f(n)n = 0, for any δ < 1.
If f satisfies 0 < limn→+∞ f(n)n ≤ 1, then there exists a non-empty positive
cost range for which the star g∗ is APS if and only if
1 ≥ lim
n→+∞ f(n)n >
f(2)
f(1)(1− f(2)) .
In particular, for the model (3.2), i.e., when f(d) = 1/d, such a non-empty
cost range does not exist.
(iii) The complete network gN is not APS for ineﬃcient communication technology,
more precisely, for a function f such that limn→+∞ f(n)n ≤ 1, for any δ < 1.
(iv) There exists a non-empty positive cost range for which the circle gc is APS if
and only if
δ ≤ f(2)− f(3)
f(2)f(3)
. (3.10)
In particular, for the model (3.2) such a non-empty cost range exists for any
0 < δ < 1 and is given by
δ
3
+
2δ2
3(2− δ) ≤ c ≤
δ
2− δ . (3.11)
(v) The structure of n2 separate pairs is APS whenever it is PS, i.e., when (3.9)
is satisfied. In particular, for model (3.2) such a non-empty cost range exists
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for any 0 < δ < 1.
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.2.
Let us return to the possible and “ruled-out” PS categories of networks listed in
Section 3.3.2. The star is an example of a PS structure in the category of networks
consisting of high degree - high information nodes and low degree – low information
nodes (structure (a)). As shown in Proposition 3.3(ii) it can be APS if communica-
tion eﬃciency declines moderately but not too rapidly in degree. For an ineﬃcient
communication technology the cost range for which the complete network is PS
becomes vanishingly small as the network size grows. This result given in Proposi-
tion 3.3(iii) can also be deduced from Section 3.3.2, since gN consists only of nodes
with a high and homogeneous degree (structure (2)). The circle is an example of a
PS structure with only low degree – high information nodes that are all important
as intermediaries (structure (b)). The incentive to add links is countered by the fact
that each node is an important intermediary but would become less important if
additional links are added. The stability of the circle is reinforced when communi-
cation eﬃciency decreases with degree. The separate pairs structure is an example
of a PS network with only low degree nodes with low information (structure (d)).
Asymptotic pairwise stability versus pairwise stability Clearly, if condi-
tions for PS depend on n, PS and APS do not coincide. On the one hand, a structure
can be PS but not APS, i.e., the cost range for stability becomes empty when the
number of agents grows. An example is the complete network with n nodes which
is PS under condition (3.5) but not APS for ineﬃcient communication technology.
Similarly, the star with n nodes is PS in the model (3.2) under condition (3.4) but
not APS. On the other hand, a structure can be APS but not PS, which is the case
for the circle, as shown in the following example.
Example 3.1. In the model (3.2), for any δ ∈ (0, 1) there exists a non-empty cost
range for which the circle is APS and this cost range is given by (3.11). On the
other hand, by virtue of (3.6) and (3.7), the cost range for which the circle with 4
nodes is PS in the model (3.2) is given by
δ
3
+
δ2
6
− δ
3
12
≤ c ≤ δ
2
+
δ2
4
.
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Note that δ2 +
δ2
4 <
δ
2−δ for any δ ∈ (0, 1). Hence, for the cost such that
max
(
δ
2
+
δ2
4
,
δ
3
+
2δ2
3(2− δ)
)
< c ≤ δ
2− δ
the circle is APS (for large n) but not PS for n = 4.
Tension between asymptotic pairwise stability and eﬃciency Under com-
petition for the access to information, it might happen that a structure is APS but
not SE in some cost range. To see that, first we calculate the following result.
Lemma 3.3. The structure of separate pairs is more eﬃcient than the circle for
very large number of agents when c > 2f(2)δ1−δf(2) − δf(1).
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.3.
From Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 3.3 we have the following conclusion.
Conclusion 3.1. In the model (3.2) the circle gc is not eﬃcient for the whole cost
range where it is APS, i.e., for c satisfying (3.11).
Proof: In the model (3.2) the condition c > 2f(2)δ1−δf(2) − δf(1) under which the struc-
ture of separate pairs is more eﬃcient than the circle for very large n is equivalent to
c > δ
2
2−δ . On the other hand, note that for every δ ∈ (0, 1), δ
2
2−δ <
δ
3 +
2δ2
3(2−δ) <
δ
2−δ .
Hence, when the circle is APS, that is, for c such that δ3 +
2δ2
3(2−δ) ≤ c ≤ δ2−δ , it is not
eﬃcient. !
3.3.5 Comparison with other related models
In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), as one could expect, the empty network is PS for
high cost and the complete graph if costs are low. The main finding is that the star is
PS for intermediary levels of cost and decay. The degree-distance-based connections
model diﬀers from the original connections model in that it reduces the value of
an information originating from an overly busy sender. However, contrary to the
CA model, only the busyness of the original sender and not of the intermediaries in
the communication chain matters. In this model, the star remained APS, while the
complete network is never APS. Similarly, under competition for information, the
complete network is never APS if the communication technology is ineﬃcient. This
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is not unexpected, in light of the result for the degree-distance-based connections
model, since the negative eﬀects of high degrees are stronger in the CA model where
they also concern the intermediaries in the communication chain. As for the star,
it can be APS in model (3.1), but only if the communication eﬃciency does not
decline too rapidly with the degree.
We note however, that when a star is formed in the CA model, the distribution of
benefits between center and periphery is diﬀerent from that in the Jackson-Wolinsky
model in the sense that it is now the center who extracts the most benefits. While
in the original connections model, if the center of the star does not want to cut a
link, then a periphery node will not want to cut the link either, in the model given
by (3.2) this is not necessarily true. In other words, it is possible that the center of
the star does not want to cut a link while a peripheral node prefers to do so. To see
that, let i be the center of a star and j a peripheral node. If we denote by uJWi the
utility of i in the Jackson-Wolinsky model, then:
uJWi (g
∗) − uJWi (g∗ − ij) = δ − c and uJWj (g∗) − uJWj (g∗ − ij) = δ + (n − 2)δ2 − c,
and therefore if uJWi (g
∗) > uJWi (g
∗ − ij) then also uJWj (g∗) > uJWj (g∗ − ij).
On the other hand, for the model (3.2), where u˜CAi (g
∗)− u˜CAi (g∗ − ij) = δ − c and
u˜CAj (g
∗) − u˜CAj (g∗ − ij) = δn−1 + (n−2)δ
2
n−1 − c, for every δ and n ≥ 3, there exists c
such that u˜CAi (g
∗) > u˜CAi (g
∗ − ij) but u˜CAj (g∗) < u˜CAj (g∗ − ij).
Under competition for information, there are in fact structures diﬀerent from those
that were PS in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) that enjoy greater asymptotic stability
than the star for ineﬃcient communication technologies. If the decline in commu-
nication eﬃciency going from degree two to degree three is large enough, the circle
will be APS for a wide range of decay levels. The same is true for the structure with
disjoint pairs if the decline in communication eﬃciency going from degree one to
two is large enough. Thus, contrary to the model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996),
where any PS network has at most one non-empty component, in model (3.1) dis-
connected structures can now be PS and remain stable when the number of agents
becomes large. We note that both for the circle and the disconnected pair struc-
ture, the (asymptotic) stability only depends on the behavior of the communication
technology for small degrees.
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 3. Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 61
3.4 A model of competition for the use of infor-
mation
3.4.1 Description of the model
We will now assume that there is no competition for the access to information but
that the use of information is rivalrous. Moreover, we assume that the disutility
inflicted by those who are closer to the sender than an agent is greater than the
disutility inflicted by those who are at the same distance to the sender as that
agent. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that it does not matter how many
steps before an agent the earlier informed people got the information. In this case,
the utility an agent i derives from network g is defined by
uCUi (g) =
∑
{j ̸=i|lij(g)<∞}
b(lij(g), xij(g), yij(g))− cdi(g) (3.12)
where b(lij(g), xij(g), yij(g)) is a three variable function b : N+ × N2 → R+ for the
value of the information that i receives from j, lij(g) is the geodesic distance from i
to j in g, xij(g) is the number of agents who are closer to j than i, and yij(g) is the
number of agents who are at the same distance to j as i. It is also assumed that∑+∞
l=1 b(l, x, y) < +∞ for all x, y ∈ N.
We note that if lij(g) = 1, then necessarily xij(d) = 0. Due to the fact that it is
worse to an agent when others are closer to the sender than when they are at the
same distance to the sender as the agent, we also assume
b(l, x, y) > b(l, x+ k, y − k) for all k ≥ 1 (3.13)
The function b is decreasing in each of the three variables. The level of decrease with
respect to x and y captures the level of rivalry in the use, the extreme cases being
the constant case: an agent does not care if others are informed, and the case where
b reaches 0 if many others learn the information before the agent. Moreover, if the
utility declines rapidly with distance, it seems reasonable that b should decline more
rapidly with respect to agents who are closer to the sender than the given agent.
Before we turn to the analysis of pairwise stability in the model of competition for
the use of information, let us compare the benefits from information as modeled in
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the diﬀerent frameworks. Note that in model (3.12) the benefit from the informa-
tion received by a neighbor x, i.e., b(1, 0, dx − 1), depends only on the degree dx
of the neighbor, as in the degree-distance-based model, where this benefit is deter-
mined by bˆ(1, dx), with bˆ(lij(g), dj(g)) depending on the distance between the sender
j and the receiver i, and on the degree of the sender. In the distance-based model
(Bloch and Jackson (2007)), which is an extension of the original connections model
with the nonincreasing benefit function b˜(lij(g)), the benefit from the information
sent by a neighbor is always the same and is equal to b˜(1). For example, in Fig-
ure 3.1 the benefit of agent i from the information sent by his neighbor k in the
degree-distance-based connections model is given by bˆ(1, 2) and bˆ(1, 7) in g and g′,
respectively, and in model (3.12) by b(1, 0, 1) and b(1, 0, 6) in g and g′, respectively.
However, if we consider the information obtained from indirect contacts, then what
is determined in the degree-distance-based connections model is “included” in the
model of competition for the use of information. More precisely, the degree of a
sender of information obtained by x which is not the sender’s neighbor is included
in the number of agents that receive the information before x does. In Figure 3.1,
for instance, the benefits of i from information sent by j are equal to b˜(2), bˆ(2, 2)
and b(2, 2, 1) in network g, and b˜(2), bˆ(2, 2) and b(2, 2, 6) in network g′.
3.4.2 Pairwise stability of some “standard” architectures
We start our analysis of the model defined in (3.12) by proving conditions for pairwise
stability of the prominent structures.
Proposition 3.4. In the model defined by (3.12) the following holds:
(i) The empty network g∅ is PS if b(1, 0, 0) ≤ c.
(ii) The star g∗ with n ≥ 3 is PS if
c ≥ b(1, 0, 1)− b(2, 1, n− 3) (3.14)
and
c ≤ min (b(1, 0, 0), b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)) . (3.15)
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(iii) The complete network gN with n ≥ 3 is PS if
c ≤ b(1, 0, n− 2)− b(2, n− 2, 0). (3.16)
(iv) The circle gc of n > 3 nodes is PS if2
c ≤
n
2
−1∑
k=1
b(k, 2k − 2, 1)−
n−1∑
k=n
2
+1
b(k, n− 2, 0) (3.17)
and for n > 6
c ≥ b(1, 0, 2)−b(n
2
, n−2, 0)+2
⌊n
4
⌋∑
k=2
b(k, 2k−2, 2)−2
n
2
−1∑
k=⌈n
4
⌉+1
b(k, 2k−2, 1) (3.18)
and for n ∈ {4, 6}, c ≥ b(1, 0, 2)− b(n2 , n− 2, 0).
(v) The structure of n2 separate pairs is PS if
b(1, 0, 1) + b(2, 1, 0) ≤ c ≤ b(1, 0, 0). (3.19)
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.4.
All the conditions for pairwise stability stated in Proposition 3.4 depend on the
benefit function b and, with the exception of the empty graph and the separate pair
structure, also on the number of agents n. For any benefit function satisfying our
general assumptions, the empty graph will be stable if the cost is high enough, i.e.,
if it exceeds the benefit of receiving an information alone. For other structures,
a non-empty cost range in which there is pairwise stability does not exist for all
benefit functions. To ensure such a cost range for the star, roughly speaking, an
agent’s utility must not decline too much when he receives an information at the
same time as all other agents in the network compared to when he receives it at the
same time as only one other agent. From monotonicity of function b and assumption
(3.13), for a given n there always exists a cost range for which the complete network
is pairwise stable, but this cost range can be small and shrink drastically when n
grows. Nevertheless, if decay is fairly large and/or the benefit of an agent decreases
drastically when he moves from a situation where all other agents are at the same
2We use the notation ⌊x⌋ := max{y ∈ N | y ≤ x} and ⌈x⌉ := min{y ∈ N | y ≥ x}.
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distance to the sender as himself to a case where all other agents are closer to the
sender, then the complete network is pairwise stable. The conditions for the pairwise
stability of the circle are rather un-plausible. They require that there is a very large
loss in benefit for an agent when moving from a case with only one more agent being
at the same distance to the sender as himself to a situation with two more agents
being informed. There exists a non-empty cost range for pairwise stability of the
separate pairs structure when decay is very large and/or when the benefit of an
agent decreases drastically when, instead of being the only one informed, another
agent is at the same distance to the sender.
3.4.3 Asymptotic pairwise stability of some “standard” ar-
chitectures
Next we analyze the asymptotic pairwise stability (APS) as introduced in Defini-
tion 3.1. We check if the PS networks listed in Proposition 3.4 remain PS if the
number of agents becomes very large.
Remark 3.2. In the model (3.12) the asymptotic stability range is determined by
(c, b), i.e., by the cost c > 0 and a function b defined in (3.12), i.e., verifying
b(l, x, y) > 0 for all l, x, y.
The asymptotic pairwise stability of some structures depends on which of the fol-
lowing two assumptions (A1) or (A2) is made:
(A1) lim
k→+∞
b(l, k, y) > 0 for every l ≥ 2, y ∈ N
(A2) lim
k→+∞
b(l, x, k) = 0 for all l ≥ 2, x ∈ N.
Assumption (A1) states that an agent’s benefit from getting the information remains
positive even if the number of agents who are closer to the sender than himself
becomes very large. On the contrary, assumption (A2) means that the agent does
not benefit anymore from the information if the is at the same distance to the
sender as a very large number of agents. Note that assumption (A1) implies that
limk→+∞ b(l, x, k) > 0 for all x ∈ N. Similarly, (A2) implies that limk→+∞ b(l, k, y) =
0 for all y ∈ N. We get the following results:
Proposition 3.5. In the model (3.12) the following holds:
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(i) The empty network g∅ is APS whenever it is PS, i.e., if b(1, 0, 0) ≤ c.
(ii) Under assumption (A1), there always exists a non-empty cost range for which
the star g∗ with n ≥ 3 is APS. The cost c must satisfy
b(1, 0, 1)− lim
n→+∞ b(2, 1, n− 3) ≤ c ≤ b(1, 0, 0). (3.20)
Under assumption (A2), there exists a non-empty cost range for which the star
is APS if and only if
lim
n→+∞(n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3) ≥ b(1, 0, 1) (3.21)
and then the cost range must satisfy
b(1, 0, 1) ≤ c ≤ min
(
b(1, 0, 0), lim
n→+∞(n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)
)
. (3.22)
(iii) There exists a non-empty cost range for which the complete network gN is APS
iﬀ limn→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2) > limn→+∞ b(2, n− 2, 0). The cost must satisfy
c ≤ lim
n→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2)− limn→+∞ b(2, n− 2, 0). (3.23)
In particular, under assumption (A2), the complete network is not APS.
(iv) The circle gc of n > 3 nodes is APS if
b(1, 0, 2) + 2
+∞∑
k=2
b(k, 2k − 2, 2) ≤ c ≤
+∞∑
k=1
b(k, 2k − 2, 1) (3.24)
(v) The structure of separate pairs is APS whenever it is PS, i.e., when (3.19) is
satisfied.
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.5.
Consider the case where the number of agents becomes very large and an agent
still derives some benefit from the information even if many others are closer to the
sender than himself. Then there always exists a non-empty cost range for pairwise
stability of the star and the more the agent benefits from the information which has
been also reached by many other agents being at the same distance to the sender,
the larger is this cost range. For the complete network, there exists a non-empty
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cost range for its pairwise stability if an agent strictly prefers to get the information
directly and to be at the same distance to the sender as all other agents than to
get the information after all other agents have got it. The sharper is this benefit
diﬀerence, the larger is the cost range for pairwise stability of the complete graph.
3.4.4 Tension between asymptotic pairwise stability and ef-
ficiency
We will show that under competition in the use of information, some structures are
APS but not SE. First, we will establish conditions under which the star is more
eﬃcient than some other structures.
Lemma 3.4. The star g∗ is more eﬃcient than:
(i) The empty network g∅ for suﬃciently small costs, i.e., if
2c < b(1, 0, 0) + b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)
and under assumption (A1) it is the case for any c > 0 when n is suﬃciently
large.
(ii) The structure of disjoint pairs when
(n− 1)[b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)] > c(n− 2) + b(1, 0, 0)
and under assumption (A1) it is the case for any c > 0 when n is suﬃciently
large.
(iii) The complete network gN for suﬃciently large costs, i.e., if
c >
n− 1
n− 2b(1, 0, n− 2)− b(2, 1, n− 3)−
b(1, 0, 0)
n− 2 . (3.25)
Proof: Let g˜ denote the structure of disjoint pairs. We have:
∑
i∈N
uCUi (g
∅) = 0,
∑
i∈N
uCUi (g˜) = n (b(1, 0, 0)− c) ,∑
i∈N
uCUi (g
∗) = (n− 1) (b(1, 0, 0) + b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)− 2c)
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and
∑
i∈N
uCUi (g
N) = n(n− 1) (b(1, 0, n− 2)− c) .
All parts result immediately from the comparison of the sums given above. !
From Proposition 3.5 and Lemma 3.4 we can write the following conclusions.
Conclusion 3.2. In the model of competition in the use of information:
(i) Under assumption (A1) for suﬃciently large n, the empty network is not eﬃ-
cient when being APS, i.e., for c satisfying c ≥ b(1, 0, 0).
(ii) Under assumption (A1) for suﬃciently large n, the structure of disjoint pairs
is not eﬃcient when being APS, i.e., for c satisfying (3.19).
(iii) There exists a non-empty cost range for which gN is APS but not eﬃcient if
lim
n→+∞ b(2, 1, n− 3) > limn→+∞ b(2, n− 2, 0). (3.26)
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.6.
3.4.5 Connectedness and degree homogeneity in (asymptot-
ically) pairwise stable networks
Given the diﬃculty of obtaining a full characterization of the PS networks in our
model, we will focus on exploring two of their properties, which are likely to be
aﬀected by the presence of the negative externality associated with connectivity,
namely their connectedness and their degree distribution. Indeed, it is natural to
ask whether the desire to access more exclusive information would tend to generate
disconnected networks contrary to the original connections model. Secondly, we
can ask what is the impact on the degree distribution? We have already seen that
agents can still form networks with highly unequal degrees such as the star. Will
they also tend to form networks in which everyone has a similar degree, so as to
distribute the “nuisance of connectivity” more evenly? In this section, we provide
a condition for the connectedness of PS networks and then turn to analyzing under
which conditions k-regular networks can be stable.
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We already know from Proposition 3.4(v) that the structure of disjoint pairs is PS
under condition (3.19). However, the following proposition which gives a suﬃcient
but not necessary condition for ensuring that only connected networks can be PS
shows that the conditions under which disconnected networks can be PS are quite
restrictive.
Proposition 3.6. Suppose that for all d ≥ 1, b(1, 0, d− 1)− b(1, 0, d) < b(2, d, d2).
Then no network containing more than one non-trivial component can be PS.
Proof: Suppose that l and i are in diﬀerent components in g and that i and l are the
nodes with the highest degrees in their respective components. Since i is in a non-
trivial connected component, he has at least one neighbor j (and similarly for l). If l
forms a link to i, he gains at least uCUj (g)−uCUj (g− ij)− b(1, 0, di−1)+ b(1, 0, di)+
b(2, dj, |N2j (g)|) ≥ uCUj (g) − uCUj (g − ij) − b(1, 0, di − 1) + b(1, 0, di) + b(2, di, d2i ),
where N2j (g) is the set of nodes which are exactly at distance 2 from node j in g.
Indeed, the direct benefit of the link to i is lower for l than for j: b(1, 0, di) instead of
b(1, 0, di− 1). Otherwise, l gains at least as much from adding the link il as j gains
from adding ij (strictly more if i and j are not disconnected in g − ij) and he also
gains b(2, dj, |N2j (g)|) because he can reach j at distance 2. Since di is the maximal
degree in i and j’s component, b(2, dj, |N2j (g)|) ≥ b(2, di, d2i ). By the assumption,
uCUl (g+il)−uCUl (g) ≥ uCUj (g)−uCUj (g−ij)−b(1, 0, di−1)+b(1, 0, di)+b(2, di, d2i ) >
uCUj (g) − uCUj (g − ij) ≥ 0. Thus agent l would like to form the link il. One can
apply an identical argument to show that agent i wants to link to l implying that g
is not PS. !
The situation under competition for the use of information is not that diﬀerent from
the standard Jackson-Wolinsky framework, where an agent on a diﬀerent island
gains more than neighbors on the same island gain from maintaining the link. The
only diﬀerence is a small disutility due to one additional link to the partner. If this
loss is small compared to the gain in indirect benefits (that we underestimate in the
proof), no network with several non-trivial components can be stable.
Note that Proposition 3.6 is consistent with condition (3.19) which implies that
there exists a non-empty cost range for pairwise stability of the structure of separate
pairs if b(1, 0, 1) + b(2, 1, 0) ≤ b(1, 0, 0). Taking d = 1 in Proposition 3.6 leads to
b(1, 0, 0) < b(1, 0, 1) + b(2, 1, 1) which implies b(1, 0, 0) < b(1, 0, 1) + b(2, 1, 0).
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We turn now to the analysis of k-regular networks. We start by introducing some
concepts and conditions that will appear in our first result.
Definition 3.2. An agent i has a growth dummy neighbor if there exists j such that
ij ∈ g and Nj(g) ⊂ Ni(g) ∪ ⋃{k|ik∈g,k ̸=i}Nk(g).
A growth dummy neighbor of i is a neighbor who does not contribute to i’s neigh-
borhood growth. Growth dummy agents exist in networks with much cohesion and
“group structure" in which an agent’s neighbors are likely to be connected to each
other and have many neighbors in common.
Condition 3.1. We say that Condition 3.1 is verified for d if for every k ≥ 3 and
0 ≤ x ≤ k2, k, x ∈ N, it holds that:
(1) b(1, 0, k − 1)− b(1, 0, k) < k[b(2, k, x)− b(d − 1, k, x)]
(2) b(2, k − 1, k2) ≥ b(d, k, 0)
(3) b(1, 0, l− 1)− b(1, 0, k − 1) > b(d, l − 1, 0)− b(2, k − 1, k2) for every l < k.
Condition 3.2. For every k ≥ 3 and 0 ≤ x ≤ k2, b(1, 0, k − 1) − b(1, 0, k) <
kb(2, k, x).
If Condition 3.1 holds for d, then it also holds for any d˜ > d. In particular, when
d → ∞, parts (2) and (3) are always verified, and part (1) becomes Condition 3.2.
When d is large, Condition 3.1 is not very demanding. It requires only that one
additional neighbor does not reduce benefits too sharply and that there are suﬃcient
benefits at distance 2.
Proposition 3.7. If Condition 3.1 is verified for d, then no network g containing
an agent i who has a growth dummy neighbor and an agent l such that dl(g) ≤ di(g)
and dil(g) ≥ d can be PS.
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.7.
Corollary 3.1. We have the following:
(i) If Condition 3.1 is verified for d, then no k-regular network g such that its
diameter diam(g) > 2d and which contains an agent who has a growth dummy
neighbor can be PS.
(ii) If Condition 3.2 is verified and k is bounded independently of n, then no k-
regular network g which contains an agent who has a growth dummy neighbor
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can be APS.
Proof: (i) Let i be the agent with a growth dummy neighbor. Since diam(g) > 2d,
there exists some agent l such that dil ≥ d. Since the network is k-regular, di(g) =
dl(g). The conditions of Proposition 3.7 are fulfilled.
(ii) Let i be the agent with a growth dummy neighbor. There is an agent l at distance
at least diam(gn)/2 from i, dl(g) = di(g). By replacing dil in Proposition 3.7 by
diam(gn)/2, we obtain that gn cannot be PS if b(1, 0, k − 1) − b(2, k − 1, k2) <
b(1, 0, k)− b(diam(gn)/2, k, 0)+∑a∈Nl(g) b(2, k, xa)− b(diam(gn)/2−1, k, xa). If k is
bounded independently of n, then we have limn→∞ diam(gn) = ∞. Assuming that
the sum of the indirect benefits converges, we have limn→∞ b(diam(gn)/2, k, 0) =
limn→∞ b(diam(gn)/2−1, k, xa) = 0. Moreover, |Nl(g)| = k. Since xa ≤ k2 (it is the
number of agents at distance 2 from l), by Condition 3.2, g cannot be APS. !
The types of networks that are ruled out (under fairly weak assumptions on the ben-
efits) are networks with many locally redundant links and large diameters. Networks
of this type are for example networks based on some notion of proximity (whether
it is geographical or in terms of similar attributes): agents make links to others
who are geographically close and do not form long range links. Let us give some
examples of networks which contain dummy players. In particular, several types of
k-regular networks have this properties and thus cannot be stable.
Example 3.2. One example is the “geography based” circle network. Let the agents
1, . . . , n be located on a circular graph and let agent i be connected to the agents
numbered i−m, i− (m−1), . . . , i+1, . . . , i+m (mod(n)). This network is k-regular
with k = 2m and has the growth dummy player property when m ≥ 2. For example,
agent i + 1 is a growth dummy for agent i. (This well known model is in fact a
special case of the circulant graph example given below).
Example 3.3. Another example is a certain type of k-regular bi-partite graph. Sup-
pose that n = 2m. Divide the nodes into two disjoint sets of size m. Label the nodes
in the sets a1, . . . , am and b1, . . . , bm, respectively. Let ajbl ∈ g ⇐⇒ |j − l| ≤ c
(mod(n)). This is a k = 2c regular network and agent bj is a growth dummy player
for player aj: the neighbors of bj are aj−c, . . . , aj+c, but these agents are also neigh-
bors of bj−c, . . . , bj+c who are neighbors of aj.
Example 3.4. Consider the following k-regular circulant graph. Let the agents
numbered 1, . . . , n be located on a circular graph and let ij ∈ g ⇐⇒ j = i + z, i +
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z + 1, . . . , i + z + k, i − z, i − (z + 1), . . . , i − (z + k) (mod(n)) with k ≥ 3. This
is a k-regular graph and j = i + z + 1 is a growth dummy player for i because his
neighbors are also neighbors of either i+ z or i+ z + 2.
The previous subsection provided examples of diﬀerent types of k-regular networks
which in virtue of Proposition 3.7 cannot be PS or APS under the weak assumptions
on the benefits. Now we will show that there are other constructions of k-regular
networks that can be PS/APS for the same degree k and under the same assumptions
on the benefits.
Example 3.5. We construct the following (2m − 2)-regular network g. Let n =
m(m + 1) with m ∈ N. Divide the agents into m + 1 islands consisting of m
agents. Number the agents on island 1 by a1,1, . . . , a1,m and the agents on island l
by al,1, . . . , al,m. Let ax,yap,q ∈ g if x = p, i.e., if agents belong to the same island.
On island 1, let agent a1,j be linked to agent av,j on every island v except v = j + 1
(mod(m)). On island 2 let agent a2,j be linked to agent av,j on every island v except
v = j+2 (mod(m)). On island t let agent at,j be linked to agent av,j on every island
v except v = j + t (mod(m)).This ensures that each agent on the same island has
a distinct island he is not linked to. Moreover, if an agent ax,y is not linked to the
agent with label y on island v, he is linked to an agent who is linked to this agent.
Network g is (2m− 2)-regular. We can verify that diam(g) = 2. Indeed, an agent is
linked directly to some agent on every island diﬀerent from his own except one. On
this island, the agents with diﬀerent labels are reached by the agents on his island.
The agent with his label is reached by some agent on another island with the same
label.
Proposition 3.8. The (2m− 2)-regular network defined in Example 3.5 is PS in a
non-empty cost range whenever b(d, ., .) is strictly decreasing in d. It is not APS if
condition (A1) does not hold.
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.8.
For n = m(m + 1) we can therefore construct (2m − 2)-regular networks that are
PS in a non-empty cost range as long as the benefit is strictly decreasing with
respect to distance, whereas other (2m − 2)-regular networks of the types in the
previous examples (nearest neighbor circle, bipartite graph, circulant graph) are not
PS. These observations indicate that k-regularity itself is not suﬃcient to determine
whether a network is PS. This is not so surprising since k-regular networks for
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the same k comprise very diﬀerent structures. In particular, the diameter of such
networks can be very diﬀerent.
Proposition 3.8 shows that there exists a k-regular network with k large and small
diameter (diam = 2) that can be PS in our model under very weak assumptions.
Now we will determine the conditions under which k-regular networks with k not
too large (i.e., such that the diameter of the network is large) can be APS. We
introduce the following condition.
Condition 3.3. The network does not contain a cycle of length l ≤ 2d+ 1.
We can show the following results.
Proposition 3.9. Assume that b(d˜, ., .) = 0 whenever d˜ > d. Let g be a k-regular
network, where k is bounded independently of n.
• If b(1, 0, k − 1)− b(1, 0, k) < b(2, k, k2), then g cannot be APS.
• If g verifies Condition 3.3 and b(1, 0, k − 1) − b(1, 0, k) > ∑l=dl=2 b(l, kl−1, kl),
then g is APS in a cost range of size
b(1, 0, k − 1)− b(1, 0, k)−
l=d∑
l=2
b(l, kl−1, kl).
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.9.
3.4.6 Connectedness and degree homogeneity in asymptot-
ically pairwise stable networks as a function of the
level of aversion to others being informed
In this section we give some results on the connectedness and degree homogeneity
of APS structures under diﬀerent assumptions about the level of aversion to others
being informed. We start with the case where there is moderate aversion to others
being informed, in the sense that the benefit declines if a very large number of agents
are closer to the sender than oneself but not if they are at the same distance to the
sender as oneself (NON A1). In this case we have a clear characterization in the case
where the cost is small compared to the direct benefit. The second case in which
we obtain some interesting results is when aversion to others being informed is very
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strong: the benefit must not only go to zero when others are at the same distance
to the sender as oneself (A2) but it must decline at a suﬃciently rapid pace. We
also have a proposition in the intermediary case, which mainly shows that in this
case there are no clear predictions about degree homogeneity/heterogeneity without
making additional assumptions.
The following definition will be important for characterizing the behavior in the first
case (NON A1).
Definition 3.3. Note by B(gn) the set of nodes whose degrees in gn are bounded
independently of n. Let BC(gn) be the complement of B(gn), so that {1, . . . , n} =
B(gn) ∪ BC(gn). Let SG be the set of connected networks g verifying the following
properties: g is connected, BC(gn) ̸= ∅. If |B(gn)| is not bounded, then there exists
at least one node l in BC(gn) for which limn→∞|{j ∈ B(gn) | lj ∈ gn}| = ∞, that
is, a node l which has a “large” number of links to nodes in B(gn).
The networks in SG are basically of two types. Either there is a very large completely
connected component of nodes whose degrees are not bounded independently of n
and a “small” (size bounded independently of n) group of nodes with low (bounded)
degrees. The network is connected, so links exist between the “high” and “low”
degree group. If there is a large (size not bounded independently of n) number of
low-degree nodes, then there is at least one high degree node who has an unbounded
number of links to nodes in the low degree group. In the first case, we have a
structure reminiscent of a complete graph, since the nodes who are not part of the
large connected component make up only a negligible fraction of the total number
of nodes. Everyone outside of this component has a much lower degree than the
agents in the component. The second case is closer to a star structure: The agents
with high degree are all connected to each other but they are not necessarily that
many of them. At least one of the high degree agents must be linked to a large
number of low degree agents.
The following proposition characterizes the APS networks in the case where there
is strong aversion to a large number of agents being closer to the sender and under
a condition on direct benefits.
Proposition 3.10. If limx→∞ b(2, x, 0) = 0 and limn→∞ b(1, 0, n− 2) > c, then:
• The complete graph is PS.
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• Any g, other than the complete graph that is APS belongs to the class SG
introduced in Definition 3.3.
• In particular, if g is PS, then it is connected and its diameter is bounded
independently of n.
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.10.
The intuition for this result is that with the given conditions on the payoﬀ param-
eters, the diameter has to be small. If the diameter is small and all agents have
similar degrees, these degrees have to be high. However, under assumption (NON
A1) an agent wants to form a direct link to another agent with a very high degree to
avoid being informed after all his neighbors. Thus a network with similar and high
degrees will always “collapse” to a complete network. Therefore, if the network is
not the complete graph, there must be degree inequality. A network with unequal
degrees can be stable because the low degree nodes want to link to the high degree
nodes but the converse is not true for all payoﬀ parameters.
If the direct benefits are lower compared to the cost, many diﬀerent types of struc-
tures can be PS and additional assumptions are needed to determine which ones
arise. The following proposition is mainly for the sake of comparison with the other
cases.
Proposition 3.11. The assumptions that limx→∞ b(2, x, 0) = 0 and
0 < limn→∞ b(1, 0, n) < c are:
• not compatible with APS of the complete graph;
• compatible with the APS of the star;
• compatible with the APS of networks with small (bounded independently of n)
and large (unbounded) diameters.
We omit the proof which is not complicated. We now consider the case where there
is stronger aversion to others being informed, in the sense that utility decreases to
zero also when a large number of others are of the same distance from the sender, i.e.,
when Assumption (A2) holds. However, the conditions under which we obtain PS
structures that are clearly diﬀerent from those with weaker aversion to others being
informed are stronger than just assumption (A2). We also make an assumption on
the rate of decline.
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Proposition 3.12. Suppose that Assumption (A2) holds and that
lim
n→∞nb(2, 0, n) < c.
Then any g that is APS is such that:
• The degrees of all nodes in g are bounded independently of n.
• The network diameter is not bounded independently of n.
• Under certain assumptions on the benefit parameters non connected networks
can be stable.
See the proof in Appendix 3.A.11.
3.5 Discussion and concluding remarks
Since the payoﬀ functions in our two models of a competition for information do
not involve the same parameters, we cannot always obtain meaningful comparison
of the stable structures in the two models. Indeed, in both models many structures
can be PS for some choices of payoﬀ parameters and the parameter ranges cannot be
compared. If we turn to asymptotic pairwise stability, predictions become sharper,
revealing diﬀerences between the eﬀects of competition for the access to, and com-
petition in the use of information, in terms of which structures agents are likely to
form. We can also contrast the results in these two models with those of the original
connections model.
In the original Jackson-Wolinsky model, the star emerged as the uniquely (asymp-
totically) pairwise stable structure in a large parameter range. This is not the case
for either one of the models considered here. In the CA model, the star is never
APS for ineﬃcient communication technologies. It fares somewhat better in the CU
model if the aversion to others being informed first is not too strong, since each
peripheral agent receives a large quantity of information although it is shared with
others. It should be noted that the star, when it is formed does not benefit the
same agents in the CA or CU model as in the original connections model. In the
latter, most of the benefits are extracted by the peripheral agents who always de-
rive a strictly greater utility from being linked to the center than the center does
from being linked to them. In short, the center sponsors costly links that mainly
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benefit the peripheral agents. Therefore, it is the center’s decision that is critical for
stability: if the center wants to maintain a link so does the peripheral node. When
we introduce competition eﬀects, the situation changes. Agents in the periphery
suﬀer the eﬀects of congestion (CA model), or from receiving information that is
always shared with many others (CU model). Now, the star typically fails to be
stable because the peripheral agents do not want to maintain a link to the center,
or because they link directly to each other to receive more “exclusive” information.
Generally speaking, competition in the use of information seems to favor the stability
of structures with small diameters and also of densely connected structures. We
have shown that if an agent sees little value in an information that many others
have received before him, and if costs are low enough, the only APS structures are
generalized stars, that is structures where a few high degree nodes, linked to each
other are linked to a large number of low degree nodes, or structures similar to
the complete network consisting of a large completely connected component whose
members are linked to lower degree nodes. Competition in the use of information
leads to small network diameters since agents get little benefit from information
that has passed through a large number of intermediaries. Again, we are not able to
characterize the eﬃcient structure although we have found that in a wide parameter
range the star outperforms the other usual structures and in particular the complete
network. It results from this that the CU model can exhibit over connectedness
since the complete network can be dominated by the star in terms of eﬃciency in
its stability range. The reason for this is quite clear: individual agents do not like
to receive a piece of information after everybody else and so they will tend to form
more links to gain early access. However, by doing so, they reduce the value of
the information for those who previously received it first. Ultimately, nobody will
receive any information that is not widely shared.
With competition for the access to information, on the other hand, neither the star
nor the complete network is APS when the communication technology is ineﬃcient.
Instead, we find that the circle, which avoids congestion eﬀects since each agent has
only two contacts, can be stable under some conditions on the parameters, mainly
that decay is high enough. While we are not able to identify the eﬃcient network
in the CA model, a comparison of several “standard” network architectures show
that the circle outperforms the others in terms of eﬃciency for a wide range of costs
and levels of decay under a condition that is only related to the communication
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 3. Competition for the access to and use of information in networks 77
technology, namely that the communication eﬃciency is close to being maximal
for agents with degree two. Moreover, we have shown that in both models some
structures are not eﬃcient when being APS. In the CU model, the circle is PS only
under very un-plausible assumptions on the payoﬀ function. A network with long
communication chains does not satisfy agents who compete for the use of information
since most of the information they receive will have passed through a large number
of intermediaries.
Depending on whether they face competition for the access to information or compe-
tition in the use of information, agents’ network formation strategies will be rather
diﬀerent. In the CU model, the desire to avoid being informed after others will in-
cite agents to create new links to bridge large distances. If costs are low, the stable
networks have short diameters and may be densely connected, sometimes too much
so from the point of view of eﬃciency. In the CA model, on the other hand, densely
connected structures are not plausible unless costs are very low. In this context, the
source of disutility is congestion, a problem which is aggravated in densely connected
networks. Longer communication chains can now be more stable and eﬃcient than
structures with short diameters because there is less congestion when information
is transmitted.
3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Proof of Proposition 3.2
Proof: (i) Consider any two agents i, j ∈ g∅. We have uCAi (g∅ + ij) − uCAi (g∅) =
uCAj (g
∅ + ij)− uCAj (g∅) = f(1)δ − c ≤ 0 iﬀ f(1)δ ≤ c.
(ii) Consider the star g∗ with n ≥ 3 agents. Take the center of the star i and two
arbitrary agents j, k, where j ̸= i, k ̸= i, and j ̸= k. This means that ij ∈ g∗ but
jk /∈ g∗. For stability the following conditions must hold:
(A) uCAi (g
∗)− uCAi (g∗ \ ij) ≥ 0 and
(B) uCAj (g
∗)− uCAj (g∗ \ ij) ≥ 0 and
(C) uCAj (g
∗ + jk)− uCAj (g∗) ≤ 0.
(A): uCAi (g
∗)−uCAi (g∗\ij) = (n−1)f(1)δ−(n−1)c−(n−2)f(1)δ+(n−2)c = f(1)δ−c.
Hence, (A) holds iﬀ f(1)δ ≥ c.
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(B): uCAj (g
∗) − uCAj (g∗ \ ij) = f(n − 1)δ + (n − 2)f(1)f(n − 1)δ2 − c. Hence, (B)
holds iﬀ f(n− 1)δ + (n− 2)f(1)f(n− 1)δ2 ≥ c.
(C): uCAj (g
∗+jk)−uCAj (g∗) = f(2)δ+f(n−1)δ2 (2f(2)− f(1))+(n−3)f(1)f(2)f(n−
1)δ3 − c. Hence, condition (C) holds iﬀ
f(2)δ + f(n− 1)δ2 (2f(2)− f(1)) + (n− 3)f(1)f(2)f(n− 1)δ3 ≤ c.
Hence, (A) and (B) and (C) lead to condition (3.4).
(iii) Let n ≥ 3. Consider any two agents i, j ∈ gN . We have
uCAi (g
N)− uCAi (gN − ij)
= f(n− 1)δ + (n− 2)f(n− 1) (2f(n− 1)− f(n− 2)) δ2
+ f 2(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3) (3f(n− 1)− 2f(n− 2)) δ3 + · · ·
+ fn−2(n− 1)(n− 2)!((n− 1)f(n− 1)− (n− 2)f(n− 2))δn−1 − c
which leads to (3.5).
(iv) Let gc be the circle of n agents. Let i, j ∈ g. The ‘no-deletion’ condition
uCAi (g
c) ≥ uCAi (gc − ij) holds iﬀ 2f(2)δ + 2f 2(2)δ2 + . . . + 2fn−1(2)δn−1 − 2c ≥
f(2)δ+f 2(2)δ2+. . .+fn−2(2)δn−2+fn−2(2)f(1)δn−1−c iﬀ condition (3.6) is satisfied.
For the ‘no-addition’ condition, it is enough to show that agent i does not want to
add a link to the node that is the most far away from himself. Denote such a node
by k. Then uCAi (g
c) ≥ uCAi (gc + ik) iﬀ
2f(2)δ + 2f 2(2)δ2 + . . .+ 2fn−1(2)δn−1 − 2c ≥
2f(2)δ + f(3)δ + 2f 2(2)δ2 + 2f(2)f(3)δ2 + . . .
+ 2f
n
2
−1(2)δ
n
2
−1 + 2f
n
2
−2(2)f(3)δ
n
2
−1 + 4f
n
2
−1(2)f(3)δ
n
2 + 2f
n
2 (2)f(3)δ
n
2
+1 + . . .
+ 2fn−3(2)f(3)δn−2 + 2fn−2(2)f(3)δn−1 − 3c
iﬀ condition (3.7) is satisfied.
(v) Consider network g consisting of n2 separate pairs. Take arbitrary i, j, k ∈ N
such that ij ∈ g, ik /∈ g. We have the following conditions:
uCAi (g)− uCAi (g − ij) = f(1)δ − c ≥ 0
uCAi (g + ik)− uCAi (g) = f(2)δ + f(1)f(2)δ2 − c ≤ 0
Hence, g is PS iﬀ (3.8) holds. The cost range is non-empty whenever f(2)δ(1 +
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f(1)δ) ≤ f(1)δ which gives condition (3.9). !
3.A.2 Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof: (i) and (v) are obvious, since the conditions for PS do not depend on n.
(ii) Let function f be such that limn→∞ f(n)n = 0. Then the star is APS if f(2)δ ≤
c ≤ 0. Suppose now that function f is such that 0 < limn→+∞ f(n)n ≤ 1. Then the
star is APS if
f(2)δ + f(1)f(2)δ3 lim
n→+∞ f(n)n ≤ c ≤ f(1)δ
2 lim
n→+∞ f(n)n.
Such a positive cost exists when
lim
n→+∞ f(n)n ≥
f(2)
δf(1)(1− δf(2)) .
Let limn→+∞ f(n)n := a ∈ (0, 1]. We need to consider the inequality
af(1)f(2)δ2 − af(1)δ + f(2) ≤ 0
We have ∆ = a2f 2(1)−4af(1)f 2(2) = af(1)(af(1)−4f 2(2)), and ∆ ≥ 0 iﬀ 2f(2) ≤√
af(1) ≤ 1. Since δ ∈ (0, 1), we have the condition af(1)−
√
∆
2af(1)f(2) < 1 which is equivalent
to a > f(2)f(1)(1−f(2)) . In particular, the condition is not satisfied for f(d) =
1
d .
(iii) Stability of the complete network requires
c ≤ f(n− 1)δ
[
1 +
n−2∑
k=1
fk−1(n− 1) (n− 2)!
(n− 2− k)!δ
k((k + 1)f(n− 1)− kf(n− 2))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=:S
.
Let us show that the right hand expression of this inequality goes to 0 as n→ +∞.
We note that
(k + 1)f(n− 1)− kf(n− 2) < (k + 1)f(n− 2)− kf(n− 2) = f(n− 2).
Since limn→+∞ f(n)n ≤ 1, there exists an M such that for all n ≥ M , f(n)n ≤ 1.
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Thus
S ≤ f(n− 1)δ
[
1 +
M∑
k=1
fk−1(n− 1) (n− 2)!
(n− 2− k)!δ
k
]
+ f(n− 1)δ
n−2∑
k=M+1
f(n− 2)fk−1(n− 1)δk (n− 2)!
(n− 2− k)! .
We have
f(n− 2)fk−1(n− 1) (n− 2)!
(n− 2− k)!
= (n− 2− k + 1) . . . (n− 3)(n− 2)f(n− 2)fk−1(n− 1) < ((n− 2)f(n− 2))k ≤ 1.
Thus
S ≤ f(n− 1)δ
⎡⎣1 + M∑
k=1
fk−1(n− 1) (n− 2)!
(n− 2− k)!δ
k +
n−2∑
k=M+1
δk
⎤⎦
The first sum in the bracket is finite, the second one converges since δ < 1 and
limn→+∞ f(n− 1) = 0. Consequently, S tends to zero and no positive cost exists.
(iv) The circle is APS if
lim
n→+∞
[
f(3)δ + 2f(3)
n−2∑
k=1
fk(2)δk+1
]
≤ c ≤ lim
n→+∞
n−1∑
k=1
fk(2)δk
or equivalently
f(3)δ + 2f(3)δ lim
n→+∞
[
f(2)δ − (f(2)δ)n−1
1− f(2)δ
]
≤ c ≤ lim
n→+∞
f(2)δ − (f(2)δ)n
1− f(2)δ
⇐⇒ f(3)δ + 2f(3)δ
[
f(2)δ
1− f(2)δ
]
≤ c ≤ f(2)δ
1− f(2)δ (3.27)
⇐⇒ f(3) + f(3)f(2)δ ≤ c(1− f(2)δ)
δ
≤ f(2).
Such a positive cost exists whenever f(3) + f(3)f(2)δ ≤ f(2) ⇐⇒ δ ≤ f(2)−f(3)f(2)f(3) .
Moreover, if we apply f(d) = 1d to (3.27), we get the cost range given by (3.11). !
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3.A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Proof: We compare the circle with the disjoint pair structure denoted by g˜. Con-
sider
lim
n→∞
(∑
i∈N
uCAi (g˜)−
∑
i∈N
uCAi (g
c)
)
We have
∑
i∈N
uCAi (g˜) = nδf(1)− nc,
∑
i∈N
uCAi (g
c) =
2nf(2)δ (1− (δf(2))n−1)
1− δf(2) − 2nc
and
lim
n→∞
(
nδf(1)− nc− 2nf(2)δ (1− (δf(2))
n−1)
1− δf(2) + 2nc
)
=
lim
n→∞
(
nδf(1) + nc− 2nf(2)δ
1− δf(2)−
)
= lim
n→∞
(
f(1)δ + c− 2f(2)δ
1− δf(2)
)
n
This quantity is positive if c > 2f(2)δ1−δf(2) − δf(1). !
3.A.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof: (i) Consider any two agents i, j ∈ g∅. We have uCUi (g∅ + ij) − uCUi (g∅) =
uCUj (g
∅ + ij)− uCUj (g∅) = b(1, 0, 0)− c ≤ 0 iﬀ b(1, 0, 0) ≤ c.
(ii) Consider the star g∗ with n ≥ 3 agents. Let i be the center of the star and j, k
two arbitrary agents, where j ̸= i, k ̸= i, and j ̸= k. The stability conditions are
the following:
(A) uCUi (g
∗)− uCUi (g∗ \ ij) ≥ 0 and
(B) uCUj (g
∗)− uCUj (g∗ \ ij) ≥ 0 and
(C) uCUj (g
∗ + jk)− uCUj (g∗) ≤ 0.
(A): uCUi (g
∗)−uCUi (g∗\ ij) = (n−1)b(1, 0, 0)−(n−1)c−(n−2)b(1, 0, 0)+(n−2)c=
b(1, 0, 0)− c. Hence, (A) holds iﬀ b(1, 0, 0) ≥ c.
(B): uCUj (g
∗) − uCUj (g∗ \ ij) = b(1, 0, n − 2) + (n − 2)b(2, 1, n − 3) − c. Hence, (B)
holds iﬀ b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3) ≥ c.
(C): uCUj (g
∗ + jk) − uCUj (g∗) = b(1, 0, 1) − b(2, 1, n − 3) − c. Hence, condition (C)
holds iﬀ c ≥ b(1, 0, 1)− b(2, 1, n− 3).
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Hence, (A) and (B) and (C) give conditions (3.14) and (3.15).
(iii) Let n ≥ 3. Consider any two agents i, j ∈ gN . We have
uCUi (g
N) − uCUi (gN − ij) = b(1, 0, n − 2) − b(2, n − 2, 0) − c ≥ 0 iﬀ c ≤ b(1, 0, n −
2)− b(2, n− 2, 0).
(iv) Consider the circle gc with n > 3 agents. Let i, j be arbitrary two agents such
that ij ∈ gc. The no-link-deletion condition uCUi (gc)−uCUi (gc− ij) ≥ 0 is equivalent
to (3.17).
Consider now the no-link-addition condition. It is suﬃcient to guarantee that a node
does not want to form a link with another node which is most far away from that
node, as connecting to any node in the circle which is not at a maximal distance
would be less profitable. Let n ≥ 8. The condition uCUi (gc) − uCUi (gc + ik) ≥ 0
for ik /∈ g is equivalent to (3.18). The first diﬀerence (b(1, 0, 2)− b(n2 , n − 2, 0)) on
the right hand side of this inequality corresponds to node i’s gain of being directly
connected to node k which was before at distance n2 from i. The second diﬀerence on
the right hand side of condition (3.18) corresponds to i’s gain from all other nodes
that can be reached by i by a shorter distance via node k. For n = 4 and n = 6 node
i’s total gain consists of the first diﬀerence only, that is, the gain of being directly
connected to k.
(v) It results immediately from the definition of PS. !
3.A.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
Proof: (i) and (v) are obvious, since the conditions for PS do not depend on n.
(ii) Consider the star g∗ with n ≥ 3 agents. Let assumption (A1) be satisfied.
Then we have limk→+∞ b(l, x, k) > 0 for all l, x. The star is APS whenever (3.20)
is satisfied, as b(1, 0, 0) < limn→+∞ (b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)). Note that
the cost range is non-empty, since b(1, 0, 1)− limn→+∞ b(2, 1, n− 3) < b(1, 0, 0).
Suppose now that assumption (A2) is satisfied. The star is APS whenever (3.22) is
satisfied. If limn→+∞(n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3) < b(1, 0, 1), then this cost range is empty.
On the contrary, if limn→+∞(n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3) ≥ b(1, 0, 1), then there exists some
cost that satisfies (3.22), since b(1, 0, 1) < b(1, 0, 0).
(iii) Stability of the complete network requires (3.23) to be satisfied. If we have
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limn→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2) > limn→+∞ b(2, n− 2, 0) then the right hand side of (3.23) is
positive and gN is APS. If limn→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2) = limn→+∞ b(2, n− 2, 0), then the
right hand side of (3.23) is equal to 0, and consequently gN is not APS.
(iv) Consider the circle gc of n > 3 nodes. When going to the limit under n→ +∞
in the right hand expressions in (3.17) and (3.18), we obtain condition (3.24). !
3.A.6 Proof of Conclusion 3.2
Proof: (i) By virtue of Lemma 3.4, g∗ is more eﬃcient than g∅ if
2c < b(1, 0, 0) + b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)
and when moving to the limit with n→ +∞, under assumption (A1), g∗ is always
more eﬃcient than g∅, and therefore also for the cost range when g∅ is APS.
(ii) By virtue of Lemma 3.4, g∗ is more eﬃcient than the structure of disjoint pairs
if
(n− 1)[b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 3)] > c(n− 2) + b(1, 0, 0)
which is equivalent to
c <
n− 1
n− 2b(1, 0, n− 2) + (n− 1)b(2, 1, n− 3)−
b(1, 0, 0)
n− 2 .
When moving to the limit with n → +∞, this condition is always satisfied under
assumption (A1), in particular when the structure of disjoint pairs is APS.
(iii) When moving to the limit in (3.25), by virtue of Lemma 3.4, g∗ is more eﬃcient
than gN if
c ≥ lim
n→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2)− limn→+∞ b(2, 1, n− 3).
From monotonicity of function b, and assumptions (3.13) and (3.26) we have
lim
n→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2) ≥ limn→+∞ b(2, 1, n− 3) > limn→+∞ b(2, n− 2, 0)
and therefore from Proposition 3.5(iii), gN is APS and the cost range for its pairwise
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stability satisfies (3.23). Hence, if the cost range is such that
c ≥ lim
n→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2)− limn→+∞ b(2, 1, n− 3)
and
c ≤ lim
n→+∞ b(1, 0, n− 2)− limn→+∞ b(2, n− 2, 0),
then gN is APS but not eﬃcient. This cost range is non-empty under assumption
(3.26). !
3.A.7 Proof of Proposition 3.7
Proof: Let i be the agent who has a growth dummy neighbor j. If g is PS, then
uCUi (g) − uCUi (g − ij) ≥ 0. Let di = k. The growth dummy condition implies
that the only loss from cutting the link to j is that j himself moves further away:
uCUi (g)− uCUi (g− ij) ≤ b(1, 0, k− 1)− b(2, k− 1, k2)− c. By the assumption, there
exists l such that dil ≥ d and dl ≤ di. Suppose first that dl = di. PS requires that
uCUi (g + il)− uCUi (g) ≤ 0.
We have uCUi (g+ il)− uCUi (g) ≥ b(1, 0, k)− b(dil, k, 0)+
∑
a∈Nl(g) b(2, k, xa)− b(dil−
1, k, xa) − c, where xa = ∑m∈N 1dml(g)=2. Forming a link to l brings the k direct
neighbors of l to distance 2 from i, while they were previously at distance dil −
1. By symmetry, we also have uCUl (g + il) − uCUl (g) ≥ b(1, 0, k) − b(dil, k, 0) +∑
a∈Nl(g) b(2, k, xa)− b(dil− 1, k, xa)− c. Thus pairwise stability of g will fail to hold
if
uCUi (g)− uCUi (g − ij) ≤
b(1, 0, k)− b(dil, k, 0) +
∑
a∈Nl(g)
b(2, k, xa)− b(dil − 1, k, xa)− c ⇐⇒
b(1, 0, k − 1)− b(2, k − 1, k2) ≤
b(1, 0, k)− b(dil, k, 0) +
∑
a∈Nl(g)
b(2, k, xa)− b(dil − 1, k, xa)
Since xa ≤ k2,∑a∈Nl(g) b(2, k, xa)−b(dil−1, k, xa) ≥ kmin1≤x≤k2[b(2, k, x)−b(3, k, x)]
and by Conditions 3.1 and 3.2 we conclude that uCUi (g)− uCUi (g− ij) ≤ b(1, 0, k)−
b(dil, k, 0)+
∑
a∈Nl(g) b(2, k, xa)−b(dil, k, xa)−c ≤ min[uCUl (g+ il)−uCUl (g), uCUi (g+
il) − uCUi (g)]. In other words, either i does not want to maintain the link ij ∈ g
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or i and l both wish to add the link il /∈ g, which contradicts g being PS. Finally,
if dl < di and dl = k′, then i gains at least b(1, 0, k′) − b(dil, k′ − 1, 0) − c >
b(1, 0, k− 1)− b(2, k− 1, k2)− c = uCUi (g)− uCUi (g− ij). Hence, in this case as well
by Condition 3.1, i would like to add il whenever he wants to maintain ij. !
3.A.8 Proof of Proposition 3.8
Proof: Consider agent ax,y. He will maintain a link to an agent on his own island
ax,z if uCUax,y(g)− uCUax,y(g − ax,yax,z) ≥ 0. uCUax,y(g)− uCUax,y(g − ax,yax,z) = b(1, 0, 2m−
1) − b(2, 2m − 1, n − (2m + 1)) + b(2, 2m − 1, n − (2m + 1)) − b(3, n − 2, 0) − c.
Note that by breaking the link to ax,z, there is an agent that moves from distance
2 to 3, namely agent ay+x(mod(m)),z . Indeed, agent ax,y is not directly linked to
this island. He can reach agent ay+x(mod(m)),y in two steps through some y label
agent on another island and then ay+x(mod(m)),z in another step, or reach some agent
ay+x(mod(m)),r in two steps, but reaching ay+x(mod(m)),z now requires 3 steps. Suppose
that agent ax,y breaks his inter island link to some av,y. We have uCUax,y(g)−uCUax,y(g−
ax,yav,y) ≥ 0 and uCUax,y(g) − uCUax,y(g − ax,yax,z) = b(1, 0, 2m − 1) − b(2, 2m − 1, n −
(2m + 1)) + b(2, 2m − 1, n − (2m + 1)) − b(3, n − 2, 0) − c. Indeed, there is an
agent that moves from distance 2 to 3, namely agent av,z with v = x+ z (mod(m)).
By construction, agent ax,z is not linked to agent av,z. After breaking the link
to island v, it requires 3 steps to reach av,z. Now the utility of adding a link is
uCUax,y(g+ax,yax+y(mod(m)),l)−uCUax,y(g) = b(1, 0, 2m−1)−b(2, 2m−1, N−(2m−1))−c.
No agent except the one he links to moves closer since everyone is already at distance
2. If b(1, 0, 2m−1)−b(2, 2m−1, n−(2m+1)) < c < b(1, 0, 2m+1)−b(2, 2m−1, n−
(2m+1))+ b(2, 2m−1, n− (2m+1))− b(3, n−2, 0), then this network is PS. A cost
range where this holds will exist if b(2, 2m − 1, n − (2m + 1)) > b(3, n − 2, 0), and
b(2, 2m−1, n−(2m+1)) > b(2, 2m−1+n−(2m+1), 0) = b(2, n−2, 0) ≥ b(3, n−2, 0).
As long as the benefit at distance 2 is strictly greater than at distance 3, such a cost
range will exist. For finite n, this k-regular network is therefore PS for a non-empty
cost range, whereas other k-regular networks cannot be PS when benefits satisfy
Condition 3.1. However, the cost range for which the island network is PS goes to
zero if condition (A1) does not hold. Therefore it is not always APS. !
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3.A.9 Proof of Proposition 3.9
Proof: Suppose that k is bounded independently of n. Thus limn→∞ diam(gn) =
∞. To simplify the analysis we will assume that there exists a cut-oﬀ level d (d large)
above which benefits are zero. Suppose that lij(g) > d. If i links to j, then he gains
b(1, 0, k) in direct benefits. All the indirect neighbors of j were previously at distance
greater than d from i. Note by nkl (g) =: |Nkl (g)|, the number of agents at distance ex-
actly k from l. The indirect benefits are
∑k=d
k=2
∑
{l∈Nk−1j (g)} b(k,
∑r=k−1
r=1 n
r
l (g), n
k
l (g)).
We should note that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ d and l ∈ Nkj (g), nkl (g) = nkl (g + ij). Now, let
m be a neighbor of j. If m breaks the link to j, then his loss of direct benefits is
b(1, 0, k − 1). His loss of indirect benefits can potentially be much smaller than the
gain of i if many of the indirect neighbors of j are also indirect neighbors of m in g.
However an upper bound on the loss is
∑k=d
k=2
∑
{l∈Nk−1j (g)}[b(k,
∑r=k−1
r=1 n
r
l (g), n
k
l (g))−
b(2, k, k2)]. Indeed, if i links to j, then agent m is at distance 2. Agent m himself
does not obtain this benefit from linking to j. Stability requires that m wishes to
maintain mj and i does not want to form ij. We have
uCUi (g + ij)− uCUi (g) = b(1, 0, k) +
k=d∑
k=2
∑
{l∈Nk−1
j
(g)}
b(k,
r=k−1∑
r=1
nrl (g), n
k
l (g))− c
uCUm (g)− uCUi (g − jm) ≤ b(1, 0, k − 1)
+
k=d∑
k=2
∑
{l∈Nk−1j (g)}
[b(k,
r=k−1∑
r=1
nrl (g), n
k
l (g))− b(2, k, k2)]− c
So g cannot be pairwise stable if b(1, 0, k− 1)− b(1, 0, k) < b(2, k, k2). Now suppose
that g satisfies Condition 3.3. An implication of Condition 3.3 is that if ab ∈ g, then
(
⋃
l≤dN la(g)) ∩ (
⋃
l≤dN lb(g)) = ∅. If Condition 3.3 holds, then
uCUm (g)− uCUi (g − jm) = b(1, 0, k − 1)+
+
k=d∑
k=2
∑
{l∈Nk−1j (g)}
b(k,
r=k−1∑
r=1
nrl (g), n
k
l (g))−
l=d∑
l=2
b(l, kl−1, kl)− c
Indeed, Condition 3.3 implies that none of m’s indirect neighbors at distance not
greater than d are indirect neighbors of j at distance not greater than d. Like before,
stability requires that m wishes to conserve mj and that i does not want to form
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ij. This is also a suﬃcient condition, because Condition 3.3 implies that neighbor
growth is tree like everywhere up to level d, and if agent i does not want to form link
ij, no agent wants to add a link that is not in g. This holds if b(1, 0, k−1)−b(1, 0, k) >∑l=d
l=2 b(l, k
l−1, kl). !
3.A.10 Proof of Proposition 3.10
Proof: Let us show that no APS network can have a diameter that is not bounded
independently of n. Suppose that the diameter d¯ verifies limn→∞ d¯(gn) = ∞. Con-
sider two agents who are at the maximal distance d¯ from each other. Each one of
them would gain at least b(1, 0, n − 2) − b(d¯, x, y) − c from forming a link. But
limd¯→∞ b(d¯, x, y) = 0 for any x and y, due to the assumption that the sum of utili-
ties converges. Moreover, we know that limn→∞ b(1, 0, n− 2) > c. This contradicts
the stability of the network with diameter d¯. From this it also follows that BC(gn)
cannot be empty. If it were, all agents would be in B(gn) and have degrees bounded
independently of n. The diameter of such a network is not bounded independently
of n which is, by the previous argument, impossible. To show that all agents with
asymptotically unbounded degree must be linked, note that the benefit of forming
a link with i ∈ BC(gn) if it does not exist is at least b(1, 0, n− 2)− b(2, di, 0). Since
limn→∞ di = ∞, limn→∞ b(2, di, 0) = 0. Moreover, if the complete graph is APS,
then b(1, 0, n− 2)− b(2, n− 2, 0) > c and limn→∞ b(2, n− 2, 0) = 0.
Suppose that limn→∞ |B(gn)| = ∞. Let M =: maxi∈B(gn)di < ∞. Set k(n) =:
log(|B(gn)|/2)
log(M) . Let gr be the restriction of g to B. For every i ∈ B, |Nk(i)| ≤ Mk ≤
|BC(gn)|/2. It follows that if we define Si =: {j|dij(gr) > k}, |Si| ≥ |B(gn)| −
|B(gn)|/2 = |B(gn)|/2. We deduce that for every j ∈ Si, i and j must have a
common neighbor in BC . Suppose that this is not the case. If there is not a path that
goes through BC and that is shorter than k, agent i gains b(1, dj, 0)− b(k(n), c1, c2)
from linking to j and the gain for j is similar. Since limn→∞ b(k(n), c1, c2) = 0, the
link is profitable. If |BC(gn)| is bounded independently of n, then automatically
every node in this set has an unbounded number of links to nodes in B(gn). Thus
suppose limn→∞ |BC(gn)| =∞. If there is a path between i and j that goes through
BC that is shorter than k but involves at least two distinct nodes in BC , then there
are at least |BC(gn)| nodes who are closer to i than j and vice versa. Then the gain
for i and j of forming a direct link is at least b(1, dj, 0)− b(2, |BC(gn)|, c2) and since
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limn→∞ b(2, |BC(gn)|, c2), the link is profitable. This contradicts the stability of g.
Therefore there must be some node in l ∈ BC that is linked to i and to every j ∈ Si.
Since limn→∞ |Si| =∞, the result follows. !
3.A.11 Proof of Proposition 3.12
Proof: Assume to the contrary that some node i has a degree that is not bounded
independently of n: limn→∞ di(gn) = ∞. Let j be a neighbor of i. j’s direct
benefit of maintaining link ij is b(1, 0, di(gn) − 1) which goes to zero as n grows.
The greatest possible indirect benefit of the link ij is achieved if i is the center
of a star (in all other configurations indirect benefits are smaller). In this case
uCUj (g)− uCUj (g − ij) = b(1, 0, di(gn)− 1) + (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 2)− c but limn→∞ c−
b(1, 0, di(gn)− 1)− (n− 2)b(2, 1, n− 2) = −c < 0. Thus all nodes must have degrees
bounded independently of n. The result about the diameter comes from arguments
given previously.
Assumption (A2) in itself is not suﬃcient to ensure this weak degree heterogeneity.
For example, the star can still be APS. To see this, note that the conditions are
that the center does not want to break with the periphery (i.e., b(1, 0, 0) ≥ c), the
periphery does not want to break with the center (i.e., limn→∞((n − 2)b(2, 1, n −
2) + b(1, 0, n− 2))− c ≥ 0) and two peripheral nodes do not want to form a link to
each other (i.e., limn→∞(b(1, 0, 1) − b(2, 1, n − 2)) − c ≤ 0). This gives b(1, 0, 1) ≤
c ≤ b(1, 0, 0) and limn→∞ b(1, 0, n) ≥ c. If the term b(1, 0, n) does not decline too
rapidly, the star can be APS but the cost range b(1, 0, 1) ≤ c ≤ b(1, 0, 0) is very
small. There are basically two eﬀects that destabilize the star. The peripheral nodes
may want to break with the center if b(1, 0, n) declines rapidly with the number of
people being at the same distance to the sender. Moreover, agents’ incentive to form
direct links in the periphery is greater than in the Jackson-Wolinsky model since the
information that two peripheral agents receive from each other in the star is shared
with everyone else which gives them incentive to link directly. !
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Chapter 4
A modification of the connections
model with negative externalities
by overall connectivity
This chapter is based on work of my own and single-authored.
4.1 Introduction
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) introduce in their seminal paper the so called connec-
tions model. It is an example for social communication between individuals where
benefits and costs for each individual are determined by the direct and indirect
connections among them. Each direct connection is costly and provides a certain
benefit. Additionally, (discounted) benefits spill over from and to more distant part-
ners to which only an indirect connection exists. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) focus
on identifying pairwise stable and strongly eﬃcient networks. A network is said to
be pairwise stable if no agent wants to sever a link, and if no two agents both want
to add a link. A network is said to be strongly eﬃcient if it maximizes the total
utility of all agents. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) point out that strongly eﬃcient
networks may not be stable. This potential conflict between stability and eﬃciency
of networks is further analyzed in Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) and Buechel and
Hellmann (2012). For directed communication networks also see Dutta and Jackson
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(2000) and for directed connections and hybrid connections models Bala and Goyal
(2000).
There are numerous extensions of the connections model. Jackson and Rogers (2005)
assume geographic costs of forming links. Players are grouped on the so called
islands, and the costs of connecting to each other are low within an island and
high across islands. Other variations of the connections model with geographic
costs are investigated in, e.g., Johnson and Gilles (2000), Carayol and Roux (2005)
and Carayol and Roux (2009). Jackson and Watts (2002), Watts (2001) as well
as Watts (2002) embed the connections model in a dynamic framework. Although
the connections model was modified intensively over time, the issue of negative
externalities has been hardly considered in this framework.
Morrill (2011) introduces a degree-based utility and implements the idea that the
more connections a direct neighbor has, the less utility is provided through a linkage.
A simple example for this is the co-author model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996):
A researcher benefits a lot from a connection to a co-author, but the more projects
he is already involved in, the less time is devoted to a single connection. Möhlmeier
et al. (2016) build up on that and propose a degree-distance-based extension of the
model by Morrill (2011) to capture the idea that increasing busyness of neighbors
(and neighbors of neighbors) causes negative externalities. Their generalized degree-
distance-based model subsumes the degree-based model by Morrill (2011) as well
as the distance-based model by Bloch and Jackson (2007) as special cases. Hence,
Möhlmeier et al. (2016) combine in the basic ideas from the connections model with
the ones from the co-auther model and provide a quite general framework with both
types of externalities, positive and negative.
Möhlmeier et al. (2017) integrate externalities due to connectivity associated with
two types of eﬀects: First, competition for the access to information and second,
rivalrous use of information. Competition for the access to information can arise
if an agent with many contacts must share his time between his contacts and thus
has fewer/shorter opportunities to pass on information to each particular contact.
The main idea is that the probability that every neighbor receives the information
decreases with the number of contacts the sender has. In the second model there is
no competition for the access to information but the use of information is rivalrous.
It is assumed that when other agents receive the information before me, the harmful
eﬀect is greater than when they receive the information at the same time as myself.
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Additional contributions on the role of externalities in social and economic networks
are provided, e.g. by Goyal and Joshi (2006),Currarini (2007), Billand et al. (2013)
and Hellmann (2013). Currarini (2007) investigates a game theoretic model of coop-
eration, in which critical structural features of an organization (which is represented
by a connected network) depend on the sign of the spillovers. Besides that, Billand
et al. (2013) provide existence results for a game with local spillovers, where the
payoﬀ function simultaneously satisfies the convexity and the strategic substitutes
property. They use the notion of a pairwise stable network (Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996)) and its refinement, called pairwise equilibrium network (Goyal and Joshi
(2006)). A network is said to be a pairwise equilibrium network if there is a Nash
equilibrium strategy profile which supports the network, and no two agents both
want to add a link. Billand et al. (2013) characterize the architecture of a pairwise
stable network and the architecture of a pairwise equilibrium network. Hellmann
(2013) studies how externalities between links aﬀect the existence and uniqueness
of pairwise stable networks.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) mention already that “... one might have a decreasing
value for each connection (direct or indirect) as the total amount of connected-
ness increases.” (p. 53.). Taking this as a starting point, we introduce the overall
connectivity model that incorporates the idea of adding negative externalities from
increasing overall connectivity to the connections model. Additional links may gen-
erate positive externalities by shorter distances, but also negative externalities, since
the total amount of connectedness increases.
Goyal and Joshi (2006) investigate two specific models which are closely related. The
first model is a playing the field game in which the payoﬀ of an agent depends on
the number of his links and the aggregate number of links of the remaining agents.
The second one is a local spillovers game in which the payoﬀ of an agent depends
on the distribution of links of all agents and the identity of neighbors.
The overall connectivity model is not covered either by the playing the field game nor
by the local spillovers game, and it identifies situations which cannot be distinguished
in the other two frameworks. In the overall connectivity model, an agent’s utility
aggregates benefits from direct and indirect connections and weighs them by a factor
considering the aggregate number of links of the other players in the network.
As an example, consider a stylized academic job market in which information about
job opportunities and candidates is distributed within a network of scientists (the
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nodes). In this network, some scientists oﬀer vacancies which they cannot fill inter-
nally, while others need to place team members, e.g. their job market candidates or
untenured faculty. Establishing and maintaining a connection to a colleague (i.e., a
link) is costly, but increases the probability of receiving valuable information. Infor-
mation received from a neighboring node is passed on to all neighbors, but its value
is depreciated. For a given node, an additional link induces a positive externality
(if it reduces the distance to other nodes) and/or a negative externality (if it better
connects remote nodes, i.e., if it gives theses scientists a relative advantage).
For the overall connectivity model, we provide results on pairwise stable, asymp-
totically pairwise stable and strongly eﬃcient networks and compare them with the
ones from the original connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Our
main findings are the following:
As in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), we provide the conditions for pairwise stability
of the empty network g∅, the complete network gN , the star network gs and the
circle network gc. All these structures are pairwise stable in the overall connectivity
model, but usually for smaller costs compared to the ones from the connections
model. This is due to the weighting factor from overall connectivity which reduces
the benefit terms. We show that pairwise stable networks with homogeneous degree
distribution, called regular networks, consist of at most one (non-empty) component
in the overall connectivity model. Furthermore, we prove that a regular network is
pairwise stable in the connections model for costs c if and only if it is pairwise
stable in the overall connectivity model for the fraction c′ = 11+L(g−i)c. For large n
we show that the star network gs is asymptotically pairwise stable, while the empty
network g∅, the complete network gN as well as the circle network gc are never
asymptotically pairwise stable. The set of strongly eﬃcient networks may diﬀer from
the architectures identified in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). However, for general
n, we are not able to fully characterize the set of strongly eﬃcient architectures,
but the star network gs appears to be a very good candidate. In terms of aggregate
utility, star network gs strictly dominates the complete network gN and the circle
network gc. The star network gs provides (relatively) short distances with a small
number of links and hence, (relatively) small negative externalities due to overall
connectivity.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2 we recapitulate some
preliminaries on networks, the connections model and the co-author model by Jack-
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son and Wolinsky (1996) as well as some of the related extensions. Section 4.3
is concerned with our modification based on overall connectivity. We indicate the
central diﬀerences to the existing modifications and provide results on pairwise sta-
bility, asymptotic pairwise stability and strong eﬃciency. In Section 4.4 we finish
with some concluding remarks and present ideas for further research.
4.2 Notation and selected models with externali-
ties
In this section we first present the preliminaries on networks (see, e.g., Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson (2008)) and then briefly recapitulate the models which
are points of departure for our work: the connections model and the co-author model
introduced in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the playing the field game and the local
spillovers game presented by Goyal and Joshi (2006), the model with degree-based
utility functions by Morrill (2011) and the model with degree-distance-based utility
functions by Möhlmeier et al. (2016).
4.2.1 Definitions
Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n} denote the set of nodes, often also called agents or players. A
network g is a set of pairs {i, j}, denoted for convenience by ij, with {i, j} ∈ N2,
i ̸= j1, where ij indicates the presence of a pairwise relationship and is referred to
as a link between players i and j. Nodes i and j are directly connected if and only
if ij ∈ g. A degree ηi(g) of agent i counts the number of links i has in g, i.e.,
ηi(g) = |{j ∈ N | ij ∈ g}|.
As a convention, the terms graphs and networks are used as synonyms in this frame-
work.
Two simple structures are the empty network g∅ without any link between players,
and the complete network gN which is the set of all subsets of N of size 2. The set
1We do not allow for loo in this setting.
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of all possible networks g on N is
G := {g | g ⊆ gN}.
By g + ij and g − ij, we denote the networks obtained by adding link ij to g,
respectively deleting link ij from g. Furthermore, we denote the network obtained
by deleting player i and all his links from the network g by g−i.
Let N(g) (n(g), respectively) denote the set (the number, respectively) of players
with at least one link, i.e.,
N(g) = {i | ∃j s.t. ij ∈ g}, n(g) = |N(g)|.
A path in g connecting i1 and iK is a set of distinct nodes {i1, i2, . . . , iK} ⊆ N(g)
such that {i1i2, i2i3, . . . , iK−1iK} ⊆ g. A network g is connected if there exists a
path between any two nodes in g.
The network g′ ⊆ g is a component of g if for all i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g′), i ̸= j,
there exists a path in g′ connecting i and j, and for any i ∈ N(g′) and j ∈ N(g),
ij ∈ g implies that ij ∈ g′. Consequently, a network is connected if and only if it
consists of a single component.
The value of a graph is represented by v : G → R. By V we denote the set of
all such functions. In what follows we will assume that the value of a graph is an
aggregate of individual utilities, i.e., v(g) =
∑
i∈N ui(g), where ui : G→ R.
A network g ⊆ gN is strongly eﬃcient (SE) if v(g) ≥ v(g′) for all g′ ⊆ gN .
An allocation rule Y : G × V → RN describes how the value of a network is
distributed to the players. We will examine the allocation rule Yi(g) = ui(g), which
might correspond to models without side payment.
A network g ∈ G is said to be pairwise stable (PS) if:
(i) ∀ ij ∈ g, ui(g) ≥ ui(g − ij) and uj(g) ≥ uj(g − ij) and
(ii) ∀ ij /∈ g, if ui(g) < ui(g + ij) then uj(g) > uj(g + ij).
Additionally, we are interested in structures which are stable when n tends to be
large. Möhlmeier et al. (2017) suggest a notion of asymptotic (with respect to
network size) pairwise stability.
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Let S be a network structure (e.g., star, complete, circle, . . . ). We say that the struc-
ture S is asymptotically pairwise stable (APS) with respect to the utility function u
if:
(i) it is asymptotically well defined, i.e., we can define a sequence of networks
(gnk)k≥1 of strictly increasing size nk such that every network gnk has the
structure of network S, and
(ii) there exist fixed admissible parameters of the utility functions (ui)ni=1 such
that for all i, j, i ̸= j
(a) lim
n→+∞ (ui(gn)− ui(gn − ij)) ≥ 0 and
(b) if lim
n→+∞ (ui(gn + ij)− ui(gn)) > 0⇒ limn→+∞ (uj(gn + ij)− uj(gn)) ≤ 0.
The set of admissible specifications (parameters) of the utility function for which
the network is APS is the asymptotic stability range. In the overall connectivity
model the asymptotic stability range is (c, δ), i.e., it is determined by the cost c > 0
and 0 < δ < 1.
APS is neither a refinement of PS, nor it is a weaker concept. A certain network
structure can be PS for some fixed n but not APS. The main interest of the concept
of APS is to reduce the parameter space since the parameter n disappears. The
conditions for APS tend to be less involved than those for PS which may depend on
n.
4.2.2 The connections model and the co-author model
In the symmetric connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the utility of
each player i from network g is defined as
uJWi (g) =
∑
j ̸=i
δtij − ∑
j:ij∈g
c =
∑
j ̸=i
δtij − cηi(g) (4.1)
where 0 < δ < 1 denotes the undiscounted valuation of a connection, tij describes
the number of links in the shortest path between i and j (with tij =∞, if there is no
path connecting i and j) and c > 0 are the costs for a direct connection. Hence, the
first sum determines the benefits agent i receives via direct and indirect connections,
while the overall utility is reduced by the costs of maintaining the direct connections.
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Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) (Proposition 1) show that the complete network gN ,
the empty network g∅ or the star network gs can be uniquely SE (depending on c
and δ). More precisely, they prove that the unique SE network in the symmetric
connections model is:
(i) the complete network gN if c < δ − δ2,
(ii) the star network gs if δ − δ2 < c < δ + (n−2)δ22 and
(iii) the emtpy network g∅ if δ + (n−2)δ
2
2 < c.
Furthermore they examine pairwise stability in the symmetric connections model
without side payments. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) (Proposition 2) prove the
following for the symmetric connections model with Yi(g) = uJWi (g):
(i) A PS graph has at most one (non-empty) component.
(ii) For c < δ − δ2, the unique PS network is the complete network gN .
(iii) For δ − δ2 < c < δ, a star network gs encompassing all players is PS, but not
necessarily the unique PS graph.
(iv) For δ < c, any PS network which is non-empty is such that every player has
at least two links (and thus is ineﬃcient).
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) also present the co-author model, in which the play-
ers are interpreted as researchers and a link represents a collaboration between two
researchers. The amount of time each researcher spends on a collaborations is in-
versely related to the number of projects in which he is involved in. The utility
function of player i in network g is given by
ucoi (g) =
∑
j:ij∈g
wi(ni, j, nj)− c(ni) (4.2)
where wi(ni, j, nj) is the benefit of i derived from a link with j when i and j are
involved in ni and nj projects, respectively, and c(ni) are the costs to i of maintaining
ni links.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) analyze the following specific utility function:
ucoi (g) =
∑
j:ij∈g
[
1
ni
+
1
nj
+
1
ninj
]
= 1 +
(
1 +
1
ni
) ∑
j:ij∈g
1
nj
(4.3)
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for ni > 0, ucoi (g) = 0 for ni = 0 and with costs c = 0.
Although there are no direct costs of a connection, every new link decreases the
strength of the existing links. Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) (Proposition 4) prove
for the model (4.3) the following:
(i) If n is even, then the SE network is a graph consisting of n2 separate pairs and
(ii) a PS network can be partitioned into fully intraconnected components, each
of which has a diﬀerent number of members.
4.2.3 Related frameworks to model externalities
As mentioned in the introduction, there are related frameworks which build up on
the connections model as well as the co-author model and which model externalities
in networks. In the following, we will present a selection of them in more detail.
Goyal and Joshi (2006) introduce two specific models of network formation. In the
first one, called a playing the field game, an agent’s aggregate payoﬀ of an depends
only on the number of his links and the aggregate number of links of the remaining
agents. More precisely, the gross payoﬀ of each player i is given by the function
πpfgi (g) = Φ(ηi(g), L(g−i)) (4.4)
and its net payoﬀ by
Πpfgi (g) = Φ(ηi(g), L(g−i))− ηi(g)c (4.5)
where ηi(g) is the degree of agent i and
L(g−i) =
∑
j ̸=i
ηj(g−i). (4.6)
Note that g−i is obtained by deleting i and all his links from g. It is assumed that for
all L(g−i), Φ(k, L(g−i)) is strictly increasing in own links k. Goyal and Joshi (2006)
study two externality eﬀects – across links of the same player and across links of
diﬀerent players (which are either positive or negative).
The second game investigated in Goyal and Joshi (2006) is called the local spillovers
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game. In that game, the aggregate payoﬀ of an agent depends on the distribution
of links of all players and the identity of neighbors. More precisely, the aggregate
gross payoﬀ of each player i is given by
πlsgi (g) = Ψ1(ηi(g)) +
∑
j:ij∈g
Ψ2(ηj(g)) +
∑
j:ij /∈g
Ψ3(ηj(g)). (4.7)
Goyal and Joshi (2006) note that the marginal payoﬀ to i from a link with j, ij /∈ g,
is given by
πlsgi (g + ij)− πlsgi (g) = Ψ1(ηi(g) + 1)−Ψ1(ηi(g)) + [Ψ2(ηj(g) + 1)−Ψ3(ηj(g))] .
Hence, it depends only on the number of links of i and j and is independent of the
number of links of k ̸= i, j.
Morrill (2011) models situations in which adding links causes negative externalities.
The payoﬀ of each player from a link is a decreasing function of the number of
links maintained by his partner. A utility function is degree-based if there exists a
decreasing function φ such that
udegi (g) =
∑
ij∈g
φ(ηj(g))− cηi(g). (4.8)
Möhlmeier et al. (2016) introduce a degree-distance-based variation that additionally
accounts for negative externalities by link addition of agents that are indirectly
connected to the relevant player. The utility of agent i is given by
udeg−disi (g) =
∑
j ̸=i
b(lij(g), ηj(g))− cηi(g) (4.9)
where b : {1, . . . , n−1}2 → R+ is the benefit that an agent receives from a connection
and c > 0 are the costs of one direct connection. It is assumed that b(lij(g), k) is
nonincreasing in degree k for all lij(g) and nonincreasing in distance l for all ηj(g).
Moreover, if there is no path connecting i and j in g, i.e., if lij(g) = ∞, then we
set b(∞, ηj) = 0 for every ηj ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n− 1}. In particular, u˜i(g∅) = 0 for every
i ∈ N . This generalizes the degree-based model by Morrill (2011) since
φ(ηj(g)) = b(1, ηj(g)), for all ηj(g) ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}. (4.10)
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4.3 The overall connectivity model
We propose a modification of the connections model which takes into account the
overall connectivity in a network. Similar to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), an agent
benefits from his direct and indirect connections, less distant connections are more
valuable than more distant ones and direct connections are costly. Our modification
additionally considers the aggregate number of links of the remaining agents in a
network. The higher the overall connectivity of the other agents, the smaller is
the benefit of an agent has from his own (direct and indirect) connections. The
idea of implementing negative externalities from increasing overall connectivity can
be motivated, for instance, by the academic job market example presented in the
introduction. In our model, which we call overall connectivity model, the utility of
agent i is given by
uoci (g) =
∑
j ̸=i
1
1 + L(g−i)
δtij − ∑
j:ij∈g
c =
1
1 + L(g−i)
∑
j ̸=i
δtij − cηi(g) (4.11)
where 0 < δ < 1, tij is the number of links in the shortest path between i and j,
c > 0 are the costs of a direct connection and L(g−i) is defined in (4.6).
To see that the overall connectivity model is not a special case of one of the existing
models, consider a few simple examples. The following figures show networks which
generate identical levels of utility for player 1 in at least one of the existing models,
but diﬀerent (greater) levels of utility for player 1 in the overall connectivity model.
g
1 2 3 4
g′
1 2 3 4
Figure 4.1: The overall connectivity model versus the connections model, the co-
author model and the degree-based utility
If my co-author and me are the only ones who work on a specific topic, the benefit
from that collaboration should be greater than the benefit as if there was another
“couple” working on that topic. Figure 4.1 indicates these two networks. While
uJW1 (g) = u
JW
1 (g
′) = δ − c, uco1 (g) = uco1 (g′) = w1(1, 2, 1) − c(1) and udeg1 (g) =
udeg1 (g
′) = φ(1)−c, the overall connectivity results in uoc1 (g) = δ−c > δ3−c = uoc1 (g′).
For Figure 4.2 let us compare the overall connectivity model with the playing the
field game. We have Πpfg1 (g) = Π
pfg
1 (g
′) = Φ(1, 4)− c, but uoc1 (g) = 15(δ+2δ2)− c >
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g
1 2
3
4 g′
1 2 3 4
Figure 4.2: Overall connectivity model versus the playing the field game
1
5(δ+ δ
2+ δ3)− c = uoc1 (g′) for every δ ∈ (0, 1). Here, although both models account
for overall connectivity, the overall connectivity model additionally distinguishes
between diﬀerent patterns of indirect connections.
g
1 2
3
4
5
6 7
g′
1 2
3
4 5
6
7
Figure 4.3: Overall connectivity model versus the local spillovers game
A comparison between the overall connectivity model and the local spillovers game
is illustrated in Figure 4.3. We see that πlsg1 (g) = π
lsg
1 (g
′) = Ψ1(1)+Ψ2(3)+3Ψ3(1)+
Ψ3(3)+Ψ3(2), but uoc1 (g) =
1
10 (δ + 2δ
2 + 2δ3 + δ4)−c > 110 (δ + 2δ2 + δ3 + 2δ4)−c =
uoc1 (g
′) for every δ ∈ (0, 1). Again, while the local spillovers game treats equally the
indirect connections of agents with the same degree, the overall connectivity model
takes into account the exact length of the paths to all (indirectly connected) of
agent 1. Note that, moreover, g and g′ of Figure 4.3 are not distinguished also by
the remaining models mentioned before (except by the connections model).
4.3.1 Pairwise stability
First, we examine pairwise stability of the typical network structures, namely the
empty network g∅, the complete network gN , the star network gs and the circle
network gc. Furthermore, we are going to show that a PS regular network always
consists of (at most) one non-empty component. Additionally, we relate the condi-
tions for pairwise stability of regular networks in the overall connectivity model to
the ones in the original connections model.
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Proposition 4.1. Let the utility be defined by (4.11). The empty network g∅ is PS
if and only if δ ≤ c.
Proof: Consider any two agents i, j ∈ g∅. Forming a link would for each of agents
i, j result in uoci (g
∅ + ij)− uoci (g∅) = uocj (g∅ + ij)− uocj (g∅) = δ − c. Hence, if δ > c,
then uoci (g
∅ + ij) − uoci (g∅) > 0 and uocj (g∅ + ij) − uocj (g∅) > 0 which implies that
both players will profit from establishing a link, and therefore g∅ is not PS. If δ ≤ c,
then uoci (g
∅ + ij)− uoci (g∅) ≤ 0 and uocj (g∅ + ij)− uocj (g∅) ≤ 0 which means that g∅
is PS. !
For high costs, c ≥ δ, no node wants to connect to another node so that the stability
range for the empty network g∅ in the overall connectivity model is the same as in
the connections model. This comes from the fact that the benefit term in the
utility function from (4.11) reduces to the one from (4.1) when checking for pairwise
stability of the empty network g∅, which means formally L(g∅−i) = 0 ⇒ uoci (g∅) =
uJWi (g
∅) for every agent i.
Next, we analyze the pairwise stability of the complete network gN .
Proposition 4.2. Let the utility be defined by (4.11).
(i) The complete network gN with n = 2 is PS if and only if δ ≥ c.
(ii) The complete network gN with n ≥ 3 is PS if and only if the following condi-
tions hold:
c ≤ 1
4(n2 − 3n+ 3) ≤
1
12
and δ1 ≤ δ ≤ δ2, where (4.12)
δ1 =
1−
√
1− 4c(n2 − 3n + 3)
2
> 0 (4.13)
δ2 =
1 +
√
1− 4c(n2 − 3n+ 3)
2
< 1. (4.14)
Proof: (i) Let n = 2. Then uoci (g
N)−uoci (gN − ij) = uocj (gN)−uocj (gN − ij) = δ− c,
and therefore gN is PS if and only if δ ≥ c.
(ii) Let n ≥ 3. Consider any two agents i, j ∈ gN . Because of symmetry, it suﬃces
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to verify uoci (g
N)− uoci (gN − ij) ≥ 0. We have
uoci (g
N)−uoci (gN−ij) =
(n− 1)δ
1 + (n− 1)(n− 2)−c(n−1)−
(n− 2)δ + δ2
1 + (n− 1)(n− 2) +c(n−2)
and therefore
uoci (g
N)− uoci (gN − ij) = uocj (gN)− uocj (gN − ij) =
δ(1− δ)
n2 − 3n+ 3 − c (4.15)
This term is nonnegative if and only if δ(1−δ)n2−3n+3 ≥ c ⇔ δ2− δ+ c(n2− 3n+ 3) ≤ 0.
We therefore consider W (δ) = δ2 − δ + c(n2 − 3n + 3) with n ≥ 3 as a parameter,
and calculate for which δ the inequality W (δ) ≤ 0 holds.
Let ∆ = 1 − 4c(n2 − 3n + 3). Since n2 − 3n + 3 ≥ 3 for each n ≥ 3, we have
∆ ≥ 0 ⇔ c ≤ 14(n2−3n+3) ≤ 112 which gives (4.12). Moreover, W (δ) ≤ 0 ⇔ ∆ ≥
0 and δ1 ≤ δ ≤ δ2, where δ1, δ2 are given by (4.13) and (4.14), respectively. !
Corollary 4.1. Let the utility be defined by (4.11) and n ≥ 3.
(i) If δ(1−δ) < 3c, then the complete network gN is not PS (for arbitrary n ≥ 3).
(ii) If the costs of a direct connection are too high, namely if c > 112 , then the
complete network gN is never PS (independently of δ ∈ (0, 1) and n ≥ 3).
(iii) For every fixed n ≥ 3, there exist δn and suﬃciently small cn > 0 such that gN
is PS. However, the larger the number of agents in the network is, the smaller
must be these required maximal costs cn > 0 (which are drastically decreasing
with n).
Proof: (i) The complete network gN is PS iﬀ δ(1−δ)n2−3n+3 ≥ c ⇔ n2− 3n+3 ≤ δ(1−δ)c .
Since n2−3n+3 ≥ 3 for each n ≥ 3, if δ(1−δ)c < 3, then it must be n2−3n+3 > δ(1−δ)c .
Consequently, the complete network gN is never PS.
(ii) This comes immediately from condition (4.12).
(iii) Given n ≥ 3, the “proper” c > 0 is determined from (4.12), and δ1 ≤ δ ≤ δ2 from
(4.13) and (4.14). Note that
(
1
4(n2−3n+3)
)
is decreasing in n and limn→+∞ 14(n2−3n+3) =
0. !
Compared to the original connections model, note two additional points about the
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stability conditions for the complete network gN . First, the stability region shrinks
down and gets more tiny. In (4.11) gN is PS iﬀ c < δ−δ
2
n2−3n+3 while in (4.1) g
N is PS
iﬀ c < δ − δ2. Second, the multiplicative constant 11+L(g−i) from the functional form
of the overall connectivity model directly appears in the pairwise stability condition:
c < δ−δ
2
n2−3n+3 =
δ−δ2
1+(n−1)(n−2) =
1
1+L(g−i)
(δ − δ2). Hence, for the complete network gN
the stability region in (4.11) is equivalent to the one in (4.1) multiplied by the factor
1
1+L(g−i)
. As we will see later on, this equivalence for the pairwise stability conditions
will hold true for arbitrary regular networks in the two frameworks.
Next, we determine the suﬃcient and necessary conditions for the star network gs
to be PS in the overall connectivity model.
Proposition 4.3. Let the utility be defined by (4.11). The star network gs with
n ≥ 3 is PS if and only if:
δ(1− δ)
1 + 2(n− 2) ≤ c ≤
δ[1 + (n− 2)δ]
1 + 2(n− 2) . (4.16)
Proof: Take the center i of the star network gs and two arbitrary peripheral agents
j, k, j ̸= k, such that ij ∈ gs, but jk /∈ gs. For pairwise stability the following
conditions must hold:
(A) uoci (g
s)− uoci (gs − ij) ≥ 0 and
(B) uocj (g
s)− uocj (gs − ij) ≥ 0 and
(C) uocj (g
s + jk)− uocj (gs) ≤ 0.
Condition (A): uoci (g
s)−uoci (gs−ij) = (n−1)δ−(n−1)c−(n−2)δ+(n−2)c = δ−c.
Hence, uoci (g
s)− uoci (gs − ij) ≥ 0 ⇔ δ ≥ c.
Condition (B): uocj (g
s)−uocj (gs− ij) = δ+(n−2)δ
2
1+2(n−2) − c. Hence, uocj (gs)− uocj (gs− ij) ≥
0 ⇔ δ[1+(n−2)δ]1+2(n−2) ≥ c. Note that if condition (B) is satisfied, then also condition (A)
is satisfied, since δ < 1 and therefore c ≤ δ[1+(n−2)δ]1+2(n−2) < δ.
Condition (C): uocj (g
s+ jk)−uocj (gs) = 2δ+(n−3)δ
2
1+2(n−2) − 2c− δ+(n−2)δ
2
1+2(n−2) + c =
δ−δ2
1+2(n−2) − c.
Hence, uocj (g
s + jk)− uocj (gs) ≤ 0 ⇔ δ(1−δ)1+2(n−2) ≤ c. !
Overall, in the star network gs costs must be high enough so that peripheral nodes
do not want to connect with each other, but at the same time small enough that
peripheral nodes want to stay linked to the center.
Corollary 4.2. Let the utility be defined by (4.11) and n ≥ 3.
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(i) If δ < c, then the star network gs is never PS.
(ii) If δ ≥ δ22 ≥ c, then the star network gs is PS for suﬃciently large n (i.e., for
n ≥ 32 + δ(1−δ)2c ). In particular, if δ ≥ δ
2
2 ≥ c and δ(1− δ) ≤ 3c, then the star
network gs is PS for every n ≥ 3.
(iii) If δ ≥ c ≥ δ22 and δ(1 + δ) < 3c, then the star network gs is never PS.
(iv) If δ ≥ c ≥ δ22 and δ(1 + δ) ≥ 3c, then the star network gs is PS for 3 ≤ n ≤
2 + δ−c2c−δ2 .
Proof: (i) If δ < c, then also δ[1+(n−2)δ]1+2(n−2) < c, and therefore condition (4.16) is not
satisfied.
(ii)-(iv) Conditions (4.16) are written equivalently as follows:
δ(1− δ)
1 + 2(n− 2) ≤ c ⇔ n ≥
3
2
+
δ(1− δ)
2c
(4.17)
c ≤ δ[1 + (n− 2)δ]
1 + 2(n− 2) ⇔ (n− 2)(δ
2 − 2c) ≥ c− δ (4.18)
Let δ ≥ δ22 ≥ c. Then (4.18) holds for every n ≥ 3, since c−δ ≤ 0 and (δ2−2c) ≥ 0.
In particular, if also δ(1 − δ) ≤ 3c, then 32 + δ(1−δ)2c ≤ 3, and therefore (4.17) holds
for every n ≥ 3.
Let δ ≥ c ≥ δ22 . Then (4.18) is equivalent to n ≤ 2 + δ−c2c−δ2 . If δ(1 + δ) < 3c, then
δ−c
2c−δ2 < 1, and hence (4.18) holds only for n < 3. If δ(1+ δ) ≥ 3c, then δ−c2c−δ2 ≥ 1, so
(4.18) holds for 3 ≤ n ≤ 2 + δ−c2c−δ2 . Moreover, if δ(1 + δ) ≥ 3c, then δ(1−δ)2c ≥ 32 − δ
2
c ,
so 32 +
δ(1−δ)
2c ≥ 3− δ
2
c , so (4.17) holds for all n ≥ 3. !
In the connections model, the star network gs is PS under the condition δ − δ2 <
c < δ. In comparison to that, the star network gs is PS in the overall connectivity
model whenever δ(1−δ)1+2(n−2) ≤ c ≤ δ[1+(n−2)δ]1+2(n−2) . We directly observe that this condition
depends on the network size n and that the upper as well as the lower bound lie
below the ones from the connections model. Intuitively, this makes sense again,
since the functional form diﬀers by 11+L(g−i) that reduces the benefit terms by overall
connectivity. Hence, for given benefits δ, costs c can possibly be higher in the
connections model to guarantee pairwise stability of the star network gs. In contrast,
for given benefits δ, there exist costs c (small enough) such that the star network gs
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is PS in the overall connectivity model, but not in the connections model.
Next, we will look at the pairwise stability of structures with more than one com-
ponent. To start with an example, consider an arbitrary network g, existing of
(multiple) disconnected completely connected components. As we will see, this type
of structure cannot be PS in the overall connectivity model.
Example 4.1. Let the utility be defined by (4.11). Take an arbitrary agent ia in
component a and an arbitrary agent ib in component b. Without loss of generality
assume that the network g consists only of two completely connected components and
component a is of size na and component b is of size nb. For pairwise stability, we
have to check for the no link deletion and no link addition conditions:
(i) No link deletion condition:
(a) If na = 2 and nb ≥ 2, it must hold that:
uocia(g)− uocia(g − iaja) ≥ 0⇔ δ1+nb(nb−1) − c− 0 ≥ 0⇔ δ1+nb(nb−1) ≥ c
(b) If na ≥ 3 and nb ≥ 2, it must hold that:
uocia(g)− uocia(g − iaja) ≥ 0
⇔ (na−1)δ1+(na−1)(na−2)+nb(nb−1)−(na−1)c−
(na−2)δ+δ2
1+(na−1)(na−2)+nb(nb−1)+(na−2)c ≥ 0
⇔ δ−δ21+(na−1)(na−2)+nb(nb−1) ≥ c
(ii) No link addition condition (no case diﬀerentiation necessary, following form
is valid for all na ≥ 2 and nb ≥ 2):
uocia(g + iaib)− uocia(g) ≤ 0
⇔ naδ+(nb−1)δ21+(na−1)(na−2)+nb(nb−1) − nac−
(na−1)δ
1+(na−1)(na−2)+nb(nb−1) + (na − 1)c ≤ 0
⇔ δ+(nb−1)δ21+(na−1)(na−2)+nb(nb−1) ≤ c
Obviously, the no link deletion and no link addition conditions can never hold jointly.
Therefore, any network g, consisting of disconnected completely connected compo-
nents, cannot be PS.
This result is in line with the connections model. There, also any network g, con-
sisting of disconnected completely connected components, cannot be PS.
Next, we provide additional results for networks with homogeneous degree distribu-
tion, called regular networks. A regular (non-empty) network gregd is a network with
equal degree d (1 ≤ d ≤ n − 1) for every node i ∈ N . We show that a PS regular
network has at most one (non-empty) component in the overall connectivity model.
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Proposition 4.4. Let the utility be defined by (4.11). A PS regular network has at
most one (non-empty) component.
Proof: The proof follows the same line of thoughts as in Jackson and Wolinsky
(1996), p. 51. Suppose that gregd is PS and has two or more (non-empty) components.
Let ∆iji denote the marginal utility which node i receives from a link to node j,
keeping the rest of network gregd fixed. So, if ij /∈ gregd it follows that ∆iji = uoci (gregd +
ij) − uoci (gregd ) and if ij ∈ gregd we have ∆iji = uoci (gregd ) − uoci (gregd − ij). Consider
ij ∈ gregd , then ∆iji ≥ 0. Consider a link kl which belongs to another component.
Since node i is already in a component with node j, but k is not, it follows that
∆kjk > ∆
ij
i ≥ 0. This holds true, since node k will also receive δ21+L(greg
d −k
) in value
from the indirect connection to node i, which is not included in ∆iji . For similar
reasons, it follows that ∆jkj > ∆
lk
l ≥ 0. This contradicts pairwise stability, since the
link jk /∈ gregd . !
Hence, in the connections model as well as the overall connectivity model, a PS
regular network has at most one (non-empty) component.
After having discussed the conditions for pairwise stability of the empty network
g∅ (regular network of degree 0) and the complete network gN (regular network of
degree n− 1), we will additionally provide the conditions for the pairwise stability
of the circle gc (regular network of degree 2).
Proposition 4.5. Let the utility be defined by (4.11). The circle gc is PS if and
only if the following conditions hold:
(i) For n even:
1
2n− 3
⎛⎝n2−1∑
k=1
δk −
n−1∑
k=n
2
+1
δk
⎞⎠ ≥ c
and
c ≥ 1
2n− 3
⎛⎝δ + 2 ⌊n4 ⌋∑
k=2
δk − 2
n
2
−1∑
k=⌈n
4
⌉+1
δk − δ n2
⎞⎠
(ii) For n uneven:
1
2n− 3
⎛⎜⎝
n−1
2∑
k=1
δk −
n−1∑
k=n−1
2
+1
δk
⎞⎟⎠ ≥ c
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and
c ≥ 1
2n− 3
⎛⎜⎝⌊
n−1
4
⌋∑
k=1
δk +
⌈n−1
4
⌉∑
k=2
δk −
n−1
2∑
k=⌈n−1
4
⌉+1
δk −
n−1
2∑
k=⌊n−1
4
⌋+2
δk
⎞⎟⎠
Proof: (i) For n even:
• No link deletion condition:
uoci (g
c)− uoci (gc − ij) ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(
2
∑n
2
−1
k=1 δ
k + δ
n
2 −∑n−1k=1 δk)− c ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(∑n
2
−1
k=1 δ
k −∑n−1k=n
2
+1 δ
k
)
≥ c
• No link addition condition (n divisible by 4):
uoci (g
c)− uoci (gc + il) ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(
2
∑n
2
−1
k=1 δ
k + δ
n
2 −
(
3δ + 4
∑n
4
k=2 δ
k
))
+ c ≥ 0
⇔ c ≥ 12n−3
(
δ + 2
∑n
4
k=2 δ
k − 2∑n2−1k=n
4
+1 δ
k − δ n2
)
⇔ c ≥ 12n−3
(
δ + 2
∑⌊n
4
⌋
k=2 δ
k − 2∑n2−1k=⌈n
4
⌉+1 δ
k − δ n2
)
No link addition condition (n not divisible by 4):
uoci (g
c)− uoci (gc + il) ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(
2
∑n
2
−1
k=1 δ
k + δ
n
2 −
(
3δ + 4
∑⌊n
4
⌋
k=2 δ
k + 2δ⌈
n
4
⌉
))
+ c ≥ 0
⇔ c ≥ 12n−3
(
δ + 2
∑⌊n
4
⌋
k=2 δ
k − 2∑n2−1k=⌈n
4
⌉+1 δ
k − δ n2
)
(ii) For n uneven:
• No link deletion condition:
uoci (g
c)− uoci (gc − ij) ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(
2
∑n−1
2
k=1 δ
k −∑n−1k=1 δk)− c ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(∑n−1
2
k=1 δ
k −∑n−1
k=n−1
2
+1
δk
)
≥ c
• No link addition condition (n− 1 divisible by 4):
uoci (g
c)− uoci (gc + il) ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(
2
∑n−1
2
k=1 δ
k −
(
3δ + 4
∑n−1
4
k=2 δ
k + δ
n−1
4
+1
))
+ c ≥ 0
⇔ c ≥ 12n−3
(
δ + 2
∑n−1
4
k=2 δ
k − δ n−14 +1 − 2∑n−12
k=n−1
4
+2
δk
)
⇔ c ≥ 12n−3
(∑⌊n−1
4
⌋
k=1 δ
k +
∑⌈n−1
4
⌉
k=2 δ
k −∑n−12
k=⌈n−1
4
⌉+1 δ
k −∑n−12
k=⌊n−1
4
⌋+2 δ
k
)
No link addition condition (n− 1 not divisible by 4):
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uoci (g
c)− uoci (gc + il) ≥ 0
⇔ 12n−3
(
2
∑n−1
2
k=1 δ
k −
(
3δ + 4
∑⌊n−1
4
⌋
k=2 δ
k + 3δ⌈
n−1
4
⌉
))
+ c ≥ 0
⇔ c ≥ 12n−3
(
δ + 2
∑⌊n−1
4
⌋
k=2 δ
k + δ⌈
n−1
4
⌉ − 2∑n−12
k=⌈n−1
4
⌉+1 δ
k
)
⇔ c ≥ 12n−3
(∑⌊n−1
4
⌋
k=1 δ
k +
∑⌈n−1
4
⌉
k=2 δ
k −∑n−12
k=⌈n−1
4
⌉+1 δ
k −∑n−12
k=⌊n−1
4
⌋+2 δ
k
)
!
While Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) do not compute pairwise stability conditions for
the circle gc, we will not provide a direct comparison here. However, as mentioned
before while analyzing the pairwise stability conditions for the complete network gN ,
we conjecture that the stability regions for regular networks in (4.11) are equivalent
to the ones in (4.1) multiplied by the factor 11+L(g−i) . The next proposition proves
this result.
Proposition 4.6. A regular (non-empty) network is PS in the connections model
for costs c = (1 + L(g−i))c′ if and only if it is PS in the overall connectivity model
for costs c′.
Proof: Suppose that gregd that is PS in Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Due to sym-
metry and pairwise stability, for any two agents i and j who are directly connected
it must hold that uJWi (g
reg
d )− uJWi (gregd − ij) = uJWj (gregd )− uJWj (gregd − ij) ≥ 0.
Let ∆ := uJWj (g
reg
d )− uJWj (gregd − ij) + c. With this, it follows that
uJWj (g
reg
d )− uJWj (gregd − ij) ≥ 0 ⇔ uJWj (gregd )− uJWj (gregd − ij) + c ≥ c ⇔ ∆ ≥ c⇔
1
1+L(g−i)
∆ ≥ 11+L(g−i)c ⇔ 11+L(g−i)(uJWj (g
reg
d ) − uJWj (gregd − ij) + c) ≥ 11+L(g−i)c ⇔
uocj (g
reg
d )− uocj (gregd − ij) + c′ ≥ c′ ⇔ uocj (gregd )− uocj (gregd − ij) ≥ 0.
Therefore, the no link deletion condition is satisfied for costs c′ = 11+L(g−i)c in the
overall connectivity model. The no link addition condition follows straightforward.
Since the above calculations are all equivalences, it holds true that a regular (non-
empty) network is PS in the connections model for costs c = (1 + L(g−i))c′ if and
only if it is PS in the overall connectivity model for costs c′. !
After having analyzed pairwise stability of some standard architectures and compar-
ing the results with the ones from the connections model, we will consider asymptotic
pairwise stability and strong eﬃciency of networks in the overall connectivity model
in the next section.
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4.3.2 Asymptotic pairwise stability
Asymptotic pairwise stability was introduced by Möhlmeier et al. (2017) and deals
with the pairwise stability of networks when the number of nodes tends to be very
large. Möhlmeier et al. (2017) show that structures which are PS, do not need to
be APS.
The following proposition checks whether, respectively under which conditions, the
standard architectures are APS in the overall connectivity model. As it turns out,
the empty network g∅ is APS whenever it is PS, the star network gs is APS under
some specific condition and the complete network gN as well as the circle network
gc are never APS.
Proposition 4.7. Let the utility be defined by (4.11).
(i) The empty network g∅ is APS whenever it is PS.
(ii) The star network gs is APS whenever c ≤ δ22 .
(iii) The complete network gN is never APS.
(iv) The circle network gc is never APS.
Proof: (i) This is obvious since the condition for pairwise stability does not de-
pend on n.
(ii) gs is PS ⇔ δ(1−δ)1+2(n−2) ≤ c ≤ δ(1+(n−2)δ)1+2(n−2) . Hence, gs is APS whenerver c ≤ δ
2
2 .
(iii) gN is PS ⇔ δ(1−δ)n2−3n+3 ≥ c. From this and due to the fact that c > 0 by
assumption it directly follows that the complete network gN is never APS.
(iv) For n even, the circle gc is PS if the following two conditions hold:
1
2n− 3
⎛⎝n2−1∑
k=1
δk −
n−1∑
k=n
2
+1
δk
⎞⎠ ≥ c
and
c >
1
2n− 3
⎛⎝δ + 2 ⌊n4 ⌋∑
k=2
δk − 2
n
2
−1∑
k=⌈n
4
⌉+1
δk − δ n2
⎞⎠ .
Since lim
n→∞
1
2n−3 = 0 and for n→∞ the sum terms converge (because δ < 1),
the circle gc is never APS. For n uneven, the result follows analogously. !
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In the following, let us provide some further intuition for the results.
The empty network g∅ will always be APS whenever it is PS since the condition for
pairwise stability is independent of the network size n. To guarantee PS and APS as
well, one has to make sure that no node wants to establish a connection to another
node, which simply means that the costs must be at least as high as the potential
benefit (c ≥ δ). Since there are no possible links to be deleted in the empty network
g∅, this is the only condition which has to be satisfied.
For the star network gs the situation is diﬀerent. For pairwise stability one has to
make sure that neither center nor the peripherals want to delete their links and the
peripherals do not want to add a link between them. By looking at the asymptotic
stability range, we see that the lower bound for the costs c goes to 0 and the upper
bound converges to δ
2
2 . This upper bound guarantees that no peripheral node wants
to delete its connection to the center. On the one hand, for increasing n, the direct
benefit from the center starts to vanish, but on the other hand there are still benefits
coming in from the peripheral nodes. As long as the sum of the benefits is high
enough (c ≤ δ22 ), the peripheral nodes maintain their links to the center while n is
getting large. The positive impact of an additional peripheral node is δ2 divided by
the overall connectivity. By an additional peripheral node, the overall connectivity
increases by 2 what provides even more intuition for the condition c ≤ δ22 . In Figure
4.4 the (asymptotic) pairwise stability regions are plotted. We directly see that
there are parameter regions, in which the star network gs is PS, but not APS, APS
but not PS as well as PS and APS simultaneously.
Regarding the complete network gN we only have an upper bound on the costs
c to consider. As we see in Figure 4.5, the stability region quickly decreases and
vanishes when n is getting large. The intuition for this result is that due to the
high connectivity of the complete network gN , a node does not want to maintain a
direct connection to another node because it is able to reach the node at distance 2
for sure. With increasing n, the marginal benefit from a direct connection strictly
decreases, converging to 0. Hence, the complete network gN is never APS.
For the circle network gc the situation is similar to the complete network gN . The
stability region steadily shrinks and finally vanishes when n is increasing. However,
in Figure 4.6 we see that the speed of convergence is (relatively) slow. Additionally,
we observe that stability for increasing network size n is only possible for high values
of δ. Intuitively, this makes sense since then a node receives a high spillover and
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Figure 4.4: (Asymptotic) pairwise stability of the star network
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Figure 4.5: (Asymptotic) pairwise stability of the complete network
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Figure 4.6: (Asymptotic) pairwise stability of the circle network
even does not want to add a link to the node(s) most far away in the circle network
gc. Furthermore, a node does not want to delete one of its existing links (as long as
the costs c are low enough for increasing δ) because by maintaining one of its links
it brings (roughly) half of the nodes closer to it.
4.3.3 Strong eﬃciency
Next, we focus on the analysis of strong eﬃciency in the overall connectivity model.
To start, we look at strong eﬃciency for n = 3.
Example 4.2. Let the utility be defined by (4.11) and n = 3. The values for the
diﬀerent possible architectures are the following (gI denotes the network consisting
of only one link):
uoc1 (g
∅) = uoc2 (g
∅) = uoc3 (g
∅) = 0 and hence
∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
∅) = 0.
uoc1 (g
I) = uoc2 (g
I) = δ − c, uoc3 (gI) = 0 and hence
∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
I) = 2δ − 2c.
uoc1 (g
s) = uoc2 (g
s) = δ+δ
2
3 −c, uoc3 (gs) = 2δ−2c and hence
∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
s) = 83δ+
2
3δ
2−4c.
uoc1 (g
N) = u2(gN) = uoc3 (g
N) = 23δ − 2c and hence
∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
N) = 2δ − 6c.
(i) The complete network gN is never SE.
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This is obvious, since the value of the complete network gN is strictly domi-
nated by the value of the star network gs and the network gI.
(ii) The empty network g∅ is SE whenever c ≥ δ.∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
∅) ≥ ∑3i=1 uoci (gI)⇔ 0 ≥ 2δ − 2c⇔ c ≥ δ. For c ≥ δ it follows that∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
s) = 83δ+
2
3δ
2−4c < 0 = ∑3i=1 uoci (g∅) and hence, the empty network
g∅ is SE.
(iii) The network gI is SE whenever δ > c > 13δ +
1
3δ
2.
For c < δ it follows that
∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
I) >
∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
s) ⇔ 2δ − 2c > 83δ + 23δ2 −
4c⇔ 2c > 23δ+ 23δ2 ⇔ c > 13δ+ 13δ2. Therefore, the network gI is SE whenever
δ > c > 13δ +
1
3δ
2.
(iv) The star network gs is SE whenever c ≤ 13δ + 13δ2.
For c < δ it follows that
∑3
i=1 u
oc
i (g
I) ≤ ∑3i=1 uoci (gs)⇔ 2δ − 2c ≤ 83δ + 23δ2 −
4c ⇔ 2c ≤ 23δ + 23δ2 ⇔ c ≤ 13δ + 13δ2. Therefore, the star network gs is SE
whenever c ≤ 13δ + 13δ2.
Corollary 4.3. Let the utility be defined by (4.11) and n = 3.
(i) The empty network g∅ is SE if and only if it is PS.
(ii) If the star network gs is PS, it is SE.
(iii) If the complete network gN is PS, it cannot be SE.
In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) only three network structures, the empty network
g∅, the complete network gN and the star network gs turned out to be SE. In the
overall connectivity model, we already observe for n = 3 diﬀerences with respect
to this result. As shown before, we observe that the empty network g∅, the star
network gs and the network gI consisting of only one link, can be SE. In contrast,
the complete network gN turns out to be never SE.
For n = 3, the complete network gN is strictly dominated by the star network gs.
While it turns out to be relatively hard to obtain results on strong eﬃciency for
general n in the overall connectivity model due to the negative externalities, we are
at least able to compare the values of the star network gs, the complete network gN
and the circle network gc with each other. In the following, we show that the value
of the star network gs strictly dominates the value of the complete network gN as
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well as the circle network gc for general n.
Proposition 4.8. Let the utility be defined by (4.11) and n ≥ 3.
(i) The value of the star network gs is always higher than the one of the com-
plete network gN . Hence, the complete network gN is never SE in the overall
connectivity model.
(ii) The value of the star network gs is always higher than the one of the circle
network gc. Hence, the circle network gc is never SE in the overall connectivity
model.
Proof: (i) The values of the star network gs and the complete network gN are
given by∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
s) = (n− 1)(δ − c) + (n− 1)
(
δ+(n−2)δ2
1+2(n−2) − c
)
and∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
N) = n(n− 1)
(
δ
1+(n−1)(n−2) − c
)
.
Comparing these values yields:∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
s) >
∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
N)
(n− 1)(δ − c) + (n− 1)
(
δ+(n−2)δ2
1+2(n−2) − c
)
> n(n− 1)
(
δ
1+(n−1)(n−2) − c
)
⇔ c(n− 1)(n− 2) > n(n−1)δ1+(n−1)(n−2) − (n− 1)δ −
(
(n−1)(δ+(n−2)δ2)
1+2(n−2)
)
⇔ c(n− 2) > nδ1+(n−1)(n−2) − δ −
(
δ+(n−2)δ2
1+2(n−2)
)
⇔ c(n−2)δ > nn2−3n+3 − 1−
(
1+(n−2)δ
2n−3
)
⇔ c(n−2)(2n−3)(n2−3n+3)δ > n(2n−3)−(2n−3)(n2−3n+3)−(1+(n−2)δ)(n2−
3n+ 3)
For n ≥ 3 and δ > 0 the expression on the left hand side is positive. Next, we
consider the expression on the right hand side and check when it is 0 at most:
n(2n− 3)− (2n− 3)(n2 − 3n+ 3)− (1 + (n− 2)δ)(n2 − 3n+ 3) ≤ 0
⇔ n(2n− 3)− (n2 − 3n + 3)(2n− 3 + 1 + (n− 2)δ) ≤ 0
This inequality is fulfilled if:
n2 − 3n+ 3 ≥ n
⇔ n2 − 4n+ 3 ≥ 0
⇔ (n− 3)(n− 1) ≥ 0
⇔ n ≥ 3
Hence, c(n−2)(2n−3)(n
2−3n+3)
δ ≥ n(2n − 3) − (2n − 3)(n2 − 3n + 3) − (1 + (n −
2)δ)(n2 − 3n + 3) holds true for every n ≥ 3 and δ > 0. Therefore, the value
of the star network gs strictly dominates the one of the complete network gN .
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(ii) The values of the star network gs and the circle network gc are given by∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
s) = (n− 1)(δ − c) + (n− 1)
(
δ+(n−2)δ2
1+2(n−2) − c
)
and∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
c) = 2n2n−3
∑n−1
2
k=1 δ
k − 2nc (for n uneven).
Comparing these values yields:∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
s) >
∑n
i=1 u
oc
i (g
c)
⇔ (n− 1)(δ − c) + (n− 1)
(
δ+(n−2)δ2
1+2(n−2) − c
)
> 2n2n−3
∑n−1
2
k=1 δ
k − 2nc
⇔ (n− 1)δ + (n−1)(δ+(n−2)δ2)2n−3 + 2c > 2n2n−3
∑n−1
2
k=1 δ
k
⇔ (2n− 3)(n− 1)δ + (n− 1)(δ + (n− 2)δ2) + 2c(2n− 3) > 2n∑n−12k=1 δk
Since 2c(2n − 3) > 0 for n ≥ 3 and δ > 0, let us ignore it and compare the
benefit terms on both sides with each other:
(2n− 3)(n− 1)δ + (n− 1)(δ + (n− 2)δ2) ≥ 2n∑n−12k=1 δk
⇔ (n− 1)(δ + (n− 2)δ2 + (2n− 3)δ) ≥ 2n∑n−12k=1 δk
Next, we analyze the number and size of the benefit terms on both sides. On
the left hand side, we have (n− 1)(3n− 4) elements that are discounted by at
most distance 2. On the right hand side, we have (n− 1)n elements which are
(partly) additionally discounted due to higher distances. Obviously, the term
on the left hand side is always larger than the one on the right hand side.
We omit the calculations for the circle network gc with n even since they are
similar and lead to the same conclusions. Consequently, the value of the star
network gs strictly dominates the one of the circle network gc. !
For n ≥ 3, the value of the star network gs is always higher than the one of the
complete network gN as well as the circle network gc. Regarding the circle network
gc, this result is in line with Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) where this structure
cannot be SE, either (for n ≥ 4, since for n = 3, the circle network gc is structurally
identical to the complete network gN). However, the result for the complete network
gN is in sharp contrast to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) where it is (uniquely) SE
whenever c < δ − δ2. In the overall connectivity model, this cannot be the case,
since the complete network gN is overconnected and always strictly dominated by
the star network gs.
Why does the star network gs perform so well in the overall connectivity model?
Intuitively, there are two reasons for this. First, it oﬀers relatively short distances.
The center reaches every peripheral node by distance 1 and the peripheral nodes
every other node by distance 2 at most. Hence, the discount factor for the benefit
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terms in the aggreagte utility is at most 2. Second, the star network gs is minimally
connected. From graph theory we know that a graph is minimally connected if
and only if it is a tree. Any connected graph with n nodes and n − 1 links is a
tree. So, the star network gs is a tree and hence, minimally connected. Due to
this, the negative externalities from overall connectivity stay in total (relatively)
small. Nevertheless, the impact of the negative externality by overall connectivity
is extremely diﬀerent for the two diﬀerent types of nodes, namely the center and
the peripheral nodes. For the center, the factor 11+L(g−i) is simply 1 and hence, the
benefit terms in the utility are not reduced at all by overall connectivity. For the
peripheral nodes, the factor 11+L(g−i) in the utility function is equal to
1
1+2(n−2) and
hence, their benefit terms are quite heavily reduced in comparison to the center.
So, overall, the main part of the value of the star network gs is contributed by
the center. In contrast, in the other structures we looked at, such as the circle
network gc and the complete network gN , the benefits of every node are (negatively)
aﬀected by overall connectivity. Due to the regularity of both structures, the induced
weight factor 11+L(g−i) for the benefit terms is the same for all nodes in the relevant
network. Apparently, some structural properties like an uneven degree distribution,
connectedness, a small number of nodes and short distances play a central role for
the total value of a network. The star network gs combines all of these structural
properties simultaneously and therefore performs so well.
However, we shall point out again that we did not prove that for general n the
star network gs is SE and if so, under which conditions. We only showed that it
dominates some other (connected) structures, like the circle network gc and the
complete network gN . Furthermore, we explained why we believe that the star
network gs is such a good candidate for being SE in the overall connectivity model.
Unfortunately, compared to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) a general proof appears
to be much more complicated due to the negative externalities by link formation
on other nodes. Additionally, there are usually also positive externalities by link
formation on other nodes and then the question is always, which eﬀect overweighs
in terms of total value of the network. In Jackson and Wolinsky (1996), the proof
on SE networks is quite straightforward because the externalities by link formation
on other nodes are purely positive and thus the calculations are (much) easier. We
tried to apply a similar argument as in the proof of Proposition 1(ii) in Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), but general statements about the value are very hard to achieve due
the individual weights 11+L(g−i) in the utility functions that are strongly dependent
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on the underlying network structure.
4.4 Concluding remarks and further research
Based on the connections model by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) we introduce
a modification that accounts for negative externalities by overall connectivity. The
functional form of the utilities in the overall connectivity model is very closely related
to the ones in the connections model. We implement the externalities by additionally
weighting the benefit terms of the connections model by a factor depending on the
overall connectivity. Then, we discuss pairwise stable, asymptotically pairwise stable
and strongly eﬃcient networks in this framework. By comparing the two models, we
observe some important similarities and diﬀerences between the connections model
(with purely positive link externalities) and the overall connectivity model with
negative externalities by overall connectivity.
As we have seen in the section on pairwise stability, the empty network g∅, the
complete network gN and the star network gs can be pairwise stable. However,
compared to the connections model, the stability regions become more tiny, since
the benefit terms are (partially) reduced by overall connectivity. Similarly to the
connections model, a pairwise stable regular network always consists of at most one
(non-empty) component in the overall connectivity model. Furthermore, we identify
the conditions for pairwise stability of the circle network gc and show that all regular
networks are PS in the connections model if and only if they are pairwise stable in
the overall connectivity model for a specific fraction of the costs.
In the section on asymptotic pairwise stability we provide conclusions regarding the
pairwise stability of networks when the number of nodes becomes large. We find out
that the empty network g∅ and star network gs can be asymptotically pairwise stable,
while the complete network gN and the circle network gc cannot be asymptotically
pairwise stable in the overall connectivity model.
Analyzing strong eﬃciency indicates already for n = 3 some central diﬀerences to
the connections model. First, a disconnected structure can be strongly eﬃcient
and second, the complete network gN cannot be eﬃcient in the overall connectivity
model. For n ≥ 3 we show that the value of the star network gs strictly dominates the
one of the complete network gN as well as the the circle network gc. Unfortunately,
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we are not able to provide the precise conditions to guarantee strong eﬃciency of
the star network gs. Due to tractability, we leave this and a full characterization of
the class of strongly eﬃcient networks for further research.
Nevertheless, what is striking in the overall connectivity model is the fact that the
star network gs performs quite well in all areas we analyzed. The usual tension
between pairwise stability and strong eﬃciency seems to be reduced here. However,
to become more specific on this conjecture, we need to clarify additional points.
Thus, for further research we suggest to identify conditions under which the star
network gs is (uniquely) strongly eﬃcient. As described before, it appears to be
a very good candidate for a strongly eﬃcient network in the overall connectivity
model. The star network gs is strongly eﬃcient (under some conditions) in the
connections model with purely positive externalitites. In a situation with negative
externalities due to overall connectivity it appears to be an even more favorable
architecture, since it combines short distances with a small number of links. As we
have seen for n = 3, even a disconnected structure can be strongly eﬃcient in the
overall connectivity model. Hence, we need to find out whether this may also happen
for larger n and under which conditions a strongly eﬃcient network is connected.
An additional hypothesis we have is that (connected) regular networks are always
dominated by the star network gs. We looked at the two extreme cases, the circle
network gc with degree 2 and the complete network gN with degree n − 1 of every
node, and eventually all regular networks with in-between degree, are dominated by
the star network gs as well.
Overall, a general discussion of strong eﬃciency in models with both, positive and
negative externalities, appears to be a fruitful area for further research and would
provide a valuable contribution to the existing literature.
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Chapter 5
Stability of customer relationship
networks
This chapter is based on a joint work with Claus-Jochen Haake and Sonja
Recker, both from Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Adminis-
tration and Economics.
5.1 Introduction
In many real-world economic situations, a company has to invest in customer rela-
tionships to sell their products, e.g. in form of organizing access to their distribution
channels. As examples one may think of a free product support, maintenance of user
accounts or royalties that have to be paid for each customer. Regarding competitors
and their products in the market, such a link formation problem is not a bare opti-
mization exercise, as customers’ demands play an important role for the incentives
to form links. An interesting question is, which link structure evolves under specific
market conditions. To answer this question, we investigate a duopoly, which is on
the one hand characterized by Cournot competition and horizontal product diﬀer-
entiation and on the other hand by the network structure that is built up by the
firms to serve customers’ demands. Beyond the scope of the current model, the own
optimal positioning strategy might also be depending on additional factors, such
as the mode of competition, the connectedness of other market participants, the
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market size or the degree of substitutability of the own product compared to those
of other competitors.
More precisely, in this article we focus on two firms’ decisions to form links to their
customers, explicitly taking link costs and the degree of substitutability into account.
That means, the firms make strategic choices on which customer relationships they
are willing to establish at given link formation costs and to what degree customers
view their products as substitutes. One would expect that if customers consider the
two firms’ products as complements, then they shall be linked to both firms. How-
ever, if the firms’ products are considered to be substitutes, customers will rather
split and only trade with one firm. Our particular interest is in the network structure
that evolves under given link costs and degree of product diﬀerentiation. For this, we
analyze stable networks, which we define in two ways: Local stability requires that
neither firm benefits from rendering the link status of a single customer, whereas
Nash stability assures this for multiple customers. In the analysis we first concen-
trate on the general case with n customers. As the number of potential changes of
the network structure significantly increases with the number of customers, we put
emphasis on specific prominent network architectures and determine as well as de-
pict the regions of local stability for arbitrary n. In the limit case (Proposition 5.2)
it turns out that already a setting with few customers is a good proxy. This im-
plies that much of the market structure and the forces that drive the results can
already be understood in a model with few customers. Additionally, for networks
with an arbitrary number of customers we establish the existence of locally stable
networks for complementary or independent products (Proposition 5.3). For these
product types either the empty, the complete or both networks are locally stable.
Moreover, we link local and Nash stability for selected networks (Proposition 5.4)
and demonstrate for which degrees of substitutability the model is sound enough to
produce valid results (Propositions 5.1 and 5.5). Motivated by the fact that stability
regions quickly converge, we devote a whole section on the scenario with three cus-
tomers. The main result is a complete characterization of the set of stable networks,
identifying for each possible network the combinations of link costs and degrees of
substitutability under which it is stable. We display and compare such regions of
stability for the diﬀerent networks and identify adjacency relations. It turns out
that in the case of complementary products, no asymmetric networks prevail and
that the firms are generally willing to accept higher costs of customer acquisition
as in the case of substitutes (Proposition 5.6) and that existence of locally stable
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networks is guaranteed for any degree of substitutability (Proposition 5.7).
Our work is linked to research in industrial organization, network and matching the-
ory. The model of a diﬀerentiated duopoly we use is most closely related to Häckner
(2000), which is based on the seminal work by Singh and Vives (1984). In our
article we basically adapt this framework, adding a customer relationship network
and putting emphasis on the impact of link costs and product diﬀerentiation on
its stability. A diﬀerent strand of related literature deals with the strategic forma-
tion of networks for research and development collaborations. Departing from the
model of Goyal and Joshi (2003), it has been studied, e.g., by Goyal and Moraga-
González (2001), by Dawid and Hellmann (2014) or by Dawid and Hellmann (2016).
In these articles a link describes a research cooperation and the network is used to
model the externalities that are induced by transferring knowledge through such a
partnership. Forming a link reduces the production costs and, hence, endogenously
introduces asymmetries. A diﬀerent type of network formation is studied in Billand
et al. (2016). They combine oligopolistic multimarket competition with a network
structure among firms, in which links represent spying activities between firms. The
article analyzes equilibria of the network formation game, in which payoﬀs are in-
fluenced by the impact of the network structure on product qualities. In contrast to
these network models, we interpret links as customer relationships that purely enable
trade and which directly impact equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities on
the market. Likewise, Kranton and Minehart (2000a, 2001, 2000b) and Corominas-
Bosch (2004) interpret a link in this way. To model trade in buyer-seller networks
Kranton and Minehart (2000a) focus on the analysis of competitive prices whereas
Kranton and Minehart (2001) use an ascending bid auction and Corominas-Bosch
(2004) assumes non-cooperative bilateral bargaining. For vertically integrated firms
Kranton and Minehart (2000b) analyze equilibrium industrial structures including
a model of link formation. Also Wang and Watts (2006) analyze the formation
of links between buyers and sellers for quality diﬀerentiated products. Apart from
similarities in the research question, our work especially diﬀers with respect to the
competition framework. We assume oligopolistic quantity competition between the
sellers and thus, drop the assumption of unit-supply to investigate perfectly divis-
ible goods. A more closely related contribution on oligopolistic competition and
an underlying network structure is Bimpikis et al. (2016). They directly investi-
gate quantity competition together with a network structure between m markets
and n firms. The main assumption connecting separate markets is a convex, i.e.,
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quadratic, cost function while at the same time products are assumed to be per-
fectly substitutable and the demand structure is linear. In contrast, we directly link
diﬀerent markets by the degree of product diﬀerentiation between two firms using
the demand function and assuming that a firm charges the same price to all its
customers. Moreover, our cost structure is supposed to be linear. In recent years,
supply-chain (networks) have been investigated in matching theory with contracts,
e.g., in Ostrovsky (2008), Westkamp (2010) and Hatfield and Kominers (2012). A
common feature in all these matching models is that preferences over the set of
available contracts (trade relations) are assumed to be exogenous and do not result
from strategic interaction. Although various single aspects were studied in the lit-
erature, our work newly brings together the features of competition under product
diﬀerentiation of divisible products and strategic formation and stability of customer
relationship networks. In the latter, decisions depend on the competition and the
degree of product substitutability in the market.
Our article is structured as follows: Section 5.2 presents the model with product
diﬀerentiation for two firms and discusses (Cournot-Nash) equilibria for an arbitrary
number and network of customers as well as the used notions of stability (local and
Nash stability). The analysis for an arbitrary number of customers is in Section 5.3.
Here we discuss the shape of the stability regions for specific architectures when n is
getting large. In Section 5.4 we focus on the case of three customers and completely
characterize stable network architectures. Section 5.5 concludes. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
5.2 The model
This section discusses the essential ingredients of our model such as the network
architecture, competition and resulting equilibria as well as the notions of network
stability. There are two firms and n > 1 customers in the market. The two firms oﬀer
diﬀerentiated products to the customers. We assume that prior to sales a customer
has to be (costly) linked to the firm he wants to purchase from. Establishing links
are in the firms’ responsibilities and therefore costs are taken by them.
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5.2.1 Networks of customer relationships
When two firms form links to customers there are three diﬀerent types of customers
that have at least one link to a firm. Customers that are only linked to firm 1
or only linked to firm 2 are termed exclusive customers (of firm 1 or 2, respec-
tively), whereas customers who are linked to both firms are called joint customers.
With n customers, we describe a customer relationship network architecture (or
simply network) by the numbers ne1 of exclusive customers of firm 1, n
j of joint
customers and ne2 of exclusive customers of firm 2, i.e., by a triplet (n
e
1, n
j , ne2) ∈ N3+
with ne1 + n
j + ne2 ≤ n. We denote the set of all networks with n customers by
Nn =
{
(ne1, n
j , ne2) ∈ N3+|ne1 + nj + ne2 ≤ n
}
. Examples for networks of customer
relationships with n = 3 customers are given in Figure 5.1 (the two firms are rep-
resented by the two nodes on the top, customers are represented by nodes on the
bottom). Note that to describe a network we always write the number of joint cus-
tomers in the middle and the exclusive customers of the two firms left and right.
This notation is intuitively related to the illustrations in Figure 5.1.
(a) (0, 3, 0) (b) (1, 1, 1) (c) (1, 0, 1)
(d) (1, 2, 0) (e) (2, 1, 0) (f) (2, 0, 1)
Figure 5.1: Examples of customer relationship networks
From a market perspective, we are interested in the structure of the network rather
than which particular customer is linked to which firm, as customers as well as firms
are assumed to be identical. Therefore, one natural distinction of networks is one
between symmetric networks, in which ne1 = n
e
2 holds, and asymmetric networks
with ne1 ̸= ne2. The networks in Figures 5.1a, 5.1b and 5.1c are symmetric, in
contrast to asymmetric networks in Figures 5.1d, 5.1e and 5.1f. Figure 5.1a shows a
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network of customer relationships where all customers are linked to both firms. This
implies that each firm has exactly three links and all customers are joint customers.
In contrast, in Figure 5.1f all customers are linked to either firm 1 or to firm 2
and in Figure 5.1c there is a customer without any link. Figure 5.1b illustrates
a symmetric network where both firms have exactly one exclusive customer, and,
in addition, there is one joint customer linked to both firms. The networks in
Figure 5.1d and Figure 5.1e are asymmetric and only one firm has some exclusive
customers. However, a network with no joint customers may also be asymmetric,
as in Figure 5.1f. These networks of customer relationships are just some examples
for n = 3 which are analyzed in full detail in Section 5.4 after the general model has
been introduced and investigated.
5.2.2 Customers’ demands
To describe the customers’ preferences we use a standard utility function on product
diﬀerentiation as in Singh and Vives (1984) and Häckner (2000). For this, we need
to specify a customer’s utility function, depending on whether he is an exclusive
or a joint customer. Recall that exclusive customers can only derive utility from
consuming the corresponding firm’s product, whereas both products enter a joint
customer’s utility function. Phrased diﬀerently, we understand a link as granting
access to a customer to purchase at that firm. In fact, creating (or deleting) a link
to a customer will alter his utility function and hence his demand for products.
Type e1 customers are exclusive customers from firm 1 and consume an amount of
qe1 = (q
e
1), type j customers are joint customers and consume q
j = (qj1, q
j
2), whereas
type e2 customers are exclusively consuming qe2 = (q
e
2) from firm 2. So, q
t
i denotes
the amount of firm i’s product that a customer of type t consumes (t ∈ {e, j}).
The vector q = (qe1,q
j,qe2) = (q
e
1, q
j
1, q
j
2, q
e
2) collects all such quantities. Customers’
utilities are as follows:1
uei (q
e
i , I, γ) = aq
e
i −
1
2
(qei )
2 + I, (type ei)
uj(qj, I, γ) = aqj1 + aq
j
2 − 12
((
qj1
)2
+
(
qj2
)2
+ 2γqj1q
j
2
)
+ I, (type j)
1Singh and Vives (1984) postulate the utility function for joint customers, as all customers
have access to trade with both firms in their model. Besides that, we newly consider exclusive
customers.
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for i ∈ {1, 2}, where a > 0 can be interpreted as the products’ common quality
level and I as the consumption (expenditures) for other goods.2 The parameter
γ ∈ [−1, 1] reflects the degree of horizontal product diﬀerentiation (or the degree
of substitutability/complementarity) and only aﬀects the utility of joint customers.
For γ = 1, the utility function uj eﬀectively depends on the sum qj1 + q
j
2, showing
that a joint customer views the products as perfect substitutes. On the contrary, at
γ = −1 he considers two products as complements, as there the squared diﬀerence
of the quantities given by (qj1 − qj2)2 enters negatively in the utility function uj.
Finally, at γ = 0 the joint customers’ utility function is additively separable and
thus, the two firms can be considered as monopolists for their products. Note that
the utility function uj of a joint customer reduces to the utility function of an
exclusive customer, uei , when the according quantity q
j
3−i is zero. Solving customers’
utility maximization problems3 at given firms’ prices p1 and p2 in a network of
customer relationships (ne1, n
j , ne2) ∈ Nn, the first order conditions of firm i, i = 1, 2
read
a− qei − pi = 0 for nei customers of type ei, (5.1)
a− qji − γqj3−i − pi = 0 for nj customers of type j. (5.2)
For ne1, n
j , ne2 > 0 the above system of equations is equivalent to
pi = a− n
e
iq
e
i + n
jqji + n
jγqj3−i
nei + nj
and qei = q
j
i + γq
j
3−i for i = 1, 2. (5.3)
The inverse demand functions pi (q) in the first part of (5.3) will next serve as
primitive for the Cournot competition among firms. Due to diﬀerentiated products
they may be charged at diﬀerent prices, but each price depends on the demands
for both firms’ products. The second part of (5.3) reflects the relation between
the demands of exclusive and joint customers from the firms’ perspective, given the
customers’ optimizing behavior.
2We assume that customers’ income is high enough, so that due to quasilinearity of the utility
function, expenditure I will not alter product demands.
3i.e., maxqe
i
uei (q
e
i , I, γ)− pqei and maxqj uj(qj, I, γ)− pqj for appropriate price vector p.
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5.2.3 Duopoly with diﬀerentiated products
We now investigate the equilibrium prices and equilibrium quantities of two firms,
taking a network of customer relationships (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn as given. On the
market the two firms compete in quantities. Although there are exclusive and joint
customers, a firm charges the same price to all his customers. The firms maximize
profits given by the diﬀerence of price and costs times total quantity sold to either
exclusive or joint customers. The price follows the inverse demand as given in (5.3).
Firms have identical and constant marginal costs denoted by k.
Computing customers’ demands is necessary to determine firms’ (Cournot-Nash)
equilibrium profits for a given network and, hence, to analyze incentives for creating
new or deleting existing links. For this, we impose a technical assumption on γ to
ensure non-negativity of linked customers’ demands. The problem can be seen as
follows. Suppose both firms sell their product to their exclusive and joint customers
such that these demand according to equations (5.1) and (5.2) and there exists
at least one customer of each type, i.e., ne1, n
j , ne2 > 0. If both firms sell positive
quantities to joint customers, then according to the second part of equation (5.3)
the quantities sold to exclusive customers are positive for γ ∈ [0, 1]. However, they
may become negative if γ ∈ [−1, 0). Therefore, to obtain non-negative equilibrium
quantities we require that for γ ∈ [−1, 0) and ne3−i > nei > 0
(1 + γ)
(
nj + ne3−i
) [
(2− γ)
(
nei + n
j
)
− γnei
]
+ γ2nj
(
nei − ne3−i
)
≥ 0 for i = 1, 2.
(5.4)
These inequalities ensure that the quantities traded in equilibrium will be non-
negative.4 As we will see below, they are vacuously satisfied for n ≤ 3 and satisfied
for a wide range of γ when n ≥ 4.
The profits of firm i are
π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
i (q) =
(
a− n
e
iq
e
i + n
jqji + n
jγqj3−i
nei + nj
− k
)(
neiq
e
i + n
jqji
)
,
4See also equation (5.7) below.
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and, hence, the first order conditions are
∂π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
i (q)
∂qei
= neia−
2 (nei )
2 qei + 2n
e
in
jqji + n
e
in
jγqj3−i
nei + nj
− neik = 0, (5.5)
∂π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
i (q)
∂qji
= nja− 2n
e
in
jqei + 2 (n
j)
2
qji + (n
j)
2
γqj3−i
nei + nj
− njk = 0 (i ∈ {1, 2}) .
(5.6)
Note that equations (5.5) and (5.6) are linearly dependent. Using the first order
conditions resulting from (5.5) or (5.6) and the second part of equation (5.3) we
have for the equilibrium quantities
qe∗i (k) = (a− k)
(1 + γ)
(
nj + ne3−i
)
[(2− γ) (nei + nj)− γnei ] + γ2nj
(
nei − ne3−i
)
4 (nei + nj) (nj + n
e
3−i)− γ2 (2nei + nj) (nj + 2ne3−i)
,
(5.7)
qj∗i (k) = (a− k)
(
nj + ne3−i
)
[(2− γ) (nei + nj)− γnei ]
4 (nei + nj) (nj + n
e
3−i)− γ2 (2nei + nj) (nj + 2ne3−i)
for i = 1, 2.
(5.8)
For a ≥ k, these equilibrium quantities are non-negative for γ ∈ [0, 1] by the non-
negativity of qj∗i (k) and the second part of equation (5.3). Moreover, with the
condition (5.4) on γ and (ne1, n
j , ne2) this also holds for q
e∗
i (k) for a ≥ k. The price
of firm i, i = 1, 2, is
pi(q
∗) = a− (a− k)(1 + γ)(n
j + ne3−i)[(2− γ)(nei + nj)− γnei ] + γ2nj(nei − ne3−i)
4(nei + nj)(nj + n
e
3−i)− γ2(2nei + nj)(nj + 2ne3−i)
.
(5.9)
It is easy to verify that for a ≥ k these prices are indeed positive.
If nj > 0 and ne1 = 0 or n
e
2 = 0, to find the equilibrium quantities and prices we drop
the first order conditions on the according quantities and on the relationship of the
quantities. The according equilibrium quantities are as in equations (5.7) and (5.8)
and the equilibrium prices are as in equations (5.9) inserting the according values
for ne1 and n
e
2.
If nj = 0, there is no joint customer and thus, there is no dependence of the products
of the firms. Using the first order condition (5.5) of the exclusive customer the
equilibrium quantities reduce to qe∗i (k) =
a−k
2 , and equilibrium prices are given by
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pi (q∗) = a+k2 for i = 1, 2.
We return to condition (5.4) that ensures non-negative equilibrium quantities. In
fact it can be viewed as a restriction on the degree of substitutability γ that may be
eﬀective for γ ∈ [−1, 0). However, for a large range they are satisfied for all network
structures.
Proposition 5.1. For all networks of customer relationships with n ≥ 3 customers
there exists γnmin < 0 such that for all γ ∈ [γnmin, 0) condition (5.4) always holds. More
precisely, γ3min = −1 and γnmin < −34 for all n ≥ 4.
The bound −34 is valid for all n ≥ 4, though it is not tight. As indicated in the
proof, in specific networks we may have positive equilibrium quantities even for a
greater range of complementarities.
5.2.4 Network formation and stability concepts
In the previous subsections we in particular calculated the firms’ profits in (Cournot-
Nash) equilibrium for a given network (ne1, n
j , ne2) ∈ Nn. Comparing its profits for
diﬀerent networks reveals a firm’s incentives to create or delete links to customers.
Thereby, establishing or deleting a link are solely the firms’ strategic decisions.
Moreover, firms pay the entire linking costs. Phrased diﬀerently, we analyze firms’
strategic decisions in customer acquisition. In our model, a customer cannot directly
influence whether a link is established or not. One way to motivate this is that
customers cannot influence receiving marketing benefits and there is no reason for
customers to reject such links.. In that sense one-sided link formation should be
interpreted as advertising a product that customers cannot discover themselves. A
well-known model of one-sided link formation in this spirit is Bala and Goyal (2000),
for instance.
Arguably, the central notion in network formation is stability. We are interested
in networks in which no firm has an incentive to alter the network and to enjoy a
higher profit. To define a stability concept, we need to specify which alterations of
networks are feasible for an firm. In our setup, deviations from a given network of
customer relationships are achieved by adding further links to acquire new exclusive
or joint customers or by deleting existing links to own exclusive or joint customers.
Figure 5.2 illustrates deviations with the addition or deletion of single links. Along
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the solid lines firm 1 alters exactly one link, whereas dashed lines correspond to
changes from firm 2. Deviations that involve exactly one customer and one firm are
called local.
(ne1, n
j , ne2)(n
e
1 + 1, n
j, ne2) (n
e
1 − 1, nj, ne2)
(ne1, n
j + 1, ne2 − 1)
(ne1, n
j − 1, ne2 + 1)
(ne1, n
j , ne2 + 1) (n
e
1 − 1, nj + 1, ne2)
(ne1, n
j , ne2 − 1)(ne1 + 1, nj − 1, ne2)
local deviations by firm 1
local deviations by firm 2
Figure 5.2: Local deviations from a network (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn
Apparently, not all of these local deviations are feasible for every network. The
reason is that given a particular network there has to be an according customer to
form or to delete a link. For example, as we consider the total number of customers
to be fixed, it is not possible to add a further link if all customers are already linked
to both firms. This is captured by defining which deviations are considered to be
locally feasible.
Definition 5.1. Given a total number of customers n ∈ N++ and a network of
customer relationships (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn.
A feasible local deviation of firm 1 from the network (ne1, n
j , ne2) to a network
(n˜e1, n˜
j , n˜e2) requires(
n˜e1, n˜
j, n˜e2
)
∈ Nn ∩
{(
ne1 ± 1, nj, ne2
)
,
(
ne1, n
j ± 1, ne2 ∓ 1
)}
Analogously, a feasible local deviation of firm 2 from the network (ne1, n
j , ne2)
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to a network (n˜e1, n˜
j , n˜e2) requires(
n˜e1, n˜
j, n˜e2
)
∈ Nn ∩
{(
ne1, n
j, ne2 ± 1
)
,
(
ne1 ∓ 1, nj ± 1, ne2
)}
.
We next turn to the notion of stability. For this, consider firm i’s equilibrium profit
π
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i at network (n
e
1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn. Recall that it is derived using the equilibrium
prices and quantities on the market from Subsection 5.2.3. By π˜
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i denote the
equilibrium profits including costs of link formation. Assuming that each link incurs
a constant cost c ≥ 0, this implies
π˜
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i = π
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i −
(
nei + n
j
)
c for i = 1, 2.
Roughly speaking, a network is stable if no firm has an incentive to feasibly mod-
ify the network by adding or deleting one or several links. Changing links has an
eﬀect on customers’ demands, hence on the equilibrium prices, quantities, and prof-
its. We discuss two versons of stability, distinguished by the number of allowed
modifications.
The first concept, termed local stability, addresses modifications of single links, i.e.,
feasible local deviations as defined above. Nash stability considers the case in which
an firm may manipulate several links at the same time, or, put in other words,
iterates feasible local deviations.
Definition 5.2. A network of customer relationships (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn is locally
stable if for both i = 1, 2, π˜
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i ≥ π˜(n˜
e
1
,n˜j ,n˜e
2
)
i for all networks (n˜
e
1, n˜
j , n˜e2) that
result from a feasible local deviation of firm i .
The basic question we raise is at what combinations of link cost c and degree of
substitutability γ a given network is locally stable. For the analysis we start at the
network and determine the minimal and maximal c (as a function of γ) such that
adding or deleting a link does not result in a higher profit.
For given (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn denote by (ne1, nj, ne2)i+ a network that is obtained if firm
i feasibly adds one link and by (ne1, n
j, ne2)i− a network if firm i feasibly deletes one
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link. Then, the conditions imposed on the costs c of link formation are
π
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i ≥ π(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2
)i+
i − c, (5.10)
π
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i − c ≥ π(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2
)i−
i for i = 1, 2. (5.11)
Inequality (5.10) defines a lower bound for the costs of link formation for the net-
work (ne1, n
j , ne2)i+, and inequality (5.11) provides an upper bound for the network
(ne1, n
j , ne2)i−. As there may be several possibilities to feasibly add or to delete links
we have to take the maximal lower and minimal upper bound. Therefore, define
c(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2
) := max
{
π
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)i+
i − π(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i | (ne1, nj, ne2)i+, i = 1, 2
}
,
c(n
e
1
,nj,ne
2
) := min
{
π
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i − π(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2
)i−
i | (ne1, nj, ne2)i−, i = 1, 2
}
.
Hence, the network (ne1, n
j , ne2) is locally stable if the costs of link formation are
c ∈
[
c(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2
), c(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
]
. Intuitively, c must not be too low, so that adding one
link is not attractive, and it must not be too high, so that deletion would become
favorable. Besides the case that networks should be stable against manipulation of
single links, we also address the case of multiple changes and define Nash stability.
Definition 5.3. A network of customer relationships (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn is Nash
stable if π˜
(ne
1
,nj ,ne
2
)
i ≥ π˜(n˜
e
1
,n˜j ,n˜e
2
)
i for all networks (n˜
e
1, n˜
j, n˜e2) that result from iterated
feasible local deviations of firm i for all i = 1, 2.
Note that Bala and Goyal (2000) refer to these networks as “Nash networks”. Local
deviations are depicted in Figure 5.2. The possibility for firm i to add or to delete
several links at the same time actually partitions the set of all networks. Two
networks are in the same set of this partition if there is a sequence of feasible local
deviations of firm i that leads from the one network to the other one. More precisely,
consider the network (0, 0, n¯), in which firm 2 has exactly n¯ links, all of them to
exclusive customers. Then firm 1 may iteratively add a further link to one of these
exclusive customers of firm 2, and/or to a new own exclusive customer who is not
yet linked. As firm 1 is only able to manipulate own links, it follows that exactly
all networks in which firm 2 has precisely n¯ links are reachable by iterated feasible
local deviations of firm 1. Hence, the partition Πni of networks with n customers
induced by local deviations of firm i contains n + 1 sets, indexed by the number of
links of the other firm. Formally, we may describe the partition induced by firm i
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by Πni := {Πni (0), . . . ,Πni (n)} with Πni (n¯) := {(ne1, nj , ne2) ∈ Nn|nj + ne2 = n¯} for
0 ≤ n¯ ≤ n for i = 1, 2. Then, a network (ne1, nj, ne2) ∈ Nn is Nash stable if it
provides the highest profit (including link costs) to firm 1 among all networks in
Πn1 (n
j + ne2) and the highest profit to firm 2 among the networks in Π
n
2 (n
e
1 + n
j).
As above, for fixed unit link costs the resulting inequalities can be translated into
bounds for c, such that the given network is Nash stable. Note that we may use this
partition of the networks to figure out how many networks exist for a given number
of customers n. Consider the partition for firm 1. Then, the set Πn1 (n¯) contains those
networks in which firm 2 has exactly nj + ne2 = n¯ links. The cardinality of Π
n
1 (n¯) is
given by |Πn1 (n¯)| = (n + 1− n¯) (n¯+ 1). There are (n¯+ 1) possibilities how the links
of firm 2 are split into joint and exclusive customers. This is, for firm 2 there may be
n¯ exclusive customers and no joint customers, n¯− 1 exclusive customers and 1 joint
customer and so on until there are no exclusive customers and n¯ joint customers of
firm 2. As for each given n¯ = n¯2 + n¯3 the links to joint customers need also to be
established by the other firm, firm 1 has n+1− n¯2− n¯3 = n+1− n¯ possibilities to
further establish links to obtain own exclusive customers. Hence, we may compute
the number of existing networks for n customers by summing over all elements of
the partition for firm 1, given by
|Nn| =
n∑
n¯=0
|Πn1(n¯)| =
n∑
n¯=0
(n+ 1− n¯) (n¯ + 1) = (n+ 3) (n + 2) (n+ 1)
6
where the last equation can be show by induction. Thus, the series containing the
number of networks is given by
(|Nn|)n≥1 = (4, 10, 20, 35, 56, 84, 120, 165, 220, 286, 364, 455, 560, 680, 816, . . .) .
Using these insights about how to partition Nn we can rephrase the conditions for
Nash stability considering the network (ne1, n
j , ne2) ∈ Nn for firm 1 as
π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
1 − π(n˜
e
1
,n˜j ,n˜e
2)
1 ≥
(
ne1 + n
j − n˜e1 − n˜j1
)
c
for all
(
n˜e1, n˜
j , n˜e2
)
∈ Πn1
(
nj + ne2
)
\
{(
ne1, n
j , ne2
)}
.
If the analogous conditions also hold for firm 2, then the network is Nash stable.
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5.3 Stable networks
In this section, we examine local and Nash stability of networks with an arbitrary
number of customers. As the number of possible networks and, hence, the number
of possible deviations is large, we concentrate on specific networks and calculate and
display the regions of local stability. Surprisingly, the qualitative picture even in the
limit for n→∞ is very similar to what we see for few customers. By Proposition 5.1,
we can ensure that the equilibrium quantities computed in equations (5.7) and (5.8)
are non-negative only for γ ∈
[
−34 , 1
]
. Then, condition (5.4) is satisfied for all
possible networks of customer relationships.
Our next Proposition collects local stability results of specific networks with n cus-
tomers, namely the complete network with only joint customers (0, n, 0) (“perfect”
oligopoly with two firms), the empty network (0, 0, 0), the asymmetric network with
exclusive customers for one firm given by (n, 0, 0) and (0, 0, n) (natural monopoly),
and, finally, the network with an equal number of exclusive customers for both firms(
n
2 , 0,
n
2
)
(two coexisting monopolies). Moreover, the limiting cases for growing n is
included and some locally unstable networks are identified.
Proposition 5.2. Consider (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn and γ ∈
[
−34 , 1
]
.
(i) The complete network with (ne1, n
j, ne2) = (0, n, 0) is locally stable if and only
if the link costs c satisfy
c ≤ (a− k)
2 n (16n− 16nγ2 + (3n + 1) γ4)
(2 + γ)2 (4n− (n+ 1) γ2)2 .
This upper bound converges to
lim
n→∞
(a− k)2 n (16n− 16nγ2 + (3n+ 1) γ4)
(2 + γ)2 (4n− (n+ 1) γ2)2 =
(a− k)2 (4− 3γ2)
(2− γ) (2 + γ)3 .
(ii) The empty network with (ne1, n
j , ne2) = (0, 0, 0) is locally stable if and only if
the link costs c satisfy c ≥ (a−k)24 .
(iii) An asymmetric network with (ne1, n
j, ne2) = (0, 0, n) or (n
e
1, n
j , ne2) = (n, 0, 0)
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is locally stable if and only if the link costs c satisfy
c ∈
[
(a− k)2 n2 (2− γ)2
(4n− (2n− 1) γ2)2 ,
(a− k)2
4
]
.
This lower bound converges to
lim
n→∞
(a− k)2 n2 (2− γ)2
(4n− (2n− 1) γ2)2 =
(a− k)2 (2− γ)2
4 (2− γ2)2 .
(iv) For n even, the symmetric network with (ne1, n
j , ne2) =
(
n
2 , 0,
n
2
)
is locally stable
if and only if the link costs c satisfy
c ∈
[
(a− k)2 n2 (n + 2) (2 + n− γ − (n− 1) γ2)2
8 (n (n+ 2)− (n− 1) (n+ 1) γ2)2 −
(a− k)2 n
8
,
(a− k)2
4
]
.
This lower bound converges to
lim
n→∞
(a− k)2 n2 (n + 2) (2 + n− γ − (n− 1) γ2)2
8 (n (n+ 2)− (n− 1) (n+ 1) γ2)2 −
(a− k)2 n
8
=
(a− k)2
4 (1 + γ)
.
(v) For n ≥ 3 the asymmetric networks with (ne1, nj, ne2) = (0, 1, n− 1) and
(ne1, n
j , ne2) = (n− 1, 1, 0) are locally unstable for all γ ̸= 0 and for γ = 0 for
all c ̸= (a−k)24 .
(vi) Networks (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn with nj = 0 and 0 < ne1 + ne2 < n are locally
unstable for c ̸= (a−k)24 .
(vii) For γ = 0 and c = (a−k)
2
4 all networks (n
e
1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn are locally stable.
Figure 5.3 illustrates some of the findings of Proposition 5.2. The stability regions for
these networks for relatively small n already appear to be a good approximation to
the stability regions when the number of customers n becomes large. Graphically,
already for n = 20 there is hardly any visible diﬀerence compared to the limit
region. We observe that the perfect oligopoly with two firms may be locally stable
for any degree of product diﬀerentiation. In comparison the natural monopoly or
two coexisting monopolies of identical size are only locally stable for substitutable
products. The costs of link formation need to be relatively high for the monopolies
to be locally stable compared to the corresponding oligopoly (for a given degree of
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product diﬀerentiation for substitutable products).
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(a) (0, n, 0)
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(b) (n, 0, 0), (0, 0, n)
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(c) (n2 , 0,
n
2 )
Figure 5.3: Stable regions of networks with n customers for γ ∈
[
−34 , 1
]
(a− k = 1)
In general for the existence of locally stable networks we know the following.
Proposition 5.3. For all n ∈ N+, all combinations of degrees of substitutability
for complementary or independent products with γ ∈
[
−34 , 0
]
, and all costs of link
formation c ≥ 0 there exists at least one locally stable network. More precisely,
either the network (0, n, 0), the network (0, 0, 0) or both are locally stable. When
products are substitutable, then for all γ ∈ (0, 1] there exist costs of link formation
c ≥ 0, for which neither the complete nor the empty network is locally stable.
Figure 5.4 illustrates these findings graphically. Proposition 5.3 shows that for
complementary or independent products we are sure that a locally stable network
always exists. However, we also establish that for substitutable products this issue
is more complex. Among others, we further investigate this question in case of three
customers in Section 5.4.
The next proposition relates local and Nash stability for some particular networks
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(0, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 0)
(0, n, 0)
(0, n, 0)
0
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c
Figure 5.4: Limit regions for local stability of the networks (0, n, 0) and (0, 0, 0)
(a− k = 1)
from Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.4.
(i) Consider networks (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn and γ ∈ [γnmin, 1]. The networks (0, n, 0),
(0, 0, n) / (n, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0) are Nash stable if and only if they are locally
stable.
(ii) For γ = 0 and c = (a−k)
2
4 all networks (n
e
1, n
j, ne2) ∈ Nn are Nash stable.
(iii) Local and Nash stability do not coincide.
Proposition 5.4 (i) exemplarily shows that there is no diﬀerence between the concepts
of local and Nash stability for the prominent networks with only exclusive, only joint,
or no customers, i.e., the regions of stability for local and Nash stability coincide.
The proof in particular shows that if there is a beneficial deviation for a firm that
involves several links, then there must be a feasible local deviation that increases
the firm’s profit. The main intuition behind Proposition 5.4 (i) is that the incentives
for feasible deviations are provided by networks that are directly neighboring. For
networks within the set Πni (0) a local deviation by firm i (i ∈ {1, 2}) triggers the
same change in profits. Hence, they are increasing or decreasing in the number of
exclusive customers and therefore the conditions imposed by local and Nash stability
for deviations of firm i coincide. Proposition 5.4 (iii) reveals that the coincidence
of local and Nash stability that was established in Proposition 5.4 (i) for selected
networks with n customers does not generalize to arbitrary networks of customer
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 5. Stability of customer relationship networks 137
relationships. We close this section by returning to the issue for which degrees of
substitutability γ our analysis in Proposition 5.2 is valid.
Proposition 5.5. The results on local stability for the networks (0, n, 0), (0, 0, 0),
(n, 0, 0) and (0, 0, n) as in Proposition 5.2 (i) to (iii) are valid for all γ ∈ [−1, 1]
and those for the network
(
n
2 , 0,
n
2
)
as in Proposition 5.2 (iv) are valid for all γ ∈[
−
√
3
√
163−3
20 , 1
]
≈ [−0.96, 1].
Proposition 5.5 states that for the specific networks we consider in Proposition 5.2 (i)
to (iv), equilibrium quantities are well defined for a broader range of γ than given
in Proposition 5.1. Readers that feel uncomfortable with not having the full range
[−1, 1] may be reconciled with the fact that there is not much diﬀerence between a
utility function of a joint customer for γ = −1 and γ = −34 . Unlike the use of Leontief
type utility functions that precisely capture the notion of perfect complements, the
utility functions used here (as well as in the literature on product diﬀerentiation)
still allow for some substitutability at γ = −1. Although it is only a good proxy
for perfect complements, the main advantage over taking a Leontief type utility
function is that equilibrium quantities are well-defined and, hence, we get a sound
basis for our analysis of stable customer relationship networks.
5.4 Networks with three customers
In this section we closer investigate a special case that allows us a complete char-
acterization of locally stable networks. More precisely, for networks with three
customers we completely identify conditions on link costs and the degree of substi-
tutability that renders specific networks locally stable. As shown in Proposition 5.1
we may consider γ ∈ [−1, 1] for n = 3. With three customers there are in total
20 diﬀerent networks, presented in Figure 5.5. The complete network (0, 3, 0) and
empty network (0, 0, 0) are at the top and bottom. Symmetric networks (ne1 = n
e
2)
are found in the center “column”. The relations between those networks through
feasible local deviations from firm 1 are depicted by solid lines, those of firm 2 by
dashed lines. Observe that the partition Π31 resulting from the iteration of feasible
local deviations precisely contains the connected components when only considering
connections along solid lines (firm 1). Here, there are four sets in this partition.
Our first stability result investigates local stability and distinguishes between the
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(0, 3, 0)
(1, 1, 1)
(0, 2, 0)
(1, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 0)
(1, 2, 0)
(2, 0, 1)(2, 1, 0)(3, 0, 0)
(2, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 0)
(0, 2, 1)
(1, 0, 2) (0, 1, 2) (0, 0, 3)
(0, 0, 2)
(0, 0, 1)
(0, 1, 1)
feasible local deviations by firm 1
feasible local deviations by firm 2
Figure 5.5: Networks with (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ N3
case with substitutes (γ > 0) and complements (γ < 0).
Proposition 5.6. Consider networks (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ N3.
(i) For substitutable products with γ ∈ (0, 1] there exist costs of link formation
such that there are symmetric (ne1 = n
e
2) locally stable networks diﬀerent from
the empty and complete network and there exist costs of link formation such
that there are asymmetric (ne1 ̸= ne2) locally stable networks.
(ii) For complementary products with γ ∈ [−1, 0) there are no asymmetric locally
stable networks for any costs c ̸= (a−k)24 of link formation. Moreover, there exist
costs of link formation such that there are symmetric locally stable networks
with 0 < ne1 + n
j + ne2 < 3.
Apart from the results stated in Proposition 5.6, we have analytically determined the
regions (in γ/c space) of stability for all networks with three customers. Figure 5.6
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shows the regions of stability for stable networks with three customers (for a− k =
1). The displayed functions in γ are upper and lower bounds on c imposed by
local stability. The gray-shaded area indicates the region of (γ, c) combinations for
which the according network is locally stable. Note that the local instability of the
networks (2, 1, 0) and (0, 1, 2) has already been established in Proposition 5.2(v) for
a general number of customers. The networks not shown in Figure 5.6 are locally
stable only for very specific values of γ and c. More precisely, the networks (1, 1, 0)
and (0, 1, 1) are locally stable only for γ = 0 and c = (a−k)
2
4 and the remaining
networks (2, 0, 0), (0, 0, 2), (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) for all γ ∈ [−1, 1] and c = (a−k)24 .
In view of Proposition 5.6 and Figure 5.6, we observe that with complementary
products we rather have symmetric networks among the locally stable ones, whereas
for substitutable products, asymmetric networks appear in the set of stable networks.
This confirms the intuition that complementary products trigger joint customers,
whereas substitutable products rather lead to exclusiveness.
Looking at Figure 5.6 there is a striking similarity between the shape of stability
regions depicted in Figure 5.3 for n customers in comparison to the corresponding
regions displayed for three customers. Qualitatively there is no diﬀerence when
comparing the regions for the complete network, the network with only one firm
being linked to all customers, or a proper dispersion of exclusive customers. For
the latter, compare the networks (n2 , 0,
n
2 ) and (2, 0, 1)/(1, 0, 2). We may therefore
conclude that the basic insights in stability of customer relationship networks seem
to be already observable in the n = 3 case. Comparing the diﬀerent graphs in
Figure 5.6, we observe that the regions of stability may overlap or be adjacent for
diﬀerent networks. As a consequence, for fixed costs of link formation and a fixed
degree of substitutability, there might be more than one locally stable network.
However, even if in some cases the regions of local stability intersect, we also observe
that there exist cases in which they are directly adjacent. The next proposition in
particular establishes that at least one locally stable network always exists.
Proposition 5.7. Consider networks (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ N3. For all combinations of
degrees of substitutability γ ∈ [−1, 1] and all costs of link formation c ≥ 0 there
exists at least one locally stable network. More precisely, if we consider substitutable
products with γ ∈ (0, 1] and order the networks by increasing costs of link formation,
then the regions of local stability of the networks (0, 3, 0), (1, 2, 0) / (0, 2, 1), (1, 1, 1),
(1, 0, 2) / (2, 0, 1) and (0, 0, 0) are directly adjacent. For complementary products
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(i) (2, 1, 0), (0, 1, 2)
Figure 5.6: Regions of stability for networks with three customers (a− k = 1)
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with γ ∈ [−1, 0) or independent products with γ = 0 either the network (0, 3, 0), the
network (0, 0, 0) or both are locally stable.
Figure 5.7 illustrates the stability regions of the networks from Proposition 5.7.
(0, 0, 0)
(1, 0, 2)/ (2, 0, 1)
(1, 1, 1)
(1, 2, 0)/ (0, 2, 1)(0, 3, 0)
(0, 0, 0)
(0, 3, 0)
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
−1 −0.75 −0.50 −0.25 0 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
γ
c
Figure 5.7: Existence of locally stable networks for n = 3 (a− k = 1)
Note that the stability region of the networks (1, 2, 0) and (0, 2, 1) in Figure 5.7 also
Figure 5.6g is hardly visible. However, in the proof of Proposition 5.7, we establish
that it is indeed located between the stability region of the networks (0, 3, 0) and
(1, 1, 1). To see the adjacency result, first consider substitutable products with
γ ∈ (0, 1] in Figure 5.7. At very low costs of link formation c, the network (0, 3, 0)
is locally stable. Then, when the costs of link formation increase, first all links to
joint customers are successively deleted going from (0, 3, 0) to (1, 2, 0) / (0, 2, 1), then
to (1, 1, 1), and finally to (1, 0, 2) / (2, 0, 1). One may think of firms alternatingly
deleting links to joint customers. Finally, for relatively high costs of link formation,
also the links to exclusive customers are deleted, ending up with the empty network
(0, 0, 0). In contrast, for complementary or independent products with γ ∈ [−1, 0],
as indicated in Figure 5.7, the empty and the complete network already suﬃce to
find a locally stable network for any (γ, c). At intermediate costs of link formation
even both of them are locally stable. We add a final remark on the shape of the
local stability regions in Figures 5.6 and 5.7 to close our discussion on local stability.
When looking at lower and upper bounds, the profits in two networks (the stable
one and a deviation network) are considered. However, one should not fail not
recall that with a change of the structure of exclusive and joint customers, the
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environment for competition among firms may completely change. Intuitively, such
changes take more eﬀect, the more complementary the products are. We use this
as an explanation for the fact that the functions describing lower and upper bounds
are not monotonic, especially for γ suﬃciently close to −1. Lastly, we briefly recall
the results from Proposition 5.4 on the second notion of stability. From Figure 5.5
we readily identify the partitions from both firms induced by iterated feasible local
deviations. The proof of Proposition 5.4 (iii) indeed gives a counter example with
n = 3 showing that for a range of complementary products that the network (1, 1, 1)
is locally but not Nash stable as there is an incentive to deviate to the network
(0, 2, 0). This can also be observed in Figure 5.6. However, by Proposition 5.4 (i)
we also know that the networks (0, 3, 0), (0, 0, 3) / (3, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 0) are Nash
stable if and only if they are locally stable.
5.5 Conclusion
Interpreting links to customers as relationships that enable trade to sell a product,
we analyzed the stability of networks where two firms strategically form costly links
to customers. Given a network of customer relationships (ne1, n
j, ne2) ∈ N3+ with n
customers and ne1 + n
j + ne2 ≤ n, we determined the equilibrium prices and quan-
tities for quantity competition between two firms. We identified a lower bound on
the products’ substitutability that is needed to ensure interior solutions in equilib-
rium and holds for all networks with n ≥ 3 customers (Proposition 5.1 and also
Proposition 5.5). Furthermore, we observed that the substitutability of the firms’
products, γ, and the costs of link formation, c, influence the firms’ equilibrium prof-
its and, thus, have an impact on the incentives to strategically form relationships to
customers. To analyze these incentives we introduced a notion of local and of Nash
stability to identify for a given network of customer relationships regions of (γ, c), in
which the given network is stable. In the general case with an arbitrary number of
customers, we determined the stability regions for selected networks and presented
the limit regions of stability when n goes to infinity (Proposition 5.2). It turned
out that the shape of the stability regions does not significantly change compared
to a setting with relatively small n. This implies that already for small n we obtain
a good picture of the general scenario. For the existence of locally stable networks
with n customers we showed that for complementary or independent products ei-
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ther the empty, the complete or both networks are locally stable, which is not true
for substitutable products (Proposition 5.3). In addition, for selected networks we
established that the stability regions for Nash and local stability indeed coincide
(Proposition 5.4). Thus, allowing for the addition or deletion of several links does
not influence the stability. For networks of customer relationships with three cus-
tomers, we observed that there is a tendency to have symmetric networks among
the locally stable ones for complementary products, whereas rather asymmetric net-
works are stable for substitutable products (Proposition 5.6). Moreover, a locally
stable network always exists (Proposition 5.7). In sum, the novelty of our model
compared to the existing literature is that instead of an indivisible good being ex-
changed along a link, it is possible to sell perfectly divisible goods and the division
of surplus between buyer and seller depends on equilibrium prices and quantities.
We close with two implications that should be mentioned. From a managerial per-
spective, the successful sales manager of a company should carefully observe these
parameters when deciding on which customers should be acquired next. One might
either go for exclusive or joint (i.e., shared) customers or even build up a specific
mixture of both customer types or stop acquiring new customers if the acquisition
costs are becoming too high. Given a network of customer relationships and a spe-
cific degree of substitutability, we will be able to provide conclusions regarding the
optimal behavior of the firms and the stability of the network. From a market de-
sign perspective, influencing link costs (e.g., through legal restrictions) ultimately
has an eﬀect on the network structure in the market. If one, for instance, thinks of
the market as organized on a centralized (Internet) platform, link costs and, hence,
stable trade relations can be influenced by the platform owner. As we found out,
this will in particular be true, when products are well substitutable.
5.A Appendix A: Proofs
5.A.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1
Proof: For n = 3 there does not exist a network of customer relationships with
nj > 0 and ne2 > n
e
1 > 0 or n
e
1 > n
e
2 > 0 and, hence, condition (5.4) is vacuously
satisfied. Therefore, we have to consider networks with n ≥ 4 customers to see when
condition (5.4) may be violated.
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Consider a network (ne1, n
j , ne2) with n ≥ 4, nj > 0 and ne2 > ne1 > 0, i.e., i = 1 in
condition (5.4). A necessary condition to find a network such that condition (5.4)
does not hold is a negative coeﬃcient in front of ne2, which is
(1 + γ)
[
(2− γ)
(
ne1 + n
j
)
− γne1
]
− γ2nj = 2
(
1− γ2
) (
ne1 + n
j
)
+ γnj < 0.
Then, if there exists an ne2 large enough in comparison to n
e
1 and n
j , condition (5.4)
no longer holds. However, the coeﬃcient in front of ne2 in condition (5.4) is always
positive for γ > −
√
16(ne1+nj)
2
+(nj)2−nj
4(ne1+nj)
which is bounded above for any ne1 and n
j by
−
√
16 (ne1 + nj)
2 + (nj)2 − nj
4 (ne1 + nj)
−
√
16 (ne1 + nj)
2 − (nj + ne1)
4 (ne1 + nj)
= −3
4
.
This means for γ ≥ −34 that there does not exist a network with n ≥ 4 that violates
condition (5.4). Note that, however, this bound is not tight. We obtain for networks
with n ≥ 4 and ne1 > ne2 > 0 for condition (5.4) an analogous bound depending on
ne2 and n
j.
Suppose now n is fixed. Consider again networks with nj > 0 and ne2 > n
e
1 > 0 or
ne1 > n
e
2 > 0, i.e., i = 1 in condition (5.4). Let γ
(ne1,nj ,ne2) denote the value for γ
when condition (5.4) is satisfied with equality (for i = 1). To find the network over
all networks with at most n customers, which imposes the maximal lower bound on
γ, we choose ne1 = 1 and n
j as large as possible as
∂
⎛⎝−
√
16(ne1+nj)
2
+(nj)2−nj
4(ne1+nj)
⎞⎠
∂ne1
= −
nj
(√
16 (ne1 + nj)
2 + (nj)2 − nj
)
4 (ne1 + nj)
2
√
16 (ne1 + nj)
2 + (nj)2
≤ 0,
∂
⎛⎝−
√
16(ne1+nj)
2
+(nj)2−nj
4(ne1+nj)
⎞⎠
∂nj
=
ne1
(√
16 (ne1 + nj)
2 + (nj)2 − nj
)
4 (ne1 + nj)
2
√
16 (ne1 + nj)
2 + (nj)2
≥ 0.
As we consider now networks with at most n customers, this observation implies that
there is a tradeoﬀ between choosing nj and ne2 large enough for finding the network
that yields the lower bound for γ. This implies that the network that puts the lower
bound on γ is of the form (ne1, n
j, ne2) = (1, n− ne2 − 1, ne2) with 2 ≤ ne2 ≤ n− 2. For
symmetry reasons this holds analogously for i = 2 and ne1 > n
e
2 > 0 with networks
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of the form (ne1, n
j, ne2) = (n
e
1, n− ne1 − 1, 1) with 2 ≤ ne1 ≤ n− 2. Therefore,
γnmin = max
{
max
2≤ne
2
≤n−2 γ
(1,n−ne2−1,ne2), max
2≤ne
1
≤n−2 γ
(ne1,n−ne1−1,1)
}
= max
2≤ne
1
≤n−2−
√
16 (n− 1)2 + (n− ne1 − 1)2 − (n− ne1 − 1)
4 (n− 1) . !
5.A.2 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Suppose γ ∈
[
−34 , 1
]
. The profits needed for the proof can be found in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Equilibrium profits for networks with n customers
(
ne1, n
j , ne2
)
π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
1 π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
2
(0, n, 0) (a−k)
2n
(2+γ)2
(a−k)2n
(2+γ)2
(0, n− 1, 1) (a−k)2n2(2−γ)2(n−1)
(4n−(n+1)γ2)2
(a−k)2n(2n−(n−1)γ−γ2)2
(4n−(n+1)γ2)2
(0, 1, n − 1) (a−k)2n2(2−γ)2
(4n−(2n−1)γ2)2
(a−k)2n(2n−γ−(n−1)γ2)2
(4n−(2n−1)γ2)2
(0, 2, n − 2) (a−k)2n2(2−γ)2
2(2n−(n−1)γ2)2
(a−k)2n(2n−2γ−(n−2)γ2)2
4(2n−(n−1)γ2)2
(0, 1, n − 2) (a−k)2(2−γ)2(n−1)2
(4(n−1)−(2n−3)γ2)2
(a−k)2(2−γ)2(n−1)(2(n−1)−γ−(n−2)γ2)
(4(n−1)−(2n−3)γ2)2(n
2 , 0,
n
2
) (a−k)2n
8
(a−k)2n
8(n
2 , 1,
n
2 − 1
) (a−k)2n2(n+2)(2+n−γ−(n−1)γ2)2
8(n(n+2)−(n−1)(n+1)γ2)2
(a−k)2n(n(n+2)−(n+2)γ−(n−2)(n+1)γ2)2
8(n(n+2)−(n−1)(n+1)γ2)2(n
2 − 1, 0, n2
) (a−k)2(n−2)
8
(a−k)2n
8
(0, 0, n) 0 (a−k)
2n
4
(0, 0, n − 1) 0 (a−k)2(n−1)4
(0, 0, 0) 0 0
Proof: (i) Because of symmetry we just consider within this proof deviations
of firm 1. From a local perspective, possible deviations from the complete
network (0, n, 0) are if firm 1 deletes a link to a joint customer yielding to
the network (0, n− 1, 1). For local stability we require π(0,n,0)1 − c ≥ π(0,n−1,1)1 .
Using the profits from Table 5.1 we obtain
c ≤ π(0,n,0)1 − π(0,n−1,1)1 = (a− k)
2 n (16n (1− γ2) + (3n+ 1) γ4)
(2 + γ)2 (4n− (n+ 1) γ2)2 . (5.12)
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For the convergence we use L’Hôpital’s rule. First note that for γ ∈ [−1, 1] we
have
lim
n→∞ (a− k)
2 n
(
16n
(
1− γ2
)
+ (3n+ 1) γ4
)
=∞,
lim
n→∞ (a− k)
2
(
32n
(
1− γ2
)
+ 6nγ4 + γ4
)
=∞,
lim
n→∞ (2 + γ)
2
(
4n− (n+ 1) γ2
)2
=∞,
lim
n→∞ 2 (2 + γ)
2
(
4n− (n + 1) γ2
) (
4− γ2
)
=∞.
Therefore, applying L’Hôpital’s rule twice yields
lim
n→∞
(a− k)2 n (16n (1− γ2) + (3n+ 1) γ4)
(2 + γ)2 (4n− (n + 1) γ2)2 =
(a− k)2 (4− 3γ2)
(2− γ) (2 + γ)3 .
(ii) Consider the empty network with (0, 0, 0). Possible local deviations from the
empty network are if firm 1 forms a link yielding (1, 0, 0) (see Figure 5.5).
In this case, profits raise from zero to (a−k)
2
4 (as computed in Table 5.1).
Therefore, if and only if the costs of link formation are c ≥ (a−k)24 , then the
empty network with (0, 0, 0) is locally stable.
(iii) Consider now the network (0, 0, n). The possible deviations are for firm 1 to
form a link to an exclusive customer of firm 2 yielding the network (0, 1, n−1).
The only possible deviation for firm 2 is to delete a link to an own exclusive
customer yielding the network (0, 0, n− 1). Therefore, we require
π(0,0,n)1 ≥ π(0,1,n−1)1 − c, π(0,0,n)2 − c ≥ π(0,0,n−1)2 . (5.13)
Using the profits from Table 5.1 this is equivalent to requiring from the first
inequality in (5.13) c ≥ (a−k)2n2(2−γ)2
(4n−(2n−1)γ2)2 and from the second inequality in (5.13)
c ≤ (a−k)24 . Thus, we have found an upper and a lower bound for the costs of
link formation such that the networks (0, 0, n) an (n, 0, 0) are locally stable. For
the convergence we use again L’Hôpital’s rule. First note that for γ ∈ [−1, 1]
we have
lim
n→∞ (a− k)
2 n2 (2− γ)2 =∞, lim
n→∞ 2 (a− k)
2 n (2− γ)2 =∞,
lim
n→∞
(
4n− (2n− 1) γ2
)2
=∞, lim
n→∞ 4
(
4n− (2n− 1) γ2
) (
2− γ2
)
=∞.
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Therefore, applying L’Hôpital’s rule twice yields
lim
n→∞
(a− k)2 n2 (2− γ)2
(4n− (2n− 1) γ2)2 =
(a− k)2 (2− γ)2
4 (2− γ2)2 .
(iv) Because of symmetry we just consider within this proof deviations of firm 1.
From a local perspective, possible deviations from the (n2 , 0,
n
2 ) are if firm 1
forms a link to an exclusive customer of firm 2 yielding (n2 , 1,
n
2 − 1) or deletes
a link to an own exclusive customer yielding to the network (n2 − 1, 0, n2 ). For
local stability we require
π
(n2 ,0,
n
2 )
1 ≥ π(
n
2
,1,n
2
−1)
1 − c, π(
n
2
,0,n
2 )
1 − c ≥ π(
n
2
−1,0,n
2 )
1 (5.14)
Using the profits from Table 5.1 this is equivalent to requiring from the first
inequality in (5.14)
c ≥ (a− k)
2 n2 (n+ 2) (2 + n− γ − (n− 1) γ2)2
8 (n (n+ 2)− (n− 1) (n+ 1) γ2)2 −
(a− k)2 n
8
and from the second inequality in (5.14) c ≤ (a−k)24 . Thus, we have found an
upper and a lower bound for the costs of link formation such that the network
(n2 , 0,
n
2 ) is locally stable. For the convergence we use again L’Hôpital’s rule.
First note that for γ ∈ [−1, 1] the numerator of the lower bound is a polynomial
in n with non-negative coeﬃcients given by
(a− k)2 n
(
2 (1 + γ) (1− γ)2 n3 + (1− γ)
(
8− γ2 + γ3
)
n2
+2
(
4− 4γ + 3γ2 − 2γ3 + γ4
)
n− γ4
)
and, analogously, the denominator is also a polynomial in n with non-negative
coeﬃcients given by
8
((
1− γ2
)2
n4 + 4
(
1− γ2
)
n3 + 2
(
2− γ2
) (
1 + γ2
)
n2 + 4γ2n+ γ4
)
.
Hence, for n→∞ the numerator as well as its first three derivatives, and also
the denominator as well as its first three derivatives, tend to ∞. Applying
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L’Hôpital’s rule four times yields
lim
n→∞
(a− k)2 n2 (n+ 2) (2 + n− γ − (n− 1) γ2)2
8 (n (n+ 2)− (n− 1) (n+ 1) γ2)2 −
(a− k)2 n
8
= lim
n→∞
(a− k)2
4 (1 + γ)
.
(v) For the network (0, 1, n− 1) to be locally stable we need to have that firm 1
is not willing to form a link to an exclusive customer of firm 2. Moreover,
firm 2 should not have an incentive to delete a link to neither a joint nor to
an exclusive customer. This requires
π(0,1,n−1)1 ≥ π(0,2,n−2)1 − c, (5.15)
π(0,1,n−1)2 − c ≥ π(1,0,n−1)2 , π(0,1,n−1)2 − c ≥ π(0,1,n−2)2 . (5.16)
Inequality (5.15) gives us a lower bound for the costs of link formation and
the inequalities in (5.16) define an upper bound. We use this conditions to
establish a contradiction between the requirements needed for local stability.
More precisely, we show that for all γ ̸= 0 one of the upper bounds always
exceeds the lower bound for the costs of link formation. We obtain
π(0,2,n−2)1 − π(0,1,n−1)1 =
(a− k)2 n2 (2− γ)2
(
2 (2− γ2)2 n2 − γ4
)
2 (2n− (n− 1) γ2)2 (4n− (2n− 1) γ2)2 , (5.17)
π(0,1,n−1)2 − π(1,0,n−1)2 =
(a− k)2 n (2n− γ − (n− 1) γ2)2
(4n− (2n− 1) γ2)2 −
(a− k)2 (n− 1)
4
,
(5.18)
π(0,1,n−1)2 − π(0,1,n−2)2 (5.19)
=
(a− k)2 n (2n− γ − (n− 1) γ2)2
(4n− (2n− 1) γ2)2 (5.20)
− (a− k)
2 (2− γ)2 (n− 1) (2 (n− 1)− γ − (n− 2) γ2)
(4 (n− 1)− (2n− 3) γ2)2 .
First note that the lower bound on the costs of link formation in equation (5.17)
is increasing in n whereas the upper bounds in equations (5.18) and (5.21) are
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decreasing in n as
∂
[
π(0,2,n−2)1 − π(0,1,n−1)1
]
∂n
=
(a− k)2 n (2− γ)2
(
6 (2− γ2)3 n3 + 6γ2 (2− γ2)3 n2 − γ6
)
2 (2n− (n− 1) γ2)3 (4n− (2n− 1) γ2)3 ≥ 0
and
∂π(0,1,n−1)2
∂n
=
(a− k)2 (γ + (n− 1) γ2 − 2n) (2 (2− γ2)2 n2 − γ (2 + γ) (2− γ2)n)
(4n− (2n− 1) γ2)3
+
(a− k)2 (γ + (n− 1) γ2 − 2n) γ3 (1− γ)
(4n− (2n− 1) γ2)3
≤ 0.
Thus, it suﬃces to consider small n to establish instability. For n = 3 we have
π(0,2,1)1 − π(0,1,2)1 = 9 (a− k)
2 (2− γ)2 (72− 72γ2 + 17γ4)
8 (3− γ2)2 (12− 5γ2)2 , (5.21)
π(0,1,2)2 − π(1,0,2)2 = (a− k)
2 (72− 72γ − 18γ2 + 24γ3 − γ4)
2 (12− 5γ2)2 ,
π(0,1,2)2 − π(0,1,1)2 =
(a− k)2 (2304− 3744γ2 + 2284γ4 − 20γ5 − 607γ6 + 8γ7 + 58γ8)
(12− 5γ2)2 (8− 3γ2)2 ,(
π(0,1,2)2 − π(1,0,2)2
)
−
(
π(0,2,1)1 − π(0,1,2)1
)
=
− γ
2 (a− k)2 (432− 720γ2 + 252γ3 + 201γ4 − 96γ5 + 4γ6)
8 (3− γ2)2 (12− 5γ2)2 ,(
π(0,1,2)2 − π(0,1,1)2
)
−
(
π(0,2,1)1 − π(0,1,2)1
)
=
γ (a− k)2 (165888− 131328γ − 290304γ2 + 248256γ3)
8 (3− γ2)2 (8− 3γ2)2
+
γ (a− k)2 (185472γ4 − 177312γ5 − 51168γ6 + 59252γ7)
8 (3− γ2)2 (8− 3γ2)2
+
γ (a− k)2 (4964γ8 − 9017γ9 + 64γ10 + 464γ11)
8 (3− γ2)2 (8− 3γ2)2 .
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Note that the polynomial in the numerator of the first equation does not
possess a zero for γ ∈ (0, 1] and is strictly positive for γ = 1.
Hence, the first equation is strictly negative for γ ∈ (0, 1]. The second equation
is strictly negative for γ ∈ [−1, 0). Thus, for complementary as well as for
substitutable products there is always one lower bound imposed on the costs
of link formation that exceeds an upper bound. This means that the network
(0, 1, 2) is locally unstable for all γ ̸= 0. Also considering γ = 0 and inspecting
the conditions we observe local instability for c ̸= (a−k)24 .
(vi) The networks (ne1, n
j , ne2) ∈ Nn with nj = 0 and 0 < ne1 + ne2 < n are locally
unstable for c ̸= (a−k)24 , as there is always a profitable deviation of one firm to
either add or delete a link to an exclusive customer. Therefore, they may only
be locally stable for very specific costs, i.e., c = (a−k)
2
4 (for all γ ∈ [−1, 1]).
(vii) For γ = 0 the profits of the intermediaries reduce to
π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
1 =
(ne1 + n
j) (a− k)2
4
, π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
2 =
(nj + ne2) (a− k)2
4
.
Therefore, for c = (a−k)
2
4 both intermediaries are indiﬀerent between deleting
and adding links. !
5.A.3 Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof: We show that there is an overlap of the local stability regions of the complete
network (0, n, 0) and the empty network (0, 0, 0). First note that the stability region
for the network (0, n, 0) shrinks as n grows. This is taking c(0,n,0) from equation (5.12)
and
∂c(0,n,0)
∂n
=
∂
[
(a−k)2n(16n(1−γ2)+(3n+1)γ4)
(2+γ)2(4n−(n+1)γ2)2
]
∂n
=
(a− k)2 γ2 (−32n+ 28γ2n− γ4 (5n+ 1))
(2 + γ)2 (4n− (n+ 1) γ3)3 ≤ 0
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(for n ≥ 1). We investigate the diﬀerence of the limit of c(0,n,0) and c(0,0,0)
lim
n→∞ c
(0,n,0) − c(0,0,0) = γ (a− k)
2 (−16− 12γ + 4γ2 + γ3)
4 (2− γ) (2 + γ)3 ≥ 0 for γ ∈ [−1, 0].
This implies that there is an overlap between the stability regions of the networks
(0, n, 0) and (0, 0, 0) for complementary or independent products. Note that for
substitutable products the above inequality shows that the regions are not even
directly adjacent. !
5.A.4 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Suppose γ ∈ [γnmin, 1]. The profits needed for the proof can be found in Table 5.2.
Table 5.2: Equilibrium profits for networks with n customers
(
ne1, n
j , ne2
)
π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
1 π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
2
(0, n − ne2, ne2) (a−k)
2n2(2−γ)2(n−ne2)
(4n−γ2(n+ne2))
2
(a−k)2n(n(2−γ)+ne2γ(1−γ))
2
(4n−γ2(n+ne2))
2(
0, nj , n− nj) (a−k)2n2(2−γ)2nj
(4n−γ2(2n−nj))2
(a−k)2n(n(2−γ)+(n−nj)γ(1−γ))2
(4n−γ2(2n−nj))2
Proof: (i) Consider the complete network with (0, n, 0). For the Nash stability,
we compare the according profits with those of a network (0, n− ne2, ne2) in
which ne2 links have been deleted by firm 1. These are all the networks in
Πn
e
1(n) The network (0, n, 0) is Nash stable if none of the firms is willing
to delete a link. This requires for firm 1 π(0,n,0)1 − π(0,n−n
e
2
,ne
2)
1 ≥ ne2c for all
0 < ne2 ≤ n.
Using the profits from Table 5.2 we obtain for
π(0,n,0)1 − π(
0,n−ne
2
,ne
2)
1
ne2
=
(a− k)2 n ((4− γ2) (4− 3γ2)n+ γ4ne2)
(2 + γ)2 (4n− γ2 (n+ ne2))2
Philipp Möhlmeier Externalities in Social and Economic Networks
Chapter 5. Stability of customer relationship networks 152
and observe that this diﬀerence is increasing in ne2 by noting that
∂
[
(a− k)2 n ((4− γ2) (4− 3γ2)n + γ4ne2)
]
∂ne2
= (a− k)2 nγ4 ≥ 0
∂
[
ne2 (2 + γ)
2 (4n− γ2 (n + ne2))2
]
∂ne2
= −2γ2 (2 + γ)2
(
4n− γ2 (n+ ne2)
)
≤ 0
and applying the quotient rule. Thus, for the Nash stability region we require
for firm 1
min
0<ne
2
≤n
π(0,n,0)1 − π(
0,n−ne
2
,ne
2)
1
ne2
≥ c.
Using the observation that this diﬀerence is increasing in ne2 this minimum is
attained at ne2 = 1. This means the network that defines the Nash stability
region for the network (0, n, 0) considering deviations of firm 1 is the the
directly neighboring network (0, n− 1, 1). Thus, by symmetry of the firms for
the network (0, n, 0) the stability regions for local and Nash stability coincide.
Consider the empty network with (0, 0, 0). There is no incentive of firm 1 to
add further links if π(0,0,0)1 − π(n
e
1
,0,0)
1 ≥ −ne1c. We obtain for
π(0,0,0)1 − π(
ne
1
,0,0)
1
ne1
=
0− (a− k)2 ne1
−4ne1
=
(a− k)2
4
.
which implies for the Nash stability region considering deviations of firm 1
c ≥ (a−k)24 . This means that the change of marginal profits is constant between
all networks in Πn
e
1(0). Thus, by symmetry of the firms for the network (0, 0, 0)
the stability regions for local and Nash stability coincide.
Consider the network with (0, 0, n). This network is asymmetric. Therefore,
we have consider the conditions imposed on Nash stability separately for both
firms. Firm 1 may add links to customers of firm 2. This is we have to establish
for the Nash stability of the network (0, 0, n) considering deviations of firm 1
π
(0,nj ,n−nj)
1 − π(0,0,n)1 ≤ njc for all 0 < nj ≤ n. We look at
π
(0,nj ,n−nj)
1 − π(0,0,n)1
nj
=
(a− k)2 n2 (2− γ)2 nj
nj (4n− γ2 (2n− nj))2 =
(a− k)2 n2 (2− γ)2
(4n− γ2 (2n− nj))2
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and observe that this diﬀerence is decreasing in nj by noting that
∂
[
(a−k)2n2(2−γ)2
(4n−γ2(2n−nj))2
]
∂nj
= −2γ
2 (a− k)2 n2 (2− γ)2
(4n− γ2 (2n− nj))3 ≤ 0.
For the Nash stability region we require for firm 1
max
0<nj≤n
π
(0,nj ,n−nj)
1 − π(0,0,n)1
nj
≤ c
and this maximum is attained at nj = 1, which is the network (0, 1, n− 1).
Firm 2 already has n links in the network (0, 0, n). Therefore, firm 2 may
only delete links. As already observed the change of marginal profits is con-
stant between all networks in Πn
j
(0), we require for the Nash stability for the
network (0, 0, n) for firm 2 c ≤ (a−k)24 .
Summing up the Nash stability region for the network (0, 0, n) is determined
by deviations to the directly adjacent networks (0, 1, n− 1) for firm 1 and
(0, 0, n− 1) for firm 2. Thus, for the networks (0, 0, n) and (n, 0, 0) local and
Nash stability coincide.
(ii) For γ = 0 and c = (a−k)
2
4 we have already established in Proposition 5.2 (vii)
that the firms are indiﬀerent between adding and deleting links and it is
straightforward to see that all networks are Nash stable.
(iii) Consider the network (ne1, n
j , ne2) = (1, 1, 1) and γ ∈ (−1, 0). For local stability
we require
c ∈
[
(a− k)2 (576 + 288γ − 660γ2 − 264γ3 + 184γ4 + 52γ5 − 5γ6)
16 (3− γ2)2 (4 + 3γ)2 ,
2 (a− k)2 (2− γ2) (64 + 96γ + 12γ2 − 36γ3 − 9γ4)
(4 + 3γ)2 (8− 3γ2)2
]
.
The diﬀerence between the upper and lower bound is equal to (a− k)2 γ mul-
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tiplied by
36864 + 33792γ − 54528γ2 − 45504γ3 + 30176γ4
16 (3− γ2)2 (4 + 3γ)2 (8− 3γ2)2
+
22164γ5 − 7416γ6 − 4584γ7 + 684γ8 + 333γ9
16 (3− γ2)2 (4 + 3γ)2 (8− 3γ2)2
and has just one zero for γ ∈ (−1, 0) at γ ≈ −0.95. Noting that for γ = −1 this
expression is positive, we know that the network (1, 1, 1) is locally stable for
γ ∈ [−1, 0.95]. This can also be seen directly looking at Figure 5.6c. However,
the network (1, 1, 1) is not Nash stable for γ ∈ (−1, 0.95] as
π(1,1,1)1 − π(0,2,0)1 =
2 (a− k)2 (2 + γ)2
(4 + 3γ)2
− 2 (a− k)
2
(2 + γ)2
=
2γ (a− k)2 (1 + γ) (8 + 7γ + γ2)
(4 + 3γ)2 (2 + γ)2
< 0
for γ ∈ (−1, 0) and firm 1 has an incentive to first delete a link to an exclusive
customer and then to establish a link to a customer of firm 2 yielding the
network (0, 2, 0). !
5.A.5 Proof of Proposition 5.5
Proof: Among the directly neighboring networks of (0, n, 0), (0, 0, 0), (n, 0, 0) and
(0, 0, n), there is no network in which condition (5.4) is not satisfied. Therefore, we
may immediately consider γ ∈ [−1, 1]. However, for the network
(
n
2 , 0,
n
2
)
, the two
neighboring networks
(
n
2 , 1,
n
2 − 1
)
and
(
n
2 − 1, 1, n2
)
may violate condition (5.4).
For the two networks
(
n
2 , 1,
n
2 − 1
)
and
(
n
2 − 1, 1, n2
)
condition (5.4) reduces to
1
2
[
n (n+ 2 + γ)− γ2n (n+ 1) + 2γ
]
(5.22)
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with a zero for γ ∈ [−1, 1] of −
√
4n4+12n3+9n2+4n+4−n−2
2n(n+1) . We have that (5.22) is
increasing in n as
(n + 1) [(n+ 3 + γ)− γ2 (n+ 2)] + 2γ − [n (n + 2 + γ)− γ2n (n + 1) + 2γ]
2
=
(1 + γ) (2n (1− γ) + 3− 2γ)
2
≥ 0 for n ≥ 4 and γ ∈ [−1, 1].
Moreover, (5.22) as a function in γ is a parabola that opens downward with a
maximum at γ = n+22n(n+1) as
∂
[
1
2 [n (n+ 2 + γ)− γ2n (n+ 1) + 2γ]
]
∂γ
=
n− 2γn (n+ 1) + 2
2
,
∂2
[
1
2 [n (n+ 2 + γ)− γ2n (n+ 1) + 2γ]
]
∂γ2
= −n (n+ 1) < 0.
These two observations imply that the lower bound for γ over all networks with n ≥ 4
is at n = 4 for the networks (1, 1, 2) and (2, 1, 1) given by −
√
3
√
163−3
20 ≈ −0.96. !
5.A.6 Proof of Proposition 5.6
For this proof we use the lower and upper bounds that local stability imposes on
the costs of link formation.
Proof: (i) A symmetric network that is locally stable for appropriately chosen
costs of link formation is the network
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (1, 1, 1). For local stabil-
ity we require
π(1,1,1)1 ≥ π(1,2,0)1 − c, π(1,1,1)1 − c ≥ π(1,0,2)1 , π(1,1,1)1 − c ≥ π(0,1,1)1 .
Note that for symmetry reasons we just investigate deviations of firm 1. Thus,
for γ ∈ [0, 1] local stability imposes the costs of link formation
c ∈
[
(a− k)2 (576 + 288γ − 660γ2 − 264γ3 + 184γ4 + 52γ5 − 5γ6)
16 (3− γ2)2 (4 + 3γ)2 ,
(a− k)2 (16 + 8γ − γ2)
4 (4 + 3γ)2
]
.
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The diﬀerence between the upper and the lower bound imposed for local sta-
bility on the costs of link formation for γ ∈ [0, 1] is
(a− k)2 (16 + 8γ − γ2)
4 (4 + 3γ)2
− (a− k)
2 (576 + 288γ − 660γ2 − 264γ3 + 184γ4 + 52γ5 − 5γ6)
16 (3− γ2)2 (4 + 3γ)2
=
(a− k)2 γ2 (240 + 72γ − 96γ2 − 20γ3 + γ4)
16 (3− γ2)2 (4 + 3γ)2 ≥ 0.
For an asymmetric network consider
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (3, 0, 0). For local stability
we require
π(0,0,3)1 ≥ π(0,1,2)1 − c, π(0,0,3)2 − c ≥ π(0,0,2)2 .
Thus, local stability imposes the costs of link formation
c ∈
[
9 (a− k)2 (2− γ)2
(12− 5γ2)2 ,
(a− k)2
4
]
.
The diﬀerence between the upper and the lower bound imposed for local sta-
bility on the costs of link formation is
(a− k)2
4
− 9 (a− k)
2 (2− γ)2
(12− 5γ2)2 =
(a− k)2 γ (6− 5γ) (24− 6γ − 5γ2)
4 (12− 5γ2)2 ≥ 0
for γ ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) Suppose ne1 < n
e
2. Then, asymmetric networks are(
ne1, n
j , ne2
)
∈ {(0, 0, 1) , (0, 0, 2) , (0, 1, 1) , (0, 0, 3) , (0, 1, 2) , (0, 2, 1) , (1, 0, 2)} .
The networks (0, 0, 1) / (0, 0, 2) are always locally unstable for c ̸= (a−k)24 .
There is always a profitable deviation of firm 2 to either add or delete a
link to an exclusive customer. The local instability of the network (0, 1, 2)
for γ ̸= 0 and for γ = 0 and c ̸= (a−k)24 has already been established in Propo-
sition 5.2(v) for n customers. From (i) we immediately observe that for the
network (0, 0, 3) the interval for the conditions of local stability is empty for
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γ ∈ [−1, 0). For the network (0, 1, 1) to be locally stable we require for the
costs of link formation
c ≥ max
{
π(1,1,1)1 − π(0,1,1)1 , π(0,2,0)1 − π(0,1,1)1 , π(0,1,2)2 − π(0,1,1)2
}
,
c ≤ min
{
π(0,1,1)1 − π(0,0,2)1 , π(0,1,1)2 − π(0,1,0)2 , π(0,1,1)2 − π(1,0,1)2
}
.
However, these conditions imposed on the costs of link formation cannot hold
simultaneously for complementary products as
(
π(0,2,0)1 − π(0,1,1)1
)
−
(
π(0,1,1)2 − π(0,1,0)2
)
= −(a− k)
2 γ (64 + 24γ − 56γ2 − 13γ3 + 12γ4 + 2γ5)
(2 + γ)2 (8− 3γ2)2 > 0 for γ ∈ [−1, 0).
For the network (0, 2, 1) to be locally stable we require for the costs of link
formation
c ≥ π(0,3,0)1 − π(0,2,1)1 ,
c ≤ min
{
π(0,2,1)1 − π(0,1,2)1 , π(0,2,1)2 − π(1,1,1)2 , π(0,2,1)2 − π(0,2,0)2
}
.
However, these conditions imposed on the costs of link formation cannot hold
simultaneously for complementary products as
(
π(0,3,0)1 − π(0,2,1)1
)
−
(
π(0,2,1)2 − π(0,2,0)2
)
= −(a− k)
2 γ (144 + 60γ − 120γ2 − 26γ3 + 24γ4 + 3γ5)
16 (2 + γ)2 (3− γ2)2 > 0 for γ ∈ [−1, 0).
For the network (1, 0, 2) to be locally stable we require for the costs of link
formation
c ≥ max
{
π(1,1,1)1 − π(1,0,2)1 , π(0,1,2)2 − π(1,0,2)2
}
,
c ≤ min
{
π(1,0,2)1 − π(0,0,2)1 , π(1,0,2)2 − π(1,0,1)2
}
.
However, these conditions imposed on the costs of link formation cannot hold
simultaneously for complementary products as
(
π(1,1,1)1 − π(1,0,2)1
)
−
(
π(1,0,2)1 − π(0,0,2)1
)
= −(a− k)
2 γ (8 + 5γ)
2 (4 + 3γ)2
> 0
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for γ ∈ [−1, 0). Examples for the second claim are the networks (0, 2, 0) and
(0, 1, 0). !
5.A.7 Proof of Proposition 5.7
Proof: Table 5.3 summarizes the networks imposing conditions on the costs of
link formation. For complementary products this has already be shown in Proposi-
Table 5.3: Networks imposing conditions on the costs of link formation
networks defining(
ne1, n
j, ne2
)
c(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2) c(n
e
1
,nj ,ne
2)
(0,3,0) — (1, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1)
(1,1,1) (1, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1) (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1) (for γ ∈ [−1, 0]),
(2, 0, 1), (1, 0, 2) (for γ ∈ [0, 1])
(0, 2, 0) (1, 2, 0), (0, 2, 1) (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1)
(0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1) (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1)
(1,2,0) (0, 3, 0) (0, 2, 0) (for γ ∈ [−1, 0]),
(1, 1, 1) (for γ ∈ [0, 1])
(0,2,1) (0, 3, 0) (0, 2, 0) (for γ ∈ [−1, 0]),
(1, 1, 1) (for γ ∈ [0, 1])
(2,0,1) (1, 1, 1) (2, 0, 0), (1, 0, 1)
(1,0,2) (1, 1, 1) (0, 0, 2), (1, 0, 1)
(3, 0, 0) (2, 1, 0) (2, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 3) (0, 1, 2) (0, 0, 2)
(0,0,0) (1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1) —
tion 5.3. For substitutable products with γ ∈ (0, 1], the statement of Proposition 5.7
can be directly seen from Table 5.3. The according networks are marked in bold. The
non-emptiness of the adjacency regions can be seen in Figures 5.6a, 5.6c, 5.6g, 5.6h
and 5.6b. As the stability region in Figure 5.6g is hardly visible, Figure 5.8 redraws
the area for γ ∈ [0.9, 1]. !
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Figure 5.8: Local stability of (0, 2, 1) , (1, 2, 0) for γ ∈ [0.9, 1] (a− k = 1)
5.B Appendix B: Conditions on the costs of link
formation for local stability for networks with
three customers
5.B.1 Equilibrium profits
The equilibrium profits are summarized in Table 5.4. Indeed, from an individual
perspective and with no costs of link formation the complete network with three
joint customers yields the highest payoﬀ for firm 1 for complementary products,
whereas this is the network with three own exclusive customers for substitutable
products.
5.B.2 Symmetric networks
Because of symmetry we just consider within this subsection deviations of firm 1.
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (0, 3, 0)
For local stability we require π(0,3,0)1 −π(0,2,1)1 ≥ c. Using inequality (5.12) from
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Table 5.4: Equilibrium profits of firm 1 for networks with three customers
(
ne1, n
j, ne2
)
π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
1
(0, 3, 0) 3(a−k)
2
(2+γ)2
(1, 1, 1) 2(a−k)
2(2+γ)2
(4+3γ)2
(0, 2, 0) 2(a−k)
2
(2+γ)2
(0, 1, 0) (a−k)
2
(2+γ)2
(1, 2, 0)
3(a−k)2(6−2γ−γ2)2
16(3−γ2)2
(2, 1, 0) 3(a−k)
2(2+γ)2(3−2γ)2
(12−5γ2)2
(1, 1, 0)
2(a−k)2(4−γ−γ2)2
(8−3γ2)2
(0, 2, 1) 18(a−k)
2(2−γ)2
16(3−γ2)2
(0, 1, 2) 9(a−k)
2(2−γ)2
(12−5γ2)2
(0, 1, 1) 4(a−k)
2(2−γ)2
(8−3γ2)2
(
ne1, n
j , ne2
)
π
(ne1,nj ,ne2)
1
(1, 0, 1) (a−k)
2
4
(2, 0, 1) 2(a−k)
2
4
(1, 0, 2) (a−k)
2
4
(3, 0, 0) 3(a−k)
2
4
(2, 0, 0) 2(a−k)
2
4
(1, 0, 0) (a−k)
2
4
(0, 0, 3) 0
(0, 0, 2) 0
(0, 0, 1) 0
(0, 0, 0) 0
the poof of Proposition 5.2 we obtain
π(0,3,0)1 − π(0,2,1)1 = 3 (a− k)
2
(2 + γ)2
− 9 (a− k)
2 (2− γ2)2
8 (3− γ2)2
=
3 (a− k)2 (24 (1− γ2) + 5γ4)
8 (3− γ2)2 (2 + γ)2 .
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (0, 0, 0)
For local stability we require π(0,0,0)1 − π(1,0,0)1 ≥ c which is c ≥ (a−k)
2
4 .
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (1, 1, 1)
Firm 1 may add a link to an exclusive customer of firm 2 delete a link to a
joint customer or to an own exclusive customer. For local stability we require
π(1,1,1)1 ≥ π(1,2,0)1 − c, (5.23)
π(1,1,1)1 − c ≥ π(1,0,2)1 , π(1,1,1)1 − c ≥ π(0,1,1)1 . (5.24)
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Inequality (5.23) defines a lower bound for the costs of link formation
c ≥ (a− k)
2 (576 + 288γ − 660γ2 − 264γ3 + 184γ4 + 52γ5 − 5γ6)
16 (3− γ2)2 (4 + 3γ)2 ,
and the inequalities in (5.24) give an upper bound. First note
max
{
π(1,0,2)1 , π
(0,1,1)
1
}
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
4(a−k)2(2−γ)2
(8−3γ2)2 for γ ∈ [−1, 0],
(a−k)2
4 for γ ∈ [0, 1].
This implies
c ≤ π(1,1,1)1 −max
{
π(1,0,2)1 , π
(0,1,1)
1
}
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
2(a−k)2(2−γ2)(64+96γ+12γ2−36γ3−9γ4)
(4+3γ)2(8−3γ2)2 for γ ∈ [−1, 0],
(a−k)2(16+8γ−γ2)
4(4+3γ)2
for γ ∈ [0, 1].
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (0, 2, 0)
Firm 1 may add a link to obtain an exclusive customer or has the possibility
to delete a link to a joint customer. Thus, for local stability we require
π(0,2,0)1 ≥ π(1,2,0)1 − c, (5.25)
π(0,2,0)1 − c ≥ π(0,1,1)1 . (5.26)
Inequality (5.25) defines a lower bound for the costs of link formation
c ≥ (a− k)
2 (144 + 144γ − 84γ2 − 120γ3 + 4γ4 + 24γ5 + 3γ6)
16 (3− γ2)2 (2 + γ)2 ,
and inequality (5.26) gives an upper bound
c ≤ 2 (a− k)
2 (32− 32γ2 + 7γ4)
(2 + γ)2 (8− 3γ2)2 .
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (0, 1, 0)
Firm 1 may add a link to obtain an exclusive customer or firm 1 has the
possibility to delete a link to a joint customer. Thus, for local stability we
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require
π(0,1,0)1 ≥ π(1,1,0)1 − c, (5.27)
π(0,1,0)1 − c ≥ π(0,0,1)1 . (5.28)
Inequality (5.27) defines a lower bound for the costs of link formation
c ≥ (a− k)
2 (64 + 64γ − 40γ2 − 56γ3 + γ4 + 12γ5 + 2γ6)
(8− 3γ2)2 (2 + γ)2 ,
and inequality (5.28) gives an upper bound c ≤ (a−k)2
(2+γ)2
.
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
= (1, 0, 1)
For nj = 0 the profits from Figure 5.4 are linearly increasing if a link is added
by firm 1 and are linearly decreasing if a link is deleted. Therefore, if the costs
of link formation are suﬃciently small, c < (a−k)
2
4 , then a further link is added,
and for c > (a−k)
2
4 a link is deleted.
5.B.3 Asymmetric networks
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
∈ {(0, 0, 3) , (3, 0, 0)}
For local stability we require
π(0,0,3)1 ≥ π(0,1,2)1 − c, (5.29)
π(0,0,3)2 − c ≥ π(0,0,2)2 . (5.30)
From the poof of Proposition 5.2 we obtain c ≥ 9(a−k)2(2−γ)2
(12−5γ2)2 and from inequal-
ity (5.30) c ≤ (a−k)24 .
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
∈ {(0, 2, 1) , (1, 2, 0)}
Consider the network (0, 2, 1). Possible deviations are for firm 1 to add or
to delete link to a joint customer and for firm 2 to delete a link either to a
joint or to an exclusive customer. For local stability of the network (0, 2, 1)
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we therefore require for the costs of link formation
π(0,2,1)1 ≥ π(0,3,0)1 − c, (5.31)
π(0,2,1)1 − c ≥ π(0,1,2)1 , π(0,2,1)2 − c ≥ π(1,1,1)2 , π(0,2,1)2 − c ≥ π(0,2,0)2 . (5.32)
Inequality (5.31) poses an lower bound on the costs of link formation given by
c ≥ π(0,3,0)1 − π(0,2,1)1 = 3 (a− k)
2 (24− 24γ2 + 5γ4)
8 (3− γ2)2 (2 + γ)2 .
The inequalities in (5.32) give us a upper bound. Thus, for local stability of
(0, 2, 1) we need to have
c ≤ min
{
π(0,2,1)1 − π(0,1,2)1 , π(0,2,1)2 − π(1,1,1)2 , π(0,2,1)2 − π(0,2,0)2
}
=
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(a−k)2(144+144γ−84γ2−120γ3+4γ4+24γ5+3γ6)
16(3−γ2)2(2+γ)2 for γ ∈ [−1, 0],
(a−k)2(576+288γ−660γ2−264γ3+184γ4+52γ5−5γ6)
16(3−γ2)2(4+3γ)2 for γ ∈ [0, 1].
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
∈ {(1, 0, 2) , (2, 0, 1)}
Consider the network (1, 0, 2). Possible deviations are for firm 1 to add a link
to an exclusive customer of firm 2 or to delete a link to an own exclusive
customer. firm 2 has the analogous deviation possibilities. For local stability
of the network (1, 0, 2) we therefore require for the costs of link formation
π(1,0,2)1 ≥ π(1,1,1)1 − c, π(1,0,2)2 ≥ π(0,1,2)2 − c, (5.33)
π(1,0,2)1 − c ≥ π(0,0,2)1 , π(1,0,2)2 − c ≥ π(1,0,1)2 . (5.34)
The inequalities in (5.33) pose a lower bound on the costs of link formation
given by
c ≥ max
{
π(1,1,1)1 − π(1,0,2)1 , π(0,1,2)2 − π(1,0,2)2
}
=
(a− k)2 (16 + 8γ − γ2)
4 (4 + 3γ)2
.
The inequalities in (5.34) pose an upper bound on the costs of link formation
given by
c ≤ min
{
π(1,0,2)1 − π(0,0,2)1 , π(1,0,2)2 − π(1,0,1)2
}
=
(a− k)2
4
.
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•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
∈ {(0, 1, 1) , (1, 1, 0)}
Consider the network (0, 1, 1). Possible deviations are for firm 1 to add a link
to an own exclusive customer, or to an exclusive customer of firm 2, or to
delete a link to a joint customer. firm 2 may add a link to an own exclusive
customer or delete a link to either an own exclusive or a joint customer. For
local stability of the network (0, 1, 1) we therefore require for the costs of link
formation
π(0,1,1)1 ≥ π(1,1,1)1 − c, π(0,1,1)1 ≥ π(0,2,0)1 − c, π(0,1,1)2 ≥ π(0,1,2)2 − c, (5.35)
π(0,1,1)1 − c ≥ π(0,0,2)1 , π(0,1,1)2 − c ≥ π(0,1,0)2 , π(0,1,1)2 − c ≥ π(1,0,1)2 . (5.36)
The inequalities in (5.35) pose a lower bound on the costs of link formation
given by
c ≥ max
{
π(1,1,1)1 − π(0,1,1)1 , π(0,2,0)1 − π(0,1,1)1 , π(0,1,2)2 − π(0,1,1)2
}
.
The inequalities in (5.36) pose an upper bound on the costs of link formation
given by
c ≤ min
{
π(0,1,1)1 − π(0,0,2)1 , π(0,1,1)2 − π(0,1,0)2 , π(0,1,1)2 − π(1,0,1)2
}
.
In the proof of Proposition 5.6 we have already shown that the network (0, 1, 1)
is locally unstable for γ ∈ (0, 1]. We now show that it is also locally unstable
for γ ∈ (0, 1]. Figure 5.9 graphically shows these conditions imposed by local
stability on the costs of link formation.
To see this, consider
(
π(1,1,1)1 − π(0,1,1)1
)
−
(
π(0,1,1)1 − π(0,0,2)1
)
=
2 (a− k)2 γ (4− 3γ2) (32 + 12γ − 12γ2 − 3γ3)
(4 + 3γ)2 (8− 3γ2)2 > 0
for γ ∈ (0, 1]. This means that the conditions imposed on the costs of link
formation cannot hold simultaneously for substitutable products with γ ∈
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Figure 5.9: Conditions for local stability for (ne1, n
j, ne2) = (1, 1, 0) , (0, 1, 1) (a−k =
1)
(0, 1]. For γ = 0 we have
max
{
π(1,1,1)1 − π(0,1,1)1 , π(0,2,0)1 − π(0,1,1)1 , π(0,1,2)2 − π(0,1,1)2
}
=
(a− k)2
4
,
min
{
π(0,1,1)1 − π(0,0,2)1 , π(0,1,1)2 − π(0,1,0)2 , π(0,1,1)2 − π(1,0,1)2
}
=
(a− k)2
4
.
Therefore, the network (0, 1, 1) is locally stable for γ = 0 and c = (a−k)
2
4 .
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
∈ {(0, 1, 2) , (2, 1, 0)}
The local instability of the network (0, 1, 2) for γ ̸= 0 and for γ = 0 and
c ̸= (a−k)24 has already been established in Proposition 5.2(v) for n customers.
•
(
ne1,n
j,ne2
)
∈ {(2, 0, 0) , (0, 0, 2) , (1, 0, 0) , (0, 0, 1)}
These networks are locally unstable for c ̸= (a−k)24 , as there is always a prof-
itable deviation of one firm to either add or delete a link to an exclusive
customer.
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